MEMOIR:In the second part of his recollections Ireland's former ambassador to Washington writes, SEÁN DONLON, of taoiseach Charles Haughey's efforts to remove him: "I had a meeting with Haughey. It was brief and cold. He sat at his desk. I was not offered a seat and remained standing. I was to leave Washington in August."
IN JANUARY 1980 Haughey and Lenihan arranged to have briefings on Northern Ireland involving officials from both their departments, ambassador Eamon Kennedy from London and myself.
Prior to the meeting, I received a message indicating that Lenihan wished to look again at our attitude to the Irish National Caucus (INC). “Noraid was, of course, beyond the pale but perhaps we were out of date in our information about the INC.”
On January 15th, the Embassy provided recent evidence of links between the INC and Noraid. It included the fact that eight of the INC board had public links with Noraid and that a September 1979 report prepared for the US state department by Martha Crenshaw of Wesleyan University, concluded that “sizable funds for the IRA and the INLA came from the Irish-American community channelled through Noraid and the INC”.
The briefing meetings took place in Dublin on January 22nd/23rd. Haughey began by saying that it was his first opportunity for a discussion of Northern Irish policy since he became taoiseach. He had not as yet taken a final decision on policy but thought that the objective should be “to get the British to declare their interest in the unification of Ireland”. London and Washington were central to the achievement of this objective. As for the unionists, they would move only when faced with the combined pressure of London, Dublin and Washington.
Much of the briefing was devoted to the US situation. Haughey made it clear that he wanted to end the divisiveness of the Irish effort in the US. He wished to see a unity of effort involving the Four Horsemen, Biaggi’s ad-hoc committee, the INC, Noraid and anyone else who might be interested. I pointed to the inherent difficulties and the implications of such an approach and was strongly supported by my colleagues from the Departments of the Taoiseach and Foreign Affairs. The discussion was frank and conducted without rancour. Haughey encouraged debate and listened to points of view to which he was clearly opposed. Lenihan said little throughout. Haughey concluded by saying that he might have a similar meeting in the future, not so much to discuss policy formulation as to discuss its implementation.
In a brief but significant aside as I was leaving the room, Haughey asked me to bear in mind that the problem of Northern Ireland had been created by the British. The primary responsibility for dealing with the fallout in the US therefore rested with them and not with us. It was clear that he did not expect me to comment.
In the early months of 1980, Irish diplomats in the US faced an unusual situation. The INC and Biaggi continued to suggest that they were working closely with Haughey and we were not in a position to deny it. It became difficult to get instructions from the department in Dublin, despite the best efforts of colleagues there. The usual reply was that “the papers are on the Minister’s desk”.
The situation was exacerbated by a St Patrick’s Day visit by Lenihan during which he met Biaggi at a White House reception. When Lenihan had returned to Ireland, Biaggi and the INC spread the word that they were now officially recognised by the Irish government and would be working closely with them. We were unable to obtain any information as to what had transpired between Lenihan and Biaggi. To this day, the only available indication as to what transpired is in an Irish Times report by Dennis Kennedy the following November. Lenihan is reported as saying that he had “a very friendly kind of discussion” but “it was not a serious meeting in terms of serious consultation”. Biaggi’s spokesman was quoted as saying that “Lenihan’s overtures were among the first they had received from the Irish government”.
On April 1st, an undersecretary at the state department asked to see me on a personal and confidential basis. He told me that Biaggi had informed secretary of state Cyrus Vance that the Irish government was now working with the INC and he handed Vance a letter formally requesting the state department to declare me persona non grata for actions incompatible with my diplomatic status. Vance had replied by letter pointing out that the Irish government was confronted with serious problems created by terrorist organisations in Ireland with the support of US groups and individuals. In that connection, the Irish government had publicly expressed doubts about the INC and the state department had no reason to doubt the bona fides of the government’s position. The undersecretary asked if I was in a position to comment on the Lenihan/Biaggi conversation. I replied that I had no instructions. I reported the meeting in full to the department on the same day.
Finally, I was invited to Dublin for meetings with Lenihan and Haughey on June 24th.
My contemporaneous note of the relevant part of the meeting with Lenihan is as follows: “The Taoiseach has decided that I should leave Washington because of my involvement in US politics. I had, however, been doing a very good job and it was not proposed that I would be penalised in any way. I would be offered promotion to the rank of deputy secretary and I could choose from a number of options. Possibilities included the deputy secretaryship of the department with Noel Dorr as secretary, the permanent representative to the UN post in New York and the post of ambassador to Germany. Lenihan pressed me for an immediate reply as Haughey, whom I would be meeting shortly, wished to know.
“I expressed appreciation of the offers and emphasised that I would leave Washington without contributing to the fuss that would probably ensue. I regretted the decision on policy and personal grounds. The allegation that I had interfered in US domestic politics was incomprehensible and I asked Lenihan to elaborate. He said that I had been in contact with prominent US politicians on a frequent basis and that I had interfered with others, including Biaggi, who were genuinely interested in Irish affairs. I also had too high a profile in the US and this had become a disadvantage. I asked if there was any instance or series of instances which gave rise to the decision. Had I done anything contrary to instruction? Lenihan assured me that this was not the case. It would simply be better all round if I left Washington.”
Later the same day, I had a meeting with Haughey. It was brief and cold. He sat at his desk. I was not offered a seat and remained standing. I was to leave Washington in August and take up the post of permanent representative to the UN in New York. It was an important post as Ireland was about to take a seat on the UN Security Council. I said that the move would, however, be seen by the Four Horsemen and others as a snub. For the first time in history, a powerful Irish lobby had been created in the US. It appeared that it was now to be put at risk. Haughey made it clear that he did not wish for a discussion. He pointed to the door and I left.
I returned to the US and was on a weekend break on Cape Cod when the story broke in the Irish media on July 5th that I was to leave Washington. It was a much bigger story than I had expected and was the lead in the Irish and some of the British broadsheets. It was also widely covered in the US media. The commentators took the view that the decision signified a shift in the government’s Northern Ireland policy. The Irish media also saw it as a sop to Blaney and a possible inducement to attract him back to the Fianna Fáil fold.
The Four Horsemen contacted me as soon as the story broke and on July 8th, I confirmed to them that I had been asked to leave Washington and would shortly be doing so. I stressed that I was giving them the information on a confidential basis and did not want to be drawn into any confrontation. Later that day, I was informed by [Ted] Kennedy’s office that the Senator had phoned Haughey and raised queries about the policy implications of the move. The media in Washington reported that [Tip] O’Neill and [Pat] Moynihan had also spoken to Haughey.
The Irish media continued to pursue the story. Fine Gael leader Garret FitzGerald declined to comment pending an official announcement by the government of diplomatic moves. Labour’s Ruairí Quinn said that removing me would be interpreted as a victory for US organisations which supported violence in Ireland. I learned later that a similar message was privately conveyed to Haughey by the SDLP’s John Hume.
The pressure from all sources led to a change of heart and on July 9th, the Department of Foreign Affairs issued a statement announcing the appointment of Noel Dorr as Permanent Representative in New York and going on to say “press speculation over recent days that the Irish Ambassador to the US, Mr Seán Donlon, was to be moved because of a change in Government policy on Northern Ireland is entirely without foundation. The Government have complete confidence in Mr Donlon as its representative in Washington”.
The media presented the situation as a major backdown by Haughey. But that did not end the affair. Haughey came under further pressure from opposition politicians and from Hume to clarify his position on Biaggi and the INC.
For Hume, this was a unique stance. Over the years, he had gone to great lengths to avoid embroiling himself and the SDLP in Dublin politics. He now issued a statement: “In order that all shades of suspicion be removed and this unfortunate affair closed, it is necessary that it be made absolutely clear that the activities of Congressman Biaggi and the organisations with which he is associated enjoy no support whatsoever among any substantial section of Irish opinion.”
The Sunday Press of July 13th noted that the government “is still under pressure to clear its line with Irish-American supporters. Mr Haughey has been called on by the Fine Gael and Labour leaders, as well as John Hume, to state his attitude to the INC and Noraid. The stakes are so high that it cannot avoid the issue . . . ”
Haughey relented. In a speech in Cork on July 27th, he appealed to “all in America who have the interests of Ireland at heart not to give this body any support . . . associations that exist between Noraid and the INC casts grave suspicions on the latter organisation . . . I say now to all supporters of the bodies I have mentioned [Noraid and the INC] that they should carefully consider whether the cause they profess to serve would not now be best served by uniting in firm support of the policy of the Irish Government”.
Series ends. Seán Donlon is retired and lives in Co Clare