Training of Egyptian pilots raised doubts at department level

AER LINGUS:THE DEPARTMENT of Foreign Affairs was "rather dubious" about the wisdom of Aer Lingus providing training to Egyptian pilots in the mid-1970s, according to State papers released by the National Archives.

The papers, from the Department of Foreign Affairs file, show the then minister, Michael O’Kennedy, considered objecting to the training of 43 Egyptian air-force personnel in 1978.

But he opted instead to request Aer Lingus, a wholly State-owned company at the time, to consult him in future before making commitments to other countries that might be politically sensitive.

In the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War between Israel and a coalition of Arab states including Egypt and Syria, the US – under then president Jimmy Carter – was making efforts to broker a peace deal in the Middle East. Out of Mr Carter’s negotiations in 1977 and 1978, the Camp David Accord was agreed and in 1979 the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty was signed.

An unsigned briefing note from the Department of Foreign Affairs, written before a discussion on the Aer Lingus plan with the minister, said the author’s first reaction to the company’s decision to train Egyptian pilots was that it would not be desirable for the company to become involved with the military army of one of the main parties to the Middle East conflict.

“On reflection however, though still nervous about it and about possible publicity, I am inclined to think that we should not recommend to the Minister that he should seek to block it, though it would be well to convey fairly clearly to Aer Lingus that they should not seek to publicise it,” the note said.

It noted Egypt had turned from dependence on Russian weapons towards the West, which was the more desirable position. “If Egypt gives up its dependence on the Soviet Union, they should not be rebuffed by the West and our common interest with the West in general is sufficient to include us in this category.” Following discussions, the minister wrote to minister for tourism and transport Pádraig Faulkner, stating he would not raise any objection to the training, but pointing out that contracts “of this kind” could raise political problems.

“My concern is simply that in particularly sensitive cases we should have some opportunity to consider the political consequences before any commitments are entered into,” Mr O’Kennedy said.

Mr Faulkner wrote to Aer Lingus with the request that prior notification be given in “politically sensitive” matters.

Other documents indicate the government secretly forged trade links with Libya in the 1970s while acknowledging it was arming the IRA. Senior officials argued it was better to stay friendly with Libya than to risk losing lucrative contracts for firms like Aer Lingus.

The then State-owned airline contacted the Fine Gael-Labour coalition in April 1973 over concerns about a contract to help train and manage Libyan Arab Airlines. While the value of the contract was not deemed great, it was felt it held out the opportunity of further deals on aircraft maintenance and leasing.

A handwritten note to then industry and commerce minister Justin Keating underlines the government’s awareness that Col Gadafy’s regime was arming the IRA. But the memo from a ministerial adviser signalled the main worry was the loss of commercial deals with other countries if Aer Lingus refused to work with Libya.

“Aer Lingus could suffer commercially, perhaps elsewhere in the Arab world [eg Algeria],” he wrote. On the question of Libya’s IRA links, he added that the Libyan administration would not be “influenced by the withdrawal of Aer Lingus from a proposed management assistance contract”.

Libyan Arab Airlines was barred from international airspace a number of times in the 1980s over diplomatic fallouts and UN sanctions after the Lockerbie bombing by a Libyan terrorist. – (Additional reporting: PA)