Claims by Pringle and men of miscarriages of justice to be reheard

CLAIMS by Mr Peter Pringle and two men in an unrelated case that there were miscarriages of justice in their cases are to be …

CLAIMS by Mr Peter Pringle and two men in an unrelated case that there were miscarriages of justice in their cases are to be reheard by the Court of Criminal Appeal following Supreme Court rulings yesterday.

If they win they will be entitled to seek compensation from the Government. Previously, all three had their convictions quashed.

Mr Joseph Grogan and Mr Joseph Mcleady, both aged 28, were convicted in 1985 of assaulting Mr Eamon Gavin, causing malicious damage to his car at Cremore, Templeogue, Dublin, on February 24th, 1984. The convictions were quashed.

Mr Pringle spent 15 years in jail before his conviction for the murder of Garda Henry Byrne, following a bank robbery at Ballaghaderreen, Co Mayo, on July 7th, 1980, was quashed.

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The three men appealed to the Supreme Court against the refusal of the Court of Criminal Appeal to grant them certificates that there had been miscarriages of justice. The Court of Criminal Appeal also asked the Supreme Court to give its opinion.

After the passing of the Criminal Procedure Act 1993, Mr Mcleady and Mr Grogan brought an application alleging newly-discovered facts showed there had been a miscarriage of justice in their cases. Two years ago the Court of Criminal Appeal quashed their convictions.

Mr Grogan had completed his five-year jail term by the time his conviction was quashed. Mr Mcleady absconded after a year in St Patrick's Institution but was arrested in England and sent back to serve his sentence.

Three weeks before he was due to finish his term in October 1990, he accepted an offer from the then Minister for Justice, Mr Raymond Burke, of temporary release without prejudice to his case.

The Court of Criminal Appeal, in quashing the convictions of the two men, said evidence as to the location of a fingerprint on the stolen car together with a memo, "the Walker memorandum", written by a solicitor in the Chief State Solicitor's office, were both newly-discovered facts which should have been disclosed to defence lawyers at the men's trials.

Mr Justice Blayney, giving one of the two judgments of the Supreme Court, held the Court of Criminal Appeal had erred in law in refusing to grant a certificate because of the fact that the guilt or innocence of the two men had not been decided by a jury at a trial where the non-disclosed material had been available to the accused.

The 1993 Act did not create any obstacle to the Court of Criminal Appeal entering on an inquiry and it seemed to him the Court of Criminal Appeal ought to have done so. The case should be remitted to the Court of Criminal Appeal to consider the applications by Mr Mcleady and Mr Grogan for a certificate.

In Mr Pringle's case, the Supreme Court decided the Court of Criminal Appeal might not have fully appreciated that an application for a certificate claiming there was a miscarriage of justice was a distinct and different inquiry from the appeal by Mr Pringle against his conviction.

In 1994 Mr Pringle claimed he had newly-discovered facts, including that there was a failure to disclose to him before and during his trial the retention by the State of a blood-stained tissue.

Mr Justice Blayney said that the mere fact of Mr Pringle's conviction having been quashed as being unsafe and unsatisfactory could not of its own entitle Mr Pringle to a certificate that there had been a miscarriage of justice.

Holding that the Court of Criminal Appeal was correct in refusing to grant a certificate to Mr Pringle, Mr Justice Blayney said it seemed that to dismiss the appeal in the special circumstances of this case might be unfair to Mr Pringle.

This was only the second application for certificates adjudicated by the Court of Criminal Appeal. When Mr Pringle's application was brought, there was virtually no guidance as to how the legislation would be construed and in particular as to what meaning would be given to the term "miscarriage of justice".