Delivering judgment on the judicial review proceedings challenging the order allowing the girl to travel, Mr Justice Geoghegan said that on the argument that Judge Fahy failed to have proper regard to the rights of Miss C's parents, it was clear full regard was given to their rights. Judge Fahy was entitled to take the view the parents were neglectful and that Miss C should properly be in temporary care.
He rejected the argument that Judge Fahy had not found, as a matter of probability, that there was a real and substantial risk to the life of Miss C, which could only be avoided by the termination of her pregnancy, and that Judge Fahy had made her order without regard to the X case.
He said Judge Fahy had prepared her judgment under great pressure and it contained what he believed was an unintended ambiguity. She had said she was of the opinion that the test as set down in the X case had not been met as she did not believe the threat of suicide was imminent.
Judge Fahy had gone on to say she was satisfied that if the pregnancy was allowed to continue the risk "will increase substantially". She was therefore allowing C to travel for an abortion.
Mr Justice Geoghegan said those parts of Judge Fahy's judgment had to be put in the context of all the evidence. He believed Judge Fahy was saying the threat of suicide was "not immediately imminent". It was not required by the X case that there be such immediate or imminent danger.
"But, more importantly, she goes on to say that she is satisfied that if the pregnancy is allowed to continue the risk will increase substantially, and I think the use of that word `substantially' was deliberate and intended to correspond with the wording of the test under the X case."
Mr Justice Geoghegan rejected the argument from Mr Durcan that Judge Fahy was entitled to make an order permitting Miss C to travel for an abortion because of the travel amendment. He said it was contended that if a child in the care of her parents could travel for an abortion, then a child in care should equally be permitted to do so.
He said the Constitution clearly not only prohibited abortion but gave a positive right to life to the unborn subject only to the provision that the mother's life was endangered.
The so-called travel amendment was framed in negative terms and should be viewed in the historical context in which it was inserted. This was a widespread feeling that a repetition of the X case should not occur in that nobody should be injuncted from travelling out of the country for the purpose of abortion.
"A court of law, in considering the welfare of an Irish child in Ireland and considering whether on health grounds a termination of pregnancy was necessary, must, I believe, be confined to considering the grounds for termination which would be lawful under the Irish Constitution and cannot make a direction authorising travel to another jurisdiction for a different kind of abortion."
He said the amended Constitution does not confer a right to abortion outside of Ireland but merely prevents injunctions against travelling for that purpose.
He believed a court would be prevented from exercising a jurisdiction authorising travel for a particular purpose, namely, for an abortion, in circumstances where the proposed abortion would not be allowed under Irish law.
Mr Justice Geoghegan concluded: "As I have at any rate taken the view that the termination of pregnancy which was authorised by Judge Fahy was one which, both in her view and in my view, was lawful under the Irish Constitution, the question which I have just been discussing does not arise."
He said he was refusing the orders sought by the girl's parents. He added that he would have taken a different view if the effect of the order permitting the girl to travel for an abortion was, contrary to his own view, to authorise an abortion outside Ireland of a kind which would not be in conformity with the Irish Constitution.