Syria and Iran crucial to success of US-led campaign against IS

Partners provide boots on ground as US co-ordinates attacks from air


The military wing of Lebanon’s Hizbullah movement, Iranian revolutionary guards and the Syrian army are unacknowledged partners in the US-led coalition seeking to drive Islamic State (IS) fighters from captured territory in northeast Syria and northwest Iraq.

Their forces are, however, essential if the battle against IS is to be won. They, along with Iraqi troops and Shia militiamen, provide boots on the ground while the coalition deploys the aircraft that give cover to troops and drop bombs to degrade IS forces and facilities.

A source close to Hizbullah told The Irish Times that acknowledged coalition members "decided to fight only when their interests were involved". He criticised European intelligence agencies that "closed their eyes to the activities of the taqfiris [Sunni extremists] that [entered Lebanon and Syria] through Turkey or Jordan. [These agencies] know the jihadis" and use their passports to track them. They will go back to their countries. . ."

“The big question mark in the international coalition is Turkey. Strict controls must be imposed on borders to prevent Da’esh [fighters] going [from Europe] to Turkey.

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“It’s not enough [for coalition members] to say they are against terrorism. They must stop those – Saudi Arabia – promoting their versions of ethnics and ideology through education in mosques and schools, making fighters.”

Disastrous strategy Sitting at a crowded cafe on Beirut’s Hamra street

, Syrian civil society activist Amer castigates US president Barack Obama for adopting a “disastrous and dangerous strategy. Like [that of president George W] Bush in 2003” which relied on long-term exiles to return to Iraq and govern the country, their sectarian agendas, mismanagement and corruption leading to the creation and rise of IS in both Syria and Iraq.

“There’s no new model on the table” to deal with IS, “which is an ideology not an organisation.” He dismisses as useless the US plan to train 5,000 “moderate” insurgents to fight IS in Syria. This would boost the number of fighters in groups under the Free Syrian Army umbrella to 10,000 while IS is gaining thousands of recruits monthly. He shrugs over training “moderates” in Saudi Arabia, which has “the same ideology as IS”.

“IS thrives on gaps in governance or in areas left without governance. It is paying $200 per year” to provide minimal services to the population in areas it controls. These are nothing more than “symbolic gestures of sovereignty”. What needs to be done is to “prevent IS from growing” by deploying “5,000 administrators rather than fighters”.

Amer continues: “The US will hit on the regime while it hits on IS” but this is a mistake because neither Russia nor Iran “will let go” of president Bashar al-Assad, who earlier was prepared to “negotiate in good faith” when “no one bothered to negotiate with him in good faith” as his enemies thought he would fall under pressure from insurgents.

Conciliatory gestures After gaining re-election in June’s presidential poll, Assad is no longer prepared to negotiate. “His friends asked him to make conciliatory gestures, to form a national unity government, bring in opposition figures. He not only refused but not only called upon the previous prime minister to form a government from outgoing ministers but also in his inaugural address, insulted Abdu

l Aziz ibn Saud,” the founder of the Saudi monarchy, prompting the Saudis to pour fresh funds into the insurgency, says Amer.

“The Saudis cannot leave this insult without an answer.”

Assad’s message was not directed primarily to Riyadh but to Tehran and Moscow: “You have no option but me.”

This means the coalition’s unacknowledged members are on collision course with its acknowledged members, with Assad the cause of friction during the campaign against IS and of the collision once IS has been contained. Assad could ultimately become a cause of collision between the US-led coalition and the Syrian people, says Amer. “If a transparent, free and fair election is held [post-conflict] in two rounds, Assad would win by 51-52 per cent of the vote in the second round because the opposition has no credible candidate.”

In spite of US and coalition air strikes against IS and other jihadi targets, the regime faces a difficult phase in the civil conflict. The army has routed insurgents in the industrial town of Adra just north of Damascus, the last rebel-held city on the road to Homs, but anti-regime fighters now pop up from sewer pipes in the centre of Damascus and continue to shell the Christian quarters of the Old City from positions in the countryside east of the capital. Troops are still battling entrenched insurgents in key suburbs and

Syrians travelling along the highway linking Damascus to Lebanon report they have been turned back by the army because of flying IS checkpoints on this road, which has been kept open by the military as this outlet is an essential strategic asset for the government.