NATO's mandate in Macedonia is to collect arms from the Albanian rebel force to confirm their acceptance of the peace agreement negotiated earlier this month - not to disarm the rebels completely. That this is a risky venture is shown by the death of a British soldier on the first day of the operation this week. But it is worthwhile because of the stark choice which continues to face the two sides between all-out war or accepting a less than fully satisfactory peace deal - in a region where conflict can so easily spill over.
NATO's limited role arises directly from the fact that the rebellion, launched last February, was not defeated by the Slav-dominated Macedonian army. European Union and NATO efforts were concentrated instead on reaching a political agreement to satisfy Albanian demands for recognition of their cultural identity, equal access to educational, religious and linguistic rights and participation in the national police force.
This was achieved in the agreement signed on August 13th, despite outspoken reservations by several Macedonian leaders, notably the prime minister, Mr Ljubco Georgievski. The agreement provided that one third of the surrendered arms should be collected by the end of this week, when parliamentary approval to implement it will be initiated.
Most observers agree the deadline of 30 days for the NATO operation is highly optimistic in the circumstances. There is also widespread surprise over its target of collecting 3,300 arms when estimates of the rebels' overall complement range from three to 20 times that number.
But there is a clear symbolic aspect to its involvement - testing the Albanians' willingness to abide by the agreement. If implemented incrementally, this will demonstrate it can work and is preferable to war.
The Macedonian majority clearly resents what is regarded as an imposed settlement and a NATO force biased against them. Many believe the Albanian rebels are only biding time while consolidating their territorial gains, preparing for another secessionist war. They say the rebels will have to be defeated before peace can come to their country. Thus the NATO force may have to stay much longer than 30 days if peace is to take root and a renewed outbreak of war to be avoided.
Despite the hostility it has provoked on the majority side, this is certainly the preferable course. The surrender of high-quality weapons allows for the hope that confidence in the agreement can be built up gradually.