Mugabe and his kind should be given no second chances

ANALYSIS: The situation in Zimbabwe can only go from bad to worse

ANALYSIS:The situation in Zimbabwe can only go from bad to worse

HUMAN RIGHTS Watch reported recently that torture camps have been established in particular provinces of Zimbabwe where government-hired thugs can beat and mutilate opposition members.

This horrific development prompts two questions: are elections dangerous in underdeveloped countries? And will this upsurge in government violence lead to the establishment of a rebel group and a subsequent civil war?

The answer to both questions is no. A transition to democracy is a painful process, made especially more difficult when a governing authority is unwilling to accept the results. But the violence occurring in Zimbabwe is similar to that in Kenya, in that all surrounding countries are eager to suppress an actual civil war. Regional leaders will suppress any chance of Mugabe's forced overthrow, as Zimbabwe is an important linchpin in southern Africa.

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This tacit regional policy will allow for both the current upsurge of violence and the underlying structural violence to continue.

People could think that Zimbabwe and Kenya demonstrate that elections (that is, democracy) lead to violence. Indeed they can, and often do, in already unstable countries. This, in turn, can lead to more organised forms of violence, while opposition groups can morph into rebel groups.

However, the relationship between elections and violence is partially a function of numbers - there are many more prospective democracies now, mainly due to international demands for democratic reform. Many of the bedrocks necessary for functional democracies, such as transparent governance, fair legal and voting systems, and equitable growth, are not present in these new democracies.

And "partial democracies" do not have a good track record; in fact, they are often more unstable and violent than autocratic governments.

Such political instability can lead to violence if the aggrieved parties can organise. Many believe that civil wars are the natural response to grievance. In that case, civil war should be on the horizon for Zimbabwe as people have had to suffer through famines (entirely government-created), economic ruin (again, due to government policies) and political repression.

But these people will not create a civil war; rarely do the poorest and most marginalised members of a society overthrow their repressors. Instead, opportunity is the key to the establishment of a rebel group and the onset of a war. Opportunity comes in various guises: the acquisition of resource wealth or the support of a benefactor can tip an unstable country towards war.

Although it gets little international attention compared to resource-driven wars, the support of a neighbouring country is a critical factor for most rebel groups, and has been especially important to sub-Saharan African civil wars.

In the Zimbabwean case, this has worked in the opposite direction. Zimbabwe is critically important to the stability of southern Africa. This may come as a surprise as we have watched it implode economically, socially and politically over the past 10 years.

However, Mugabe's standing in Africa is such that his being overthrown through violence would be thought of as irreparably harming the stability and reputation of other leaders. Keeping him in power is essential for many to justify their own forms of personal and repressive rule.

In Thabo Mbeki's case, Mugabe represents a looming threat he can present to his detractors to bolster his own sense of pragmatism and responsible rule. He can contain Zimbabwe, and use the political implosion there to his benefit.

In doing so, South Africa and other supportive countries allow for the perpetuation of structural violence. This will not lead to many dead bodies on the street to be photographed for the international press, but to the slow and painful destruction of people's ability to sustain their livelihoods, to live without crippling fear and to question their government.

Yet Mbeki's and Mugabe's actions are not surprising. In fact, they are quite rational responses to challenges to their power. They cry that western democracies impose external solutions to African problems and that the international community has no right to involve itself in domestic affairs. While is true that the "international community" hardly acts perfectly and has severe biases, it cannot sit back and continue to watch the deadly circus act that is African governance (with important exceptions, of course).

Mugabe and his kind should be given no refuge or second chances.

Many call for dialogue during these tense times. But dialogue assumes that political leaders are open to changing those very policies that allow them to stay in power. Such actions tacitly deny the great and continued suffering under the hands of leaders often not supported by their fellow citizens.

While it is true that the forced removal of Mugabe might lead to temporary regional instability, his continued "rule" is definitely leading to both domestic and regional instability, violence against civilians and the perpetration of structural violence in Zimbabwe and beyond.

Clionadh Raleigh is a researcher at the University of Essex