Let us get to the heart of the matter. What we have witnessed in the "peace process" crisis of the last weeks has been a festival of ethnic rage and low gradery. David Trimble was being asked to deliver a power-sharing executive in the North without prior decommissioning, yet in the European election in June, 12 out of 13 unionist voters supported candidates who declared "no guns no government". Ask Bertie Ahern to go against his constituency in this way. What would be his response?
The failure of the strategy thus far should make us all pause for reflection. It could never have worked, because had Mr Trimble yielded, he would have been destroyed and with him the agreement. However, for nationalist and republican Ireland, this is a moment of truth. Mr Trimble spent the dying days of the negotiation seeking help from republicans - an IRA statement of good intent - and the Irish government and the SDLP.
All he got was talk about an Orange centre on the Boyne - "the dreadful sound of Dr Martin Mansergh scraping the barrel", as one of Mr Trimble's allies put it.
Has nationalist Ireland said its last word on the subject? Is a suggestion that decommissioning might occur all that is on offer?
It has to be said, however, that low gradery is not confined to nationalist Ireland. Much of the unionist contribution to the debate in the House of Commons was, quite simply, behind the game. Why does Dr Ian Paisley appear to think that Articles 2 and 3 are certain to stay with us for two years, when one advantage of the Way Forward proposals is that the Articles would rapidly have been restructured?
Few on the unionist side seems to have a full grasp of the precise offer which was being made: in part, to be fair, because the legislation was unclear on key points (such as the fate of the implementation bodies) but also because many unionists were so angry that they were unable to calculate rationally. Such emotionalism is never an advantage in political life.
The SDLP is now also in a very difficult position. If the agreement falls under these circumstances, Sinn Fein will gain massively in the North's Catholic and nationalist community; it may seem far-fetched to say it in the wake of Mr Seamus Mallon's traumatic resignation speech, but the SDLP has to work its way rapidly towards an understanding with the Ulster Unionist Party because continued sectarian polarisation will condemn it - quite conceivably as early as the next general election - to a subordinate, defensive role within pan nationalism.
What elements of hope remain? It is important to recall that Mr Trimble defines his leadership in contrast to that of his predecessor, Jim (now Lord) Molyneaux. Trimble admires Molyneaux's circumspection and tactical skill, but notes that it all went into the service of one political objective - retaining control of the province's largest political party. Today, having resisted the hype, the intense pressure and ineffective spin doctoring of the process, Mr Trimble's control of the Ulster Unionist Party is solid; in the middle of last week, his party opponents were set for the final kill.
Remember, Trimble does not want to be another Molyneaux. He wants to take unionism out of the ghetto and make the historic compromise with republicanism and nationalism. He knows that the comforting numbers in last week's Gallup poll of UK opinion depend above all on his ability to project a modernising image.
He has always dreaded the day when he might have to live with London press coverage attributing a failure in the peace process to him.
Last week he had no choice but to take that risk, but the commentary in the market leaders stretching from UK broadsheet through to tabloid, remained balanced and, in several instances ,highly sympathetic. Only BBC Northern Ireland, in the grip of an incurious provincial political correctness 10 years out of date, really stepped up the anti-Trimble message.
The logic of Mr Trimble's position is clear. He has moved away from any pedantic conception of prior decommissioning. He wishes his own community to have the opportunity to ponder calmly the options, rather as it did over the admission of Sinn Fein to talks in the autumn of 1997.
However, to achieve a repeat performance and set up the executive will still be an enormously difficult task. The key player, as always, will be the British government, which has just given us a text-book example of how not to do it but is more likely than any of the other elements (Dublin, the republicans, the SDLP and the unionists) to be able to learn from mistakes and improve performance. This autumn, quiet private discussions away from the pressure cooker atmosphere of Castle Buildings is the most likely way to achieve success and the final implementation of the agreement.
There is understandable dismay and frustration within nationalist Ireland arising out of the week's failure, but the fact remains that the agreement offers a great deal to Irish nationalism: unionists have always been much less enthusiastic at the best of times.
In last week's legislation, the Blair government sent out an important signal - joint authority is not on the agenda, despite the fears of some and the hopes of others; indeed, the Blairistas appear to regard joint authority as just another 1980s intellectual fad which has had its day.
The consequence is unavoidable: if nationalist Ireland really wants to save the agreement, and get the best possible deal for itself, it is going to have to forego the joys of self-righteous indignation - but can it rise to the challenge? The omens are not good: riding on another man's wound is too great a pleasure.
Professor Paul Bew is professor of Irish Politics at Queen's University, Belfast