World View/Carl O'Brien: Every morning, without fail, a file of between five and 25 pages lands on the desks of counter-terrorism officials in the US State Department. The "terror threat matrix report" is a daily compilation of telecommunication intercepts and old-fashioned intelligence gathering detailing the daily threat facing the US and its interests.
"It's not exactly cheery reading," one senior State Department official nonchalantly told The Irish Times, "but it does get the heart going every once and a while."
The US's coiled spring approach to the terror threat is one of many differences in perception of the war on terror which have contributed to unprecedented stresses and strains in the Atlantic partnership between the EU and the US.
The sources of tension have been many: the September 11th attack was perceived in different ways, the redefinition of security policy divided both and, ultimately, disagreement over the war in Iraq intensified all these concerns.
Continuing European integration and a new array of threats facing the West has for the first time in decades led Europeans and Americans to question the durability and necessity of this alliance.
In just over three weeks at the EU-US summit in Dromoland Castle, Co Clare - billed as an attempt to narrow the transatlantic rift - key questions on redefining this relationship will be addressed.
In the starkest terms, each side has the option of allowing the relationship to drift to the point where each operates on the principle that it will pursue its own specific interests, co-operate where they can, but that they are no longer bound by any special relationship.
Or else they can reshape the close relationship which has existed for the last five decades to the point where they would be prepared to do things for each other beyond the narrow confines of their respective narrow interests and actually define a common purpose.
In many ways, the nature of the international system will be crucially determined by what decisions are made in the weeks and months ahead. For both sides, it would appear, the path of partnership and the objective of co-operation appears the best course.
Most European governments agree that Europe and the US have far more to gain as allies than as neutrals. And, despite some signs to the contrary in recent times, US government officials are anxious to stress that they see Europe as an indispensable ally.
The US's strength, they say, its ability to use its influence in the world, depends on its legitimacy. This, in turn, depends on its ability to co-operate with other nations, especially Europe. And so the future of the transatlantic partnership is still of profound importance. US officials are also keen to emphasise that a unified Europe defined as a partner rather than as a counterweight to the US is in the global interest.
This all sounds very well, but how the rhetoric of continued partnership will survive increasingly turbulent international conditions is another matter. In this case the report of an independent task force, Reviewing the Atlantic Partnership, sponsored by the US-based Council on Foreign Relations, makes for interesting reading.
The task force, consisting of Europeans and Americans, including Dr Henry Kissinger, says Europe and the US should reassess existing principles governing the use of military force and seek to reach agreement on new "rules of the road" for pre-emptive action.
It also argues that Europe and the US should develop a common policy towards states that possess weapons of mass destruction or that support terrorism. The "rules of the road" is perhaps one of the most pressing issues facing the alliance. The task force suggests that these rules could begin by reaching consensus on what not to do regarding pre-emptive military action. It suggests, for example, that Europeans could agree not to reject pre-emptive action in principle, while Americans would agree that pre-emption would be reserved for special cases and would not be the centrepiece of its policy.
In dealing with "irresponsible states", the task force says guidelines on the use of force will need to take into account their divergent views. While US leaders have generally favoured containment and confrontation, European leaders have generally opted for negotiation and accommodation. The task force suggests that the EU should acknowledge the need for credible threats in dealing with rogue states, while Americans should be more open to including inducements in their strategy.
The task force also addressed the future of NATO, the need for agreement on the role of international institutions such as the UN, and the need for Europeans and Americans to work together to promote political and economic reform in the greater Middle East, along with expanding development and trade.
As the report points out, it remains as true today as when the post-war transatlantic community first emerged, that politics and economics are intertwined and are vital to the development of the EU-US relationship.
Despite such obvious and urgent priorities, whether the new direction of the Atlantic partnership will, in the long-term, be based on continued partnership to advance common values in a world of very different threats and opportunities, or whether it will be based on division, still very much remains to be seen.