Look, don't talk: how the Belfast Agreement was won

Trimble on Gerry Adams: Rather incredibly, David Trimble and the Ulster Unionists negotiated the Belfast Agreement without ever speaking to Gerry Adams or his colleagues in Sinn Féin.

Was it wise for him to have agreed the terms of any deal without first satisfying himself that the IRA cessation was genuine and that the peace process was not in fact a variation of the republican stratagem of "an armalite in one hand and a ballot paper in the other"?

"My view was that the republicans were coming into the political process not as a result of having had a Road-to-Damascus-type conversion, and a realisation that the violence was wrong and that they really ought to commit themselves to peaceful and democratic means. I did not think that we were dealing with people who had such a conversion. I thought that they were coming into the political process partly as a result of the pressure that was generated by the realisation that their campaign was failing and partly as a result of the attraction of possibly achieving things through politics. So I said that their position, the ceasefire and the movement into politics wasn't a matter of principle but was essentially driven by tactical considerations. That didn't however mean that you should therefore say, 'Oh, these people aren't genuine, so we will ignore them'. Because they were being driven by circumstances, it seemed to me that they could still continue to be driven, and it is my view looking back at it that I think the republican position has changed. It has changed significantly as a result of them being in the process. So by admitting them into the talks, I wasn't regarding them as being a party with whom I would have to negotiate in order to get agreement.

"I could see that an agreement could be obtained without having to negotiate with them because of the sufficient consensus rule that the talks were operating under. I was negotiating with the British, the Irish and the SDLP to get an agreement that would hopefully achieve my objectives but also at the same time lock the republicans further into the process and take them further down the process as well. As for our particular position of not actually speaking to them in the building and all the rest of it, there were tactical elements in that because we were having to manage our own party, as well as actually having to manage our own selves."

But did he not feel a bit ridiculous at times, not speaking? He promptly reminds me this was the least of his difficulties back then: "I found it very difficult at first to actually cope with them being in the room. I don't think we had any illusions about their character, and so having them in the room was a difficult thing, a very difficult thing, and even to engage in social pleasantries was not easy. You're dealing with people who you know have been responsible, if not personally for planting bombs and pulling triggers, of having directed a campaign which planted bombs and pulled triggers and resulted in hundreds, thousands of deaths having occurred. So that was a difficult thing to deal with, and one did not feel comfortable."

Yet, by September 2003, he finally felt able to shake hands with Adams. Where did the famous handshake take place? Trimble confirms it took place in the former first minister's office at Stormont. "It was when we were starting the September conversations which eventually led to the aborted sequence in October 2003.

"Way back in April of that year, after we'd reached the end of that round of unsuccessful talks, Adams and ourselves started to discuss how we might handle the problem of sectarian interfaces during the marching season and over the summer. It seems a little bit strange to go from trying to construct a sequence, failing because republicans haven't come up to the mark, and then having discussions about handling the problem of the interfaces. But we had a whole series of meetings which even got down at some point to talk about individual interfaces and brought people in from local communities. An example is Ardoyne, an area of North Belfast which is difficult, which had management problems for republicans. Reg Empey and Fred Cobain were there with me and Adams had come with a group of people from the Ardoyne. I think really the purpose of the meeting wasn't so much anything we'd actually agree, it was I think just a matter of getting these people involved and letting them see there was serious commitment and political leadership in terms of getting things sorted out. And it worked. Northern Ireland had its best summer for a decade. It had been a situation where republican violence had just simply disappeared. There were still some punishment beatings taking place but anything that would have had any impact on the unionist community had disappeared. Now I thought that was quite a considerable step forward from Adams. In the spring failing to make a declaration that paramilitary activity was at an end, but working hard during the summer to achieve that, you know, without actually saying it.

"That seemed to me to go a long way and I know it also impressed [ Tony] Blair as well, so that's the context."

And did the handshake occur quite spontaneously or had he thought about it in advance? "No, I hadn't given it any thought beforehand. I would put it under the category of spontaneous." So, Trimble just extended his hand? "No, Adams extended his hand and I took it." Somehow or other he knew the moment had arrived and this just seemed the right thing to do? "Yeah, I thought it would have been churlish not to in view of what had happened in the summer." Were there witnesses to this event? "No." And did Adams say anything after they had shaken hands? Were they both embarrassed? Was there a little awkwardness? This was quite a moment for the pair of them in highly personal as well as in political terms. Was there maybe a tear in the eye that day? A lump in the throat? Trimble laughs as he assures me that "there certainly were no tears" before admitting, "There might have been a little bit of an awkwardness."