BEFORE the Good Friday document, the six-county state was an undemocratic, illegitimate and failed political entity and after it, it remains so. The Good Friday document is itself a testament to that.
The special provisions for power-sharing in the executive, checks and balances in the Assembly, equality measures and an all-Ireland Ministerial Council confirm the true nature, status and limitations of the six-county state. Nowhere else in "these islands", and almost nowhere else in Europe, can such distinctive arrangements be found.
The Good Friday agreement is but part - an essential part but part only - of a wider peace process, firmly set in the context of conflict resolution, whose primary objective is the removal of the causes of conflict. That is, an ongoing process which is much wider and deeper than the agreement itself but of which the agreement is the essential element of this phase.
Implementation of the agreement in all its aspects, therefore, is critical to developments in the wider process.
The agreement can be a transitional phase to a lasting peace settlement. It was negotiated and endorsed by the two governments, the UUP, SDLP, Sinn Fein, Alliance, PUP, WC and the UDP.
It was democratically endorsed in referendums, North and South, by over 80 per cent of the Irish electorate.
It represents a historic compromise, the essential compromise for this phase of the process. The provisions of the agreement relate to:
the constitutional issues;
the institutions;
rights, safeguards, equality of opportunity;
demilitarisation of society;
policing;
justice;
decommissioning;
prisoners.
The agreement makes categoric provision for the establishment of political institutions. Principally, the new Assembly, its executive, the North-South Ministerial Council, the associated all-Ireland implementation bodies, the Civic Forum and the British-Irish Council.
The establishment of these political institutions is mandatory. Politically, their establishment and proper functioning is self-evidently important to the creation of a positive climate in which the many outstanding issues can be addressed.
That is, the positive climate engendered by the experience and practice of shared responsibilities, decision-making and policy-implementation inherent in the powers and responsibilities attached to those institutions.
The institutions are, therefore, a foundation stone for further progress. Their establishment and functioning are indispensable, both under the terms of the agreement and in terms of political progress.
Of course, several critical issues were not resolved by the agreement. These include policing; justice; human rights; equality in all its dimensions; demilitarisation; and decommissioning.
Instead, a number of mechanisms were agreed by which these matters would be addressed with a view to resolution. These include the Independent Commission on Policing, a review of the justice system, human rights and equality commissions and the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning.
There is no uniformity attached to the provisions on these various issues. For obvious reasons, different provisions are attached to different issues and the mechanisms by which they are to be addressed. The issues themselves have yet to be resolved.
So the Good Friday agreement acknowledged the extent of political difficulties which have to be resolved if we are to establish a peaceful and stable society. It is not a peace settlement in itself, but it does map out the structures and mechanisms which, if put in place and operated, can move us towards a durable peace.
The agreement, to realise this potential, has to be implemented. The change, which it promised, has to become a reality.
Claims that every element of the agreement has been, or is being, implemented - with the sole exception of decommissioning - do not stand up to scrutiny. Nor does the Ulster Unionist Party pretence that it has supported and encouraged progress on all these other elements of the agreement. In fact, the opposite is the case.
The "spirit of the agreement", so often referred to in the context of decommissioning, has been singularly absent in the UUP approach to the overall peace process and many of the issues which are central to it.
The UUP opposed the opening of negotiations. It tried to prevent Sinn Fein participation in those negotiations; it tried repeatedly to have Sinn Fein expelled from the negotiations. The UUP finally met Sinn Fein in direct bilateral discussions only last month, six years into the peace process, 20 months into the second IRA cessation and almost 11 months after the signing of the agreement.
And this negative approach is not restricted to Sinn Fein. The UUP opposed the legislation on the release of prisoners, an integral part of the agreement which it signed up to, and has campaigned consistently to have the release of prisoners slowed down or stopped.
The UUP has blocked the establishment of the institutions which it agreed on Good Friday. It has attempted to neuter the all-Ireland structures. It has called for the suspension of the policing commission. It has resisted every move towards demilitarisation; opposed the removal of repressive legislation; attempted to create categories of victim, with some deemed more deserving than others; and has determinedly attempted to rewrite the Good Friday agreement on its own terms.
The reality is that the Good Friday agreement is still in the process of implementation. It is also a reality that, where possible, its implementation has been blocked or slowed by the UUP. Progress has been made in some areas but the effect of unionist opposition is that we have achieved much less in the last 12 months than was possible.
This recalcitrant approach has had most effect and done most to retard progress in terms of the political institutions.
THE Good Friday agreement states: "Following the election of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, the posts of ministers will be allocated to parties on the basis of the d'Hondt system by reference to the number of seats each party has in the Assembly.
"The ministers will constitute an executive Committee, which will be convened, and presided over, by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (Strand One).
"As soon as practically possible after elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly, inaugural meetings will take place of the Assembly, the British-Irish Council and the North/South Ministerial Council in their transitional forms. All three institutions will meet regularly and frequently on this basis during the period between the elections to the Assembly, and the transfer of powers to the Assembly, in order to establish their modus operandi (Strand Two)."
The agreement in specific and categoric terms makes provision for the early establishment of inclusive political institutions, including all-Ireland institutions as the political foundation on which to build. Unionists have sought to rewrite the actual provisions of the agreement on this issue by superimposing the demand for decommissioning as a precondition. Eleven months after the agreement and 10 months after elections to mandate the participants in these new institutions, they have still not been established.
The refusal to establish the executive and the all-Ireland Ministerial Council is not an isolated blip in the implementation of the agreement. This is not a difference of interpretation or emphasis. It is in fundamental conflict with the provisions of the agreement. It is undemocratic and a denial of the rights and wishes of the vast majority of the people of Ireland who voted for the agreement on May 22nd last year.
Of course, the UUP has attempted to justify its refusal to implement the agreement on the basis of its judgment that no progress has been made on decommissioning.
The UUP has, subsequent to the agreement, attempted to impose a precondition for the establishment of the institutions and has, effectively, exercised a unilateral veto over a multi-party and democratically-endorsed agreement.
The fact is that decommissioning was raised consistently during the negotiations, it was discussed in the greatest detail and a mechanism was agreed for dealing with this issue. That mechanism is the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning, headed by Gen John de Chastelain.
It is this independent body which is tasked with dealing with this issue and it is this body which must make judgments on whether progress is being made. There is, also in the agreement, a mechanism for removing from executive office anyone who is not committed to democratic and peaceful means.
Mr David Trimble, in his position as First Minister, has attempted to usurp the role of the IICD. The UUP may desire this but the reality is that there is no decommissioning precondition in the agreement. If there had been Sinn Fein would not have been able to sign up to it because it is something we simply cannot deliver.
What we can do is fulfil our commitment under the terms of the agreement. This is what we are prepared to do. By changing the political conditions, by developing a viable and credible process of peaceful change, it also represents the only realistic prospect of resolving this sensitive issue.
Decommissioning is, therefore, a problem to be overcome collectively, through changing and improving the political conditions. The irony is that by presenting this as a demand, and by blocking political progress on the basis of this demand, the UUP is making the resolution of this issue much more difficult.
Its approach is certainly not in keeping with its commitment in the agreement to "work constructively and in good faith" and "to use any influence they may have" to resolve the issue of decommissioning.
Progress has also still to be made over a range of other issues. For example, the Good Friday agreement identifies the right to freedom from sectarian harassment as a core human right. The right to freedom from sectarian harassment is a right but not yet a reality for nationalists living in the North.
Sectarian intimidation and attacks on Catholic families and communities persist. Loyalist groups continue to use grenades, guns and petrol bombs in attacks on nationalists. The Garvaghy Road experience is the most systematic and sustained example of sectarian harassment, inflicted by the Orange Order on a small nationalist community and in Mr Trimble's own constituency.
And, of course, the Orange Order is organically linked to the UUP.
Progress has still to be made over many issues: policing, demilitarisation, equality, justice, human rights and, of course, decommissioning. At the level of the everyday lives of nationalists, there is no significant positive change vis-a-vis any of these matters since the agreement was reached. But it is crucial that none of these be, or become, a precondition to progress.
The Good Friday agreement was endorsed by the overwhelming majority of Irish people in May. It has many elements to it, some more palatable than others. But taken together, they make up the overall package which was the essential political compromise reached last Easter. The potential of the agreement only becomes real through its implementation. That has not yet been completed; in fact, in many areas it has not even begun.
The implementation of the agreement is a process which was mapped out on Good Friday. This programme needs to be adhered to. Sinn Fein is committed to the totality of the agreement. Despite our political reservations, we want to see it implemented in all its aspects. That is the responsibility of all those who negotiated and agreed the Good Friday document, including the two governments. That remains our priority.
Gerry Adams MP is president of Sinn Fein.