There has been evidence recently of a strong popular desire among unionists for peace and a willingness to compromise, so long as these did not prejudice Northern Ireland's continued presence within the United Kingdom.
This strand of moderate, extra-political, unionist opinion found leadership in the business community, which since the publication of the Framework Document three years ago has been pressing for a compromise settlement.
On the other hand, in contrast to the situation on the nationalist side, unionist opinion was not being prepared during negotiations for a settlement, and this has made the reaction of the unionist community to the agreement more uncertain.
This difference in approach was, of course, inevitable. For while, in such negotiation, those seeking change can moderate followers' expectations beforehand, those being asked to change cannot hint in advance at any concessions they might be prepared to make.
Another factor which has complicated the situation for the UUP is that, while those seeking institutional change (Sinn Fein in this
case), do not have to commit in advance to work with any new institutions that might emerge, those being asked to cede power must be prepared to stand over and to work with any new institutional structure. It is this imbalance between the situations in which two key protagonists, Sinn Fein and the UUP, found themselves that explains Sinn Fein's apparent comfort with an outcome that offers it less than have has problems in selling a solution that will cost it less than it feared.
It is more difficult for the UUP because of the fact that within its community there exist important political forces seeking to outflank it, while in the case of Sinn Fein, although there are certainly paramilitary groups taking a harder line, there is no significant more extreme political force that could hope to gain votes at its expense.
It has been helpful to the UUP that the first poll evidence of unionist popular reaction to this agreement has been encouraging.
However, the five-to-one ratio between support for and opposition to the agreement in Northern Ireland suggested by this poll (73 per cent to 14 per cent), may be exaggerated; discounting those Don't Knows and Won't Votes and those who refused to answer, such a voting pattern would involve 83 per cent of voters supporting the agreement, which seems an improbably high figure.
How might this poll have come to exaggerate unionist public support for the agreement? First of all the Northern Ireland sample was small, 500 people, rather than the 1,000 sample used in the Republic. Second, it was a telephone poll rather than one done by calling at people's homes.
Nevertheless, as some 92 per cent of houses in the North have telephones, even if all the homes without telephones were working-class homes, a telephone poll would under-represent this section of the community by less than one-sixth and would not affect the outcome by more than a couple of percentage points.
There is some evidence that DUP supporters have been encouraged not to participate in polls. But past experience also suggests people are less inclined to admit voting for the DUP and Sinn Fein.
Also the poll was carried out mainly during the holiday weekend, before politicians opposing the agreement had had an opportunity to start their campaign against it. It is possible some UUP supporters recorded by this poll as supporting the agreement could change their minds.
But, unless David Trimble lost control of the UUP as a result of an adverse vote at today's Ulster Unionist Council support for the agreement is unlikely to fall by more than 10 or 12 percentage points, which would still leave more than 70 per cent in favour.
While support for the agreement in Northern Ireland may thus end up somewhat lower than this first poll suggested, in this State the referendum could yield an outcome more favourable than the three-to-one majority suggested by this survey.
Public opinion here was not prepared for a successful outcome to the negotiation, and it will take time for those who are attached to Articles 2 and 3 in their present form to come to view the proposed amendment of these Articles as an integral part of a settlement, rather than continuing to see this constitutional change in isolation.
The election to the Assembly in the North will see a continuation of the struggle between its protagonists and its opponents.
A battle may be fought within the ranks of the UUP, focusing on the selection of the party's candidates. Unionist constituency associations are independent of central control, and anti-agreement MPs whose constituency executives support their stance might be able to push candidate selection in an anti-agreement direction.
If candidates in these constituencies were to be biased in favour of opponents of the agreement, it could be difficult for a pro-agreement unionist electorate to give effect to its views in the June 22nd Assembly election. This may account for Mr Trimble's tough line on dissidents at his Thursday press conference, when he warned that, following an expected pro-agreement vote at today's Ulster Unionist Council vote, members who persisted in opposing the agreement would be regarded as dissidents, and presumably ineligible to stand as UUP candidates.
Mr Trimble is aware that if he is to succeed in establishing the Executive Committee provided for by the agreement he will need to elect at least 23 to 25 pro-agreement members out of perhaps 58 unionists in all.
The structure of this Executive Committee, which appears to represent the outcome of negotiations between Seamus Mallon of the SDLP and Reg Empey of the UUP should be capable of withstanding the pressures it will face. For, although it is to be an inclusive body, comprising Assembly members from all significant groups it will not be susceptible to disruption from within.
The Executive Committee's first decision will be on the matters to be handled by North-South bodies, and until it reaches agreement, neither it, nor indeed the Assembly, will secure any transfer of powers.
When, on completion of this task, the Executive Committee starts to function, it will have very limited responsibilities as a body. The members' principal joint role will be to agree each year a programme including a budget, its only other collective functions being to prioritise legislation, sort out inter-ministerial disputes, and recommend a common position on certain issues, e.g. external relations.
On these matters the individual ministers must support Executive Committee decisions, but within the broad programme agreed by the Executive Committee they are free to get on with their jobs: each is to have "full executive authority" in his or her area of executive responsibility.
The actions of ministers will, however, have to conform to their pledge of office, which requires them to serve all the people of Northern Ireland equally, to participate in preparing the programme for government, and to operate within its framework.
It will be open to its members to disagree. For example, because for the foreseeable future devolved government in Northern Ireland will have no responsibility for security matters, the members of the Executive Committee could - and assuredly will! - disagree about such matters as policing and parades.
It remains to be seen whether Sinn Fein and/or DUP Assembly members will serve on the Executive Committee. In the case of the Sinn Fe in leadership, its participation will depend both on the party's willingness to accept membership of a Northern Ireland administration and on a start being made on decommissioning. The incentive is the opportunity that membership of the Executive Committee will offer participation in the work of the North-South Ministerial Council.
In the case of the DUP the obstacle to participation in the Executive Committee will be the fact that participation in the work of the North-South Ministerial Council will be "one of the essential responsibilities attaching to relevant posts" in the Executive Committee, and if a DUP minister did not "participate normally in the work of the Council", the First and Deputy First Minister could "make alternative arrangements".
If the new system of government of Northern Ireland is successfully established, it will thus be fairly well guaranteed against subsequently breaking down because of disagreements about sensitive issues such as security matters.