OPINION:Human nature tends to devise self-serving escape methods other than national teamwork, writes JOE HUMPHREYS.
THERE IS a fatal spirit of non-co-operation in the air. Fat cat bosses are clutching greedily to contracts negotiated in the boom times. Trade unions are threatening mass protests. Every sectional interest in the economy is pledging to give not an inch.
This is clearly the road to ruin, and the Government must try to avoid it. But how?
Well, some answers can be found in psychology and related research on why people co-operate. The American scientist Robert Axelrod conducted landmark studies in this area in the 1980s for his book The Evolution of Co-operation. He asked: “Under what conditions will co-operation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority?” (A world, in other words, not unlike Ireland today).
His conclusion, derived principally from staging thousands of tit-for-tat simulation games, is deceptively simple. Mutual co-operation can be promoted by 1: making the future more important relative to the present; 2: changing the payoffs; and 3: teaching people values, facts and skills that will promote co-operation.
All are highly relevant to our situation. We are mired in the present (some of us, arguably, still haven’t left the past) and unless we can collectively imagine a future after the recession, then our basic interactions are likely to be selfish rather than co-operative.
Teaching people about reciprocity and “how to care”, as Axelrod also recommends, might build social solidarity too, but not as much, surely, as changing the payoffs for individuals who either agree or refuse to co-operate.
Game theory shows that in a “prisoner’s dilemma”, where two “players” wonder whether to co-operate or defect, the optimum strategy, all things being equal, is to adopt a tit-for-tat stance. A concept used in economics too, the “prisoner’s dilemma” refers to a situation where someone knows it is best to co-operate but fears their willingness to do so will be exploited (a situation which will also probably resonate with Irish workers).
But, through his experiments, Axelrod found: “If the punishment for defection is so great that co-operation is the best choice in the short run, no matter what the other player does, then there is no longer a dilemma.”
The finding has implications for policymakers. It would suggest, first, that the Government should take a much tougher stance on people who try to dodge paying tax. It would also suggest that those who refuse to accept their share of the pain be treated unmercifully. For instance, judges who fail to cough up the pension levy could be suspended or disbarred.
Such actions are not about revenge (or at least they shouldn’t be). They are about demonstrating that reciprocity is the only game in town.
The Government’s minimalist reform of Oireachtas pay and perks provides a depressing backdrop. So too its limited attempts to cut corporate pay in the bailed-out banks. Minister for Finance Brian Lenihan has repeatedly argued that existing contracts must be honoured, but this legalistic stance ignores the fact that payoffs can be changed – even retrospectively. If he so wished, he could make life very uncomfortable for some people who believe they have escaped the net.
What goes for bankers, moreover, goes for everyone else. There is no point telling electricians that pay rates negotiated in the boom times can’t be honoured if you are also insisting, for example, that the €2,500-a-day deal done with tribunal lawyers is non-negotiable.
The scale of the Government’s task can’t be underestimated. Lamely appealing to patriotism won’t work (at best, patriotism appears to be a byproduct rather than a source of co-operation). And speaking about “restoring trust” between sections of society is overly optimistic. Judging by the dire industrial relations situation and the general mood of anger and recrimination, we are close to year zero in terms of the evolution of co-operation.
Research shows, moreover, that even in the best of times it is devilishly difficult to get people to co-operate. A study carried out by a pair of economists in Zurich a few years ago showed how people, in a trade-off situation, preferred to seek revenge against those who had “got one over them” rather than actually improve their own conditions.
Axelrod has some advice for us here too. If we are in a “prisoner’s dilemma” scenario, wondering whether to co-operate, he recommends: 1: don’t be envious; 2: don’t be the first to defect; 3: reciprocate both co-operation and defection; and 4: don’t be too clever (by, for instance, always trying to second-guess what others will do).
Are these the sort of strategies we need if we are to dig ourselves out of the hole we are in? If so, don’t expect to hear them from a macroeconomist.
Joe Humphreys is an Irish Timesjournalist