Nationalist hints that the Belfast Agreement is a stepping stone to a united Ireland undermine trust in the North, writes Dennis Kennedy
The Belfast Agreement has been called many things, but few descriptions have been so grandiose as that offered by Paul Gillespie (Worldview, August 24th) ". . . a hybrid instrument of domestic and international law, associated with transitional justice dedicated to resolving such a deep-seated conflict outside the traditional bounds of British sovereignty". He was quoting "legal scholars" who are not always given to concision, but whose authoritative-sounding opinions are often accepted at face value.
Cynics will say that this example is typical of the gobbledegook repeatedly produced by the proponents of the Northern "peace process" - notably the Department of Foreign Affairs - to camouflage a particularly shoddy exercise in appeasement of terrorism, abandonment of principle and general fudge.
Calling the Belfast Agreement a hybrid instrument of domestic and international law is probably fair enough. Two sovereign states did enact its provisions through their own legislative processes, though bilateral rather than international might be more accurate.
This instrument, we are then told, is associated with transitional justice dedicated to resolving the problem. The layman may balk at the phrase "transitional justice", being under the impression that justice is justice, and that fairness, or the quality of being just, cannot be transitional.
But he may perhaps accept an assurance that what is meant is an instrument to ensure justice for all parties during a transition period or a time of fundamental change.
But the basic question then arises, what is the nature of this transition? Who or what is moving from whence to where? If the transition were from an unstable Northern Ireland, where violence continues and communal mistrust seems greater than ever, to a better, peaceful and communally agreeable place, then fine.
But is that the transition envisaged? Apparently not, for the resolution of the conflict in this particular approach will be "outside the bounds of British sovereignty". To the man in the Sandy Row omnibus, all will now be revealed. This is yet another nationalist ploy to pursue Brits Out while dressing it up in the language of legal correctness and international principle.
Is he right? There is much in the Agreement to support the view that it is in no way "transitional" on the constitutional issue. The legitimacy of Northern Ireland's position within the UK by virtue of the will of a majority of its people is the very first principle affirmed. The impossibility of making any change in that status without majority consent is endorsed. The sovereignty of the UK government over Northern Ireland is acknowledged.
The Agreement allows for the possibility of constitutional change if a majority inside Northern Ireland decide they do want it. But it is no more than a theoretical possibility conditional upon a seismic change of heart on the part of a significant number of people in Northern Ireland.
That hardly makes the Agreement an instrument for resolving the problem outside the bounds of British sovereignty. It would be much more accurate to describe it as an instrument to resolve the problem within the bounds of British sovereignty, in part by guaranteeing equality and fairness to nationalists.
So why then do the legal scholars and the Dublin political establishment persist in seeing the Agreement as an instrument providing for a transitional process leading eventually to the end, or curtailment, of British sovereignty?
Is it because they simply cannot contemplate abandoning the Holy Grail of Irish unity? Is it because, as the more extreme unionists believe, the whole thing is a Dublin-inspired plot to subvert Northern Ireland?
Or is the clue in the adjective "traditional" as applied to the bounds of British sovereignty? Can national sovereignty be exercised in ways that are not traditional, and in ways that will promote the resolution of the conflict?
The Agreement prescribes that sovereign power within Northern Ireland be exercised with rigorous impartiality, full respect for all citizens and so forth, but these requirements can be found in UN conventions and other international documents and are within the recognised bounds of sovereignty.
Might other aspects of the Agreement relating to the North-South Ministerial Council and the cross-Border bodies be beyond the bounds? Possibly, but then they would also be beyond the traditional bounds of Irish sovereignty, so why specify British? And, once again, in what way is any of this "transitional"?
The Northern nationalist parties, not least the SDLP, continue to trumpet their nationalism within very traditional bounds - a sovereign independent united Ireland is their goal. Fianna Fáil's ultimate goal remains a united Ireland and nothing in the Belfast Agreement, it says, can prejudice that objective.
The suspicion remains, not just among unionists, that all these parties see the Belfast Agreement as part of a transitional process leading to the ending of British sovereignty, and that they will seek to exploit the process to that end.
Such suspicions helped the massive erosion of trust which brought about the suspension of the Assembly.
One of the keys to restoring trust and finding some way to revive or reform the Agreement is to make such suspicions untenable. Formulations such as the one discussed in this article have the opposite effect. The idea that a transition is possible through nationalists accommodating unionist identities and using the Agreement as a stepping stone to a united Ireland is, in the light of all available evidence, simply whistling in the green twilight.