On July 8th, speaking at the Nato Summit in Ankara, Donald Trump referred to the Iranian leadership as “scum” and declared the agreement reached with Iran less than three weeks earlier, which brought an end to the war launched by the US and Israel on February 28th, was “over”. However, like so many of the pronouncements of the American president, this one cannot be taken completely at face value.
The immediate prompt for Trump’s declaration was a number of Iranian attacks on commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, which were met in turn by US air strikes on Iranian targets. Iran then attacked US military facilities in the Gulf. Tit-for-tat exchanges of hostilities have followed.
Control of the Strait of Hormuz, through which, as everyone now knows, a significant proportion of global oil and other essential goods transits, has been central to the events of the past week.
For decades, passage through the strait was largely unimpeded for maritime traffic. Indeed, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that no country has the right to claim international waters. While neither Iran nor the US have ratified the convention, legal experts argue it has become part of international customary law and therefore binds both.
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However, the conflict between the US and Iran has made clear to Iran’s leaders the leverage which its position on the north side of the strait provides. Its closure during the course of the conflict has had economic repercussions on a global scale, and securing its reopening was a major objective for the US in talks with Iran earlier this year.
But the June memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the two sides is less than clear about the terms for its reopening. Iran claims a clause in the MOU gave it the right to manage shipping traffic for 60 days, so long as no fees were charged. The MOU is vague on what should happen after the 60-day period has elapsed and whether Iran can then charge fees for passage through the strait. Iran has demanded that ships use a route near its coast rather than one along Oman’s coastline on the southern side of the strait, through which the US military had been guiding traffic.
Iran has been suspected of attacking ships that used the Oman route. In response, Trump has reimposed an American blockade of Iran’s ports and announced the US would levy a 20 per cent charge on cargo shipped through the strait to cover the costs “necessary” to provide security and safety, though he has since reversed that threat.
This is despite the fact that only last month, Trump’s Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated tolls should not be applied in the Strait of Hormuz because “that’s existing international law”.
In any case, military experts are unclear as to how the US might secure and maintain control of the passageway, regardless of its president’s rhetoric. There is considerable consensus that it would require significant deployment of US military and naval power in the form of warships, if not troops on the ground, on such a scale as to be unlikely and unsustainable.
The future control of the Strait of Hormuz is not the only issue on which the June MOU is vague. Ambiguity is built into its terms. On Iran’s nuclear programme, there is little clarity, apart from an Iranian commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons, which has been its publicly stated position for decades. The agreement is similarly vague on the issue of funding for Iran’s reconstruction and development, stating the US would develop a “mutually agreed plan” with regional partners for a $300 billion (€262 billion) fund. The same goes for the question of Iran’s frozen assets.
With regard to Lebanon, there is yet more ambiguity. Iran sees the agreement as stipulating an end to the Israeli campaign there and mandating its withdrawal from Lebanese territory. US mediation of a deal between Israel and the Lebanese government that effectively allows Israel to continue its occupation of southern Lebanon constitutes a breach of the agreement from an Iranian perspective.
Despite these points of contention, there are some positive signs.
In the first instance, while Trump was dismissing the MOU, he did not commit to ending negotiations with Iran. Indeed, he suggested Iran wanted to continue the dialogue.
The character of the renewed violence is also significantly different from earlier rounds of fighting. On February 28th, Israel and the US conducted a sustained series of attacks on Iranian cities, killing Iran’s supreme leader on the first day. The latest round of US strikes has been largely around the Strait of Hormuz, while Iranian attacks have been directed at US military facilities in the Gulf.
Both sides have clear motivation to bring the fighting to an end. The economic cost of continued conflict is clear. According to one oil industry insider in the region, the cost of direct damage to Gulf energy infrastructure alone now exceeds $60 billion, while the cost of disrupted trade has surpassed $150 billion.
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Closer to home, the war with Iran is deeply unpopular in the US. An opinion poll last month showed just 24 per cent of Americans thought it was worth the cost while only 23 per cent of respondents believed the US was in a stronger position with regard to Iran than before the war. Trump’s personal approval ratings are also poor. According to the New York Times earlier this month, just 37 per cent of Americans approved of his performance.
For Iran’s leadership too, an end to the conflict is critical to economic recovery. A substantial deal with the US holds out the promise of billions of dollars to rebuild the economy. According to the Iranian government’s own data, around two million jobs have disappeared over the course of the war, with much of the damage caused not by the conflict, but by the almost three-month-long internet shutdown. This is estimated to have had a cost of $2.6 billion to the economy.
Clearly, there is a persistent danger of unintended consequences and conflict escalation for as long as the current round of fighting continues. However, it may be more likely that negotiations will continue while both sides persist in breaches of the MOU and of international law more broadly.
Dr Vincent Durac lectures in Middle East politics in the UCD school of politics and international relations
