Judge Hiller Zobel gave his verdict yesterday on Louise Woodward in a 16-page text. It began with an elaborate declaration of the deafness of courts to the "clamours of the populace". The Massachusetts judge stated: "In this country, we do not administer justice by plebiscite."
Following a summary of the pertinent evidence he turned to the "motion for a required finding of not guilty", stating: "It is essential to understand that at no time was defendant obliged to prove anything."
"If the government's theory failed to win them [the jury] over, beyond a reasonable doubt, their inquiry was complete . . ."
He continued: "Now for purposes of deciding defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty, the law requires our assuming that the jury did indeed discard every scrap of evidence . . . tending to cast doubt on the prosecution's theory.
"Measuring the evidence by this strict standard, my duty inescapably mandates my denying the motion in its entirety. Whatever my own views of the evidence might or might not be, I cannot, in deciding this motion, place any of them upon the scales."
Turning to the motion for a retrial, Judge Zobel stated: "A judge may not grant a new trial merely because had he been the fact-finder the case would have come out differently . . .
"The verdict, it seems to me, was not against the weight of the evidence."
He concluded that the prosecution's argument was "tough but eminently fair" and that there were no grounds for a retrial.
On the motion to reduce the verdict he cited many precedents in Massachusetts law and stated: "Thus although as a father and grandfather I particularly recognise and acknowledge the indescribable pain Matthew Eappen's death has caused his parents and grandparents, as a judge I am duty-bound to ignore it.
"I must look only at the evidence and the defendant. Having considered the matter carefully, I am firmly convinced that the interests of justice . . . mandate my reducing the verdict to manslaughter."
He continued: "Viewing the evidence broadly, as I am permitted to do, I believe that the circumstances in which the defendant acted were characterised by confusion, inexperience, frustration, immaturity and some anger, but not malice (in the legal sense) supporting a conviction for second degree murder.
"Frustrated by her inability to quiet the crying child, she was "a little rough with him." "This sad scenario is, in my judgment after having heard all the evidence and considered the interests of justice, most fairly characterised as manslaughter, not mandatory-life-sentence murder."