In the wake of last month's attacks on Iraq by the United States and Britain, the United Nations is facing a grave issue of credibility over whether its arms inspection agency, Unscom, has passed on intelligence information to these two states. Reports in US newspapers that the UN Secretary General, Mr Kofi Annan, has such evidence have been flatly denied by his spokesman. But the suspicions of a dual intelligence approach are sufficiently well founded to provoke a serious debate about the proper United Nations role in the confrontation with Iraq.
The UN is founded centrally on the principle of sovereign equality among the nation states that make up its membership. This principle sits together - often uncomfortably - with the power of the Security Council to mandate sanctions or military action against an errant UN member state. If the legitimacy and acceptability of such decisions is to be upheld, it is obviously essential that the boundaries between UN and big power interests are scrupulously maintained. The UN's record with regard to Iraq is replete with legal ambiguity, as a result of which its reputation in the Middle East has been seriously impaired. The United States and Britain claimed a general justification under previous Security Council resolutions for last month's attacks, but it was transparently obvious that they were acting unilaterally and not within the strict legal order of the world organisation, as Mr Annan himself made plain.
That is one very serious problem. But if, to it is added the effective subversion of the Unscom operation by US intelligence in order to pursue its own unilateral agenda against Iraq, an even more grievous issue is posed. Despite Mr Annan's disclaimer there have been disturbing and undenied reports that intelligence has been leaked to the Israelis from Unscom and that US aid to the arms inspection teams was effectively a dual purpose operation, based on the assumption that the Iraqi groups they were monitoring are also closest to President Saddam Hussein. While it would be naive to assume that national intelligence services would not seek to maximise opportunities for gathering such information, it is up to the Security Council to ensure the integrity of its operation, as Mr Annan has quite correctly been insisting. Irrespective of the precise truth of these reports it is essential that this integrity be restored. After last month's attacks, it was very difficult to see how Unscom could survive on the legally necessary basis of acceptability to Iraq. After these reports, it looks an impossible task. Thus, there is now an opportunity for a root and branch review of the Unscom operation, including a change of its leading personnel, which would make it more acceptable to the other permanent members of the Security Council. The announced intention of the US and Britain to seek the overthrow of Saddam Hussein cannot be squared with UN mandates and is, in any case, unrealistic as a strategy. He would be endangered more by a relaxation of sanctions, or at least a clear linkage between that and compliance with a reformed arms inspection programme, which could give Iraq's population back the confidence to assert itself against his dictatorship.