IRA PRISON ESCAPES:THE QUESTION of allowing armed sentries at the Maze prison to open fire on escaping prisoners dominates confidential files just released from the Public Record Office in Belfast from 1978-79.
Difficulties in guarding the prison, the centre of the H Block “dirty protest” in the late 1970s, were considered by a working committee of the Northern Ireland Office (NIO), British army, RUC and prison authorities in February 1978. Had the British army got its way, the 1983 escape of 38 IRA prisoners might have had a very different outcome.
The committee’s report agreed that the major security threat stemmed from having 800 special category prisoners housed in insecure compounds in the older part of the Maze. The committee felt that there was no comparable threat from the new H Blocks consisting of secure cellular accommodation.
The committee considered that any mass escape attempt might be accompanied by an external attack on the Maze by the Provisional IRA. The best protection was the removal of “large numbers of disciplined, hardened and potentially violent paramilitary prisoners” to cellular blocks but this could not be completed until 1982.
The army wanted a firm commitment for the withdrawal of the military guard force at the prison by that date, but the prison authorities pleaded that the military guard should continue as the prison staff alone could not ensure adequate security. The Maze military commitment consisted of 160 armed soldiers, together with a further 56 in an army dog unit.
The prison authorities had no doubt that “the presence of armed soldiers in the watchtowers is the decisive psychological factor in deterring a mass escape from the Maze ... Without the fear – however mistaken – of being shot ... it is believed that disturbances and escape attempts could occur with such frequency as to make the running of the prison vastly more difficult.”
However, the army disagreed.
The report noted: “Under the existing law, members of the security forces are allowed to use only ‘reasonable force’ to apprehend those attempting to escape from custody. Should a soldier open fire on an unarmed prisoner, therefore, it would be for the courts to decide on the facts of the case whether or not this constituted reasonable force. The yellow card issued to all soldiers provided guidelines to ensure that soldiers acted within the law.”
The report noted: “As the yellow card has been published in the press, the inmates at the Maze must be well aware of the limitations on opening fire and the army, therefore, believe that armed soldiers in watchtowers do not represent a deterrent to potential escapees and neither would armed policemen or prison officers whose legal position would be the same.”
However, the prison authorities felt that the prisoners were more impressed by the precedent set by shootings during previous escape attempts of two men, McIlhone and Cooney, for which the soldiers involved were either acquitted or never prosecuted. The army wanted the legislation to be amended to allow security forces to open fire to prevent an escape.
On February 21st, 1978, AW Stephens of the Northern Ireland Office briefed the permanent under-secretary Sir Brian Cubbon on the tensions between the GOC and the NIO and prison authorities. In a further letter to Cubbon dated February 23rd, 1978, Stephens outlined that there had been no meeting of minds between army and prison staff.
“In particular, the debate raised the question of whether prison officers should be armed with rifles for watchtower duty or with a full range of riot equipment to replace the stand-by troop. This has implications for ministers.”
Stephens informed Sir Brian that the two parties had agreed on “the desirability of legislation to permit opening fire on escaping prisoners”. The following day Stephens reported to officials that he had spoken to the GOC who was “in no mood for trade-offs”.
It quickly became clear that Sir Timothy Creasey’s feelings were strongest on the issue of military guards in the watchtowers at the Maze. He said that if a “large-scale escape from the Maze were to take place, the army would be in an intolerable position since it would be seen to have failed in a task in which it was automatically prevented from succeeding”.
In a further note on the file, dated March 24th, 1978, Stephens informed an official, JD Janes, that any move to legislate would raise all sorts of difficulties. The legislation would not be changed and when 38 IRA prisoners, including Gerry Kelly, successfully escaped from the Maze in 1983, they were not fired upon by the sentries.