Solving deficit in democracy

In its ruling on the Maastricht Treaty the German Constitutional Court argued in 1993 that European democracy had to be based on "certain pre-legal conditions, such as continuous free debate between opposing social forces, interests and ideas, in which political goals become clarified and change course, and out of which public opinion emerges which starts to shape political will".

It argued that because such conditions did not exist in the European Union established by that treaty, "democratic legitimisation comes about through the feedback of the actions of the European institutions into the parliaments of the member-states".

This remains a very influential, if conservative, view of democracy and political legitimacy within the EU. It has much to be said for it, given the continuing lack of strong cross-national political parties or media within its political system.

But it has been strongly contested this week by the resignation of the entire European Commission after publication of a scathing report on fraud, corruption and cronyism ordered in January by the European Parliament as an alternative to voting the Commission out of office. Early on Tuesday morning it decided to resign rather than face a certain two-thirds parliamentary vote to dismiss it.

The degree of cross-national political and media consensus that this was the right outcome has been striking. So has the growing EU-wide debate on how best to make the Commission more democratically accountable. Along with the dramatic resignation of Oskar Lafontaine as German finance minister last week it is surely evidence that at last the Europeanisation of politics is beginning to catch up with the long-standing Europeanisation of public policy-making, of which the Commission is the apex.

This public policy-making, in the words of the UCD political scientist Brigid Laffan, "privileges administrative, technical and expert knowledge over political power and represents a system of government by committee". It is a dense maze of bureaucratic networks, linking middle-level officialdoms in Brussels and the member-states, scrutinised ineffectively by domestic parliaments or by the European one.

It must be remembered that this has eminently suited the national governments which put it in place. They have gained capacity and effectiveness as a result. (In the same way most of the fraud complained of by the European Parliament - little of which was proven in this week's report on the 20 commissioners - takes place at national levels, where 80 per cent of the EU budget is spent).

But national political leaders have been much slower to communicate the level of Europeanisation to their electorates. It is this gap that may now be somewhat closed, as parties, media and citizens examine the issues throughout the EU and communicate politically about them rather more effectively.

It is not surprising that this should take place just as the euro is introduced and the EU impinges much more on such core political matters as money, security, identity and borders. Within this emerging system these matters begin at home in member-states but no longer end there. It is part and parcel of an interlocking or enmeshing relationship between the national and the European that makes the EU a pioneering experiment in internationalised government. It breaks down the boundaries between domestic and foreign affairs, between politics and diplomacy.

It is based on regulation and co-ordination rather than on the expenditure of huge amounts of money. Remember that next week's wrangles over the EU budget at the European Council on Agenda 2000 in Berlin concern a mere 1.27 per cent of the EU's aggregated gross domestic product, and that the great areas of national expenditure, such as social security and welfare, health, education and the military remain largely outside its domains.

But how best to address this so-called democratic deficit? By federalising the relationship between Commission, Parliament and the Council of Ministers? That would assume, many believe, a much greater Europeanisation of political processes than has actually occurred so far or that is warranted by the balance of forces between the national centres and Brussels; these remain in many respects as the German Constitutional Court defined them.

Another political scientist, Simon Hix, argues in a detailed comparative study of democracy in the EU* that "the evidence suggests that making the Commission permanently accountable to a majority in the EP would not guarantee that EP elections became `first-order' contests: fought on `European' issues, by `European' parties.

"For at least the foreseeable future, the EU is an `upside-down political system': the institutions at national level exercise greater executive authority in most areas of public policy than the European institutions, and the media and the general public are primarily concerned with who controls these national offices".

In these circumstances Mr Hix suggests it would be better to reform the EU not into a parliamentary system along the lines of most member-state ones, but into a partial presidential one, in which the Commission president would be elected directly or indirectly.

THIS has been discussed at political level by, among others, Jacques Delors and John Bruton recently. Candidates for the Commission presidency could be required to be endorsed by at least one principal party in each of the member-states for direct election.

For an indirect one an electoral college of all national MPs and the MEPs is suggested. One way or another there would be a choice between different political mandates. This would underwrite the strengthening of the presidential office written into the Treaty of Amsterdam, which comes into effect in May and will give whoever is chosen discretionary powers to select colleagues and to organise the Commission more effectively.

As is usual with the EU, this political debate about democratic legitimacy, while historic, comes too late to affect June's direct elections to the EP. The parliament is definitely a winner in the confrontation with the Commission and gets more powers from the latest treaty, both to ratify the Commission and in legislative co-decision; but new accountability procedures will have to wait the next Inter-Governmental Council.

Its remit may well be broadened beyond the expected agenda of Commission representation and weighting of national votes after these events to include a a more clearcut statement of constitutional norms, as was proposed in these pages by the Czech President, Vaclav Havel, this week. It is a standing feature of political affairs, after all, that popular enthusiasm for change often outstrips established caution once the penny drops.

West European Politics, July 1998