"No ship can be allowed to keep on dictating the speed of the whole convoy. That is why the introduction of a flexibility clause in the treaty is so crucial for the continuing process of European integration. Countries who want and are able to must be allowed to proceed faster - and to do so within the common institutional framework and with everyone's approval.
"Any group of countries can join together by their own initiative and to do certain things jointly. However, and this is the fundamental British position, if they wish to have access to EU institutions that is only acceptable if all 15 EU states agree.
THESE two quotations go to the heart of the most difficult issues in the Inter Governmental Conference of the European Union under its Irish presidency. The first comes from a speech by the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Klaus Kinkel, reporting to the Bundestag on October 10th on the Dublin summit the previous weekend. The second is from the British Foreign Secretary, Mr Malcolm Rifkind, speaking in a Commons debate on Thursday.
This week France and Germany presented their proposals for a flexibility clause into the treaties. These are aimed at preventing Britain from vetoing such "enhanced co operation". If this cannot be done within the EU "we will have to do it outside in various other arenas, on what will inevitably be a more selective basis", according to the German Minister for European Affairs, Mr Werner Hoyer. He sees the issue as "the most important strategic question for the IGC".
Undoubtedly the French and Germans would much prefer to achieve this within the treaty framework. Mr Hoyer has spelled out his thinking in briefings for European journalists. He strenuously denies it is an attempt to get around the need for unanimity or qualified majority voting. Rather is it intended to prevent any one country being able to veto a group that wants to co operate on foreign, defence, justice or home affairs matters from doing so.
Mr Hoyer spelled out six principles that should apply to "enhanced co operation". It must deepen integration; it must not dilute the acquis communautaire, specifically the single market; all must be allowed to participate; nobody should have a veto on other members moving forward (although there will have to be a certain critical mass): all who cannot go along now should be able to do so when they are able; and EU solidarity would apply to both the "ins" and "outs".
Mr Hoyer also denies that the Franco German proposal is aimed solely at British reluctance, tardiness or exceptionalism. Indeed, he - and Mr Kinkel - insist they want Britain "to be at the heart of Europe and not on the periphery".
It is important not to forget that it suits both France and Germany to cultivate alliances with Britain in certain areas to balance off the other power in their own partnership - the Germans on free trade and transatlantic relations, for example, and the French on security and defence; under President Chirac the French oppose enhanced roles for the European Parliament and the Commission.
But clearly France and Germany fear decision making will be blocked by the imperatives of the British election campaign, which will coincide almost exactly with the concluding stages of the IGC negotiations under the Dutch EU Presidency next year. The Dublin summit made a commitment to conclude negotiations at the Amsterdam Council in June.
The Franco German proposal is particularly intended to cater for an enlarged EU, with up to 30 member states in the years to come. It is designed to achieve this despite British opposition.
Ironically, the British also propose a flexible model of European integration. But it is much looser than the competing ones. It is helpful to classify the voluminous vocabulary that has been used in this debate on "differentiated integration" under three headings time, space and matter. This has been suggested by a researcher from the Finnish foreign ministry, Mr Alexander Stubb*. They tend to coincide with proposals associated with Germany, France and Britain respectively.
Thus the inclusive formula stressed by Mr Hoyer would use the existing institutions and invite all EU member states to participate in "enhanced co operation" when and if they are able and willing to do so. This would see a core group going faster with common objectives, on the assumption that the others will follow on later. Multi speeds imply different timescales but the same policies and actions.
Differentiations of space are usually described in the jargon as "variable geometry". This is less ambitious about the possibility of including all partners in common objectives and more reconciled to institutionalising cultural and Economic diversity and accepting an irreversible separation between more or less integrated countries. It tends towards a two or multi tier rather than a two or multi speed EU, in football parlance towards a league rather than a cup competition. Its political centre of gravity is in Paris.
Differentiations of matter are focussed on a culinary metaphor the a la carte menu. This would allow the member state to pick and choose between co operation in different policy areas (the subject matter of integration), while maintaining a minimum number of common objectives. It tends to gravitate towards the British (and Danish) opt outs of monetary, social or defence unions.
Ireland is apprehensive and ill at ease with this agenda, whether in its presidency or national roles. Such proposals threaten the institutional cohesion of the EU and could create different membership classes. There is no suggestion that this affects the readiness of the Irish presidency to handle the subject; but it is a tricky assignment, for three main reasons.
First, a polarisation between Franco German and British approaches at the Dublin summit in December will make it more difficult to prepare a draft treaty, as the Irish presidency is mandated to do. Secondly, it poses difficult political choices in the short term, given the need to engage with Britain on Northern Ireland.
Thirdly, and in the longer term, Ireland faces dilemmas of positioning as between the emergent European core states and a reluctant Britain across the span of policies, including monetary union, freedom of movement and foreign and security policies. More political debate is needed here on all these matters before irreversible decisions are made.
