IN 1995 the Northern Ireland Office appointed Maurice Hayes, the former Northern Ireland ombudsman, to examine the RUC complaints system with a view to recommending improvements.

The way citizen complaints, against the police are handled is, of course, a vital factor in the level of public confidence in, and support for, the force. There will always be situations where individual citizens are abused by one or more police officers. Similarly, it will sometimes happen that a section of the public will feel discriminated against and victimised by policing practices or, decisions taken at police management level

If such victims do not believe there is an effective mechanism allowing them to call the police to account, there is a danger that their frustration and bitterness will fester and manifest itself in alienation from the police and the state. Maurice Hayes's task was to consider what changes were necessary to ensure the RUC complaints system delivers the necessary accountability.

The scale of this task is reflected in the fact that in 1995 less than 1 per cent of complaints against the RUC resulted in any form of disciplinary action. Incredibly, that is the norm for the RUC. For example, out of 1,235 complaints from persons arrested under the emergency legislation between 1990 and 1992, none was upheld. This was despite the fact, that over £1 million in compensation was paid to complainants over roughly this period.

Not surprisingly, there is a widespread belief (reflected in recent public opinion surveys) that the exceptionally low success rate is the inevitable result of the current system being heavily skewed.

When a citizen makes a complaint against an RUC officer it will be investigated by an RUC colleague. Only if the complaint is serious will the investigation be supervised by an external body - the Independent Commission for Policed Complaints.

The question of formal disciplinary charges resulting from the investigation is primarily a matter for the Chief Constable. Where a charge is preferred, it will be heard before a tribunal which is normally composed of three RUC members.

It follows that despite the partial provision for independent input, the procedure from start to finish is substantially under RUC internal control.

Viewed against this background, the Hayes report can be viewed ash by far the most radical and clear thinking contribution of its kind to the vexed subject of police complaints since organised police forces first appeared in these islands 200 years ago.

Its proposals go to the heart of the problem - the need to convince the public that complaints will be dealt with thoroughly and fairly. The pivotal recommendation is the establishment of an independent ombudsman to replace the current multi member ICPC.

The impartiality and independence of the new ombudsman is underpinned by the stipulation that he or she should be a judge or senior barrister of 10 years standing. This "is a far cry from the current ICPC, whose members are appointed by the Secretary of State and who, therefore, suffer from the appearance of being "establishment" people, even if this is an unfair perception. The ombudsman model is new in these islands but precedents are to be found in major Canadian, US and Australian police forces.

A VITAL aspect of the ombudsman arrangement is that he or she will have a staff of independent investigators. The tradition in these islands has always been to entrust the actual investigation of complaints against the police to the police themselves.

Hayes recommends all complaints against the RUC should be investigated by the ombudsman's own independent investigators. This pragmatically recognises that the public will not have confidence in RUC personnel investigating themselves. Hayes also envisages a sort of "sale and leaseback" arrangement whereby the investigation of minor complaints can be restored to the RUC in the future if it manages to secure cross community confidence.

A valuable and overdue proposal will give the ombudsman a role in complaints which reflect on operational policies. Up to now the tradition has been to confine complaints mechanisms to the conduct of individual officers considered on a cased by case basis. Where these, individual complaints expose an underlying policy problem, it will come within the ombudsman's remit. This could have implications for controversial matters such as the policing of parades and public protests.

This combines with another distinctive proposal which merits attention - the ombudsman should be, cable to initiate an investigation's without having to wait to be called in. The current ICPC has highlighted its inability to do just that as a major factor inhibiting its success.

There are other proposals in the report which will play a significant role in enhancing public confidence in the complaints system. For example, the ombudsman, as opposed to the Chief Constable, will decide whether disciplinary charges should be preferred on the basis of an investigation report.

The focus on redress to the complainant as opposed to the punishment of the errant officer underscores, the system's accountability function.

Inevitably, there are gaps.

The most prominent concerns the failure to recommend a clear obligation on RUC personnel to co operate fully with an administrative investigation under the complaints system. This omission could prove important. Experience elsewhere suggests police officers can be unduly obstructive when confronted by non police investigators. The full benefits of independent investigation may be diminished, therefore, if some mechanism is not built into the system to offset this strategy.

Experience suggests the Northern Ireland Office will adopt a conservative and minimalist approach to proposed reforms in the sensitive area of policing. Certainly, in the present, political and security climate, ills difficult to envisage the NIO being prepared to adopt measures not backed by RUC management.

It is interesting, therefore, that both the Chief Constable and the Police Authority support the ombudsman idea and the former has welcomed the concept of independent investigation of complaints. Nevertheless, that still leaves much scope for a watering down of the substance of the Hayes report.

The prospect of it achieving a significant improvement in the accountability potential of the RUC complaints system still depends heavily on the NIO displaying a reforming zeal it is not noted for this. This is unfortunate because if the police complaints system cannot be reformed to boost cross community confidence in the RUC, there is little prospect of reforming in the force's composition, structure, function, ethos and image.

ALTHOUGH the Hayes report is concerned solely with the RUC complaints system, it also has implications for the Garda complaints system. Significantly, the Garda system is closely modelled on, albeit not identical to, that pertaining to the RUC. It follows that reforms which are considered necessary for the latter should be taken seriously by the former.

Admittedly, the Garda does not suffer from the level of distrust associated with the RUC. But widespread community support cannot be taken for granted. It depends very substantially on public confidence in an effective system for calling the Garda to account for any abuse of power.

Opinion among those solicitors and community groups who have regular direct experience with the operation of the complaints system suggests public confidence in it is low. The radical and very necessary reforms proposed in Hayes, therefore, should be taken very seriously not only by the NIO and the RUC, but also by the Department of Justice and the Garda.