The US wants to build a National Missile Defence (NMD). This would breach the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, so the US needs Russian agreement to amend that treaty.
The stable relationship between nuclear powers depended on their ability "to maintain confidence in a secure and survivable retaliatory capacity". During the 1960s both sides recognised that "large numbers of highly capable ballistic missile defence systems could undercut confidence in the ability to deter" (LAWS white paper - see below).
Sophisticated thinking by what John K. Galbraith called "nuclear theologians" brought agreement, in effect, to seek stability through vulnerability. Both sides agreed not to have nation-wide anti-ballistic missile defences.
Under the 1972 ABM treaty the US and the Soviet Union eventually agreed that only one anti-ballistic missile site, with 100 launchers, would be allowed to each country. This leaves their huge land masses almost defenceless against "first-strike" attacks. Mutual vulnerability was thus voluntarily accepted as a deterrent to such attacks because second-strike, retaliatory attacks remained possible. These would trigger MAD - mutually assured destruction.
The theory worked because the US and Russia have responsible governments. Associated treaties froze missile stockpiles and banned air, sea and space defences against ICBMs. These agreements were made with wary distrust. But the overkill build-up of nuclear warheads and missiles was halted. Europe waited cautiously before standing down its Fall-out Warning and Monitoring Organisations - vital requirements during the nuclear race.
The US claims that the National Missile Defence system it now wants to build will be a limited system of early-warning and tracking radars, with 100 "interceptors" in Alaska. These are to destroy small-scale missile attacks from "rogue" states such as North Korea or Iran and, later, from Iraq and Libya. NMD will be nation-wide, covering the 50 states of the US. It will have space-based sensor tracking systems, thus further breaching the treaty - unless Russia agrees to changes.
NMD would not protect, and is deliberately designed not to protect, the US against a large missile attack from Russia. This ensures that the Russian deterrent capability remains potent and that the ABM treaty continues. In such subtle ways the "nuclear theologians" think out their dilemmas - successfully, so far.
The US formally dropped the term "rogue state" from June 19th, partly resulting from the cordial meetings of the two Korean presidents. "States of concern" will replace it.
NMD will not use "X-ray lasers from space", or other "Star Wars" technologies. Groundlaunched, 120 lb interceptors would be alerted and launched to destroy incoming missiles by "kinetic energy".
This is "hit-to-kill" technology. Kinetic energy is the energy of a moving body - Keith Wood on the charge is a good example. The interceptors are called EKVs (exo-atmosphere kill vehicles) because the ramming will occur in space, outside the Earth's atmosphere. The closing speed could be 15,000 m.p.h.
Tests have been inconclusive; a January one failed, a June one was postponed. New tests were to be held early this morning. If they succeed, President Clinton may finally decide to deploy the system. There is scientific scepticism about the ability to discriminate against misleading decoys, which are emitted as missiles pass through the exo-atmosphere.
Interception when missiles are "on the way up", during the early "boost" stages of trajectory in the Earth's atmosphere, and before decoys are emitted, would have enormous advantages. But the technical problems involved are also enormous. Israel's size and geographical location have caused it to make great efforts to solve them, hitherto without success, it seems. The stakes are high - don't be surprised at a breakthrough.
Both parties and presidential candidates support NMD. The Republican Party wants a "thicker" (stronger), less limited version. The Democrats' support seems moderate and firm. The US public supports NMD; it is said that some Americans (and many Europeans) cannot believe that the US has no national missile defences in place. North Korea's launch of a long-range Taepo-dong 1 missile in 1998 convinced many people that North Korea was developing the ability to build ICBMs.
All the varied pressures a rich democracy is heir to have been working for and against deploying NMD. The arguments have been long, acrimonious and public, as befits a democracy. One has to say that the US administration's arguments are well thought out and persuasive but assume that regimes will risk becoming instant smoking ruins in order to land a few small missiles on the US. Is this credible?
SO who opposes NMD, and why? The Russians; several European governments; commentators who studied the build-up of missiles and nuclear warheads halted by the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) and the ABM treaty; organisations such as the Lawyers' Alliance for World Security (LAWS) in the US which has produced an excellent white paper on national defence. (It argues that NMD will make the US less, not more, secure). The British government seems split.
There are many who don't believe the "threat", including the anonymous writer in Jane's De- fence Weekly for March 15th who cannot accept that ill-nourished North Koreans "produce more ballistic missiles per year than the entire US".
But power has its susceptibilities. One missile landing on US soil would be a visceral technopolitical shock, damaging to an administration which had not produced an NMD.
If Mr Putin refuses ABM treaty changes, what will happen? The US might abrogate the treaty. The "nuclear theologians" are working out the possible consequences, which include restarting the nuclear arms race and more proliferation. The Clinton administration would prefer agreement. It has been stated that the North and South Korea summit will not affect US plans.
Compromises are possible. Mr Clinton has offered several, including giving NMD information to Russia. The "stewardship" of the US nuclear stockpile will cost $2.34 billion next year. Russia has ratified the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II). Agreement on a START III, with further reductions and cost cuts, might be traded for NMD deployment. Mr Putin may find Mr Clinton more amenable than a Republican president.
But election rhetoric is unreliable. The Republican President Nixon signed the original ABM treaty, now 30 years old and showing its age. It has been the linchpin of nuclear restraint. The saying is that "treaties are like girls and roses, they last as long as they last". Or perhaps the ABM treaty is more like nurse? We all fear that letting it go may bring something worse. Countries of our size would prefer to see the replacement girls, roses, and nurse before we lose any of the current ones.
coled.doyle@ireland.com