THE OPERATION in northern Iraq in 1991 was a forcible humanitarian intervention, something very rare. Security Council Resolution 678 allowed the use of force to "restore international peace and security".
Although the intervention contravened Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter, it constituted interference in the internal affairs of Iraq, forbidden by Article 2 (7) of the Charter.
Resolution 688 condemned Iraq's oppression of its civilian population and said the flow of refugees across international borders was a "threat to international peace and security". (This was an argument used in New York by Dr Patrick Hillery, as Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1969, when asking for a UN force for Northern Ireland).
Article 2 (4) of the Charter requires all members to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of any state. Under Article 2 (7) the UN is not authorised to intervene in matters within the jurisdiction of any state.
The 1991 intervention has been much discussed by the experts. Thomas Pickering, US Ambassador to the UN, said in 1991: "The response of the international community to the humanitarian crisis in Iraq, particularly the suffering of the Kurds, has broken new ground. The doctrine of non intervention in the internal aft fairs of states is a fundamental principle of international conduct . . Moreover, the respect it commands is important since the alternative is an invitation to anarchy and chaos."
He pointed out that the international community had decided the non intervention doctrine should not shield genocidal and other practices which were themselves prohibited by international law and treaties.
Javier Perez de Cuellar, while UN Secretary General, said: "We are clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes towards the belief that the defence of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents."
The pitfalls are obvious. Richard Gardner says: "Individual governments would be free to make decisions on the quality of democracy and respect for human rights in other countries, and launch whatever military operations they deemed necessary.
The US is relying on Resolutions 678 and 688 for its current intervention. The attempt to get a new resolution through the Security Council has failed. Saddam, after all, was invited into northern Iraq by some of his own citizens.
Various reasons have been given for Saudi and other Arab reluctance to provide facilities for the US. The increased influence of Iran, the implications of accepting contraventions of Article 2 (7), the Kurdish question and the apparent US acquiescence in Israel's new policies are all factors.
In brief, the Kurdish question consists of 20 million people with no state. This is not Washington's fault - the US tried to get them one in 1919, but Britain refused.
However, Iraq has been effectively partitioned since 1991. Turkey would oppose an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq and Turkey is a valued Nato ally.
Various lessons, and some disinformation, emerged from the Gulf War. It seems clear that the Iraqi air defence system (largely Soviet, with some French and British input) was not able to withstand US electronic counter measures (ECM). One of the few comments on the war to emerge from Moscow was that the Soviet Union must review its own air defences.
Iraq may have rebuilt the system since then, but Saddam could not afford the drastic updating needed, even if anyone would sell to him.
By contrast, the US command, control and communication arrangements have been continuously improved, as have its missiles, aircraft and attack techniques. The official Nato assessment claims that 80 per cent of the strikes in Bosnia last autumn were successful. All these improvements and the experience gained are now available for use against Iraq.
The Stealth F-117A fighters are sometimes incorrectly called Stealth bombers. The Stealth bomber (or B2) is a different aircraft. The F-117A is a fighter and attack aircraft which can carry bombs. It is interesting that, in the most open society in the world, these aircraft were designed, built and used for several years in conditions of complete secrecy.
The peculiar shape, special materials and surface coatings of the aircraft cause radar pulses to be partly absorbed and diffracted so as to reflect back very little energy to the radar transmitter, like reflections from a shattered mirror. Exhaust gases are deflected and cooled before emission to avoid infra red homing missiles. The radar "cross section" remaining is said to be that of "a medium sized bird".
The GBU-28 special penetration bomb was developed before the end of the Gulf War when it was found that existing bombs were not adequate for very deep bunkers. Two were used with F-117A aircraft in the last days of the war. It is said that they can penetrate 100 feet of concrete.
Given these considerations, it is incredible that Saddam should repeat his pre Gulf War errors and has made only one small effort to defuse the situation while he has a chance.
It would seem that US decisions are already made. Command bunkers must have been located in the last five years of intensive intelligence work. The aim may be to destroy Saddam and his principal military and civilian staffs. This would be considered in Washington as unfinished business since 1991.