Little to lose, much to gain by including Sinn Fein

WE CAN have the ceasefire back but First there can be no guarantees that the ceasefire will be forever. Second, Sinn Fein will have to be left in on all party talks on a settlement without meeting even the conditions laid down in the Mitchell commission report.

This is disappointing, maybe even a little humiliating but we should take it because, in spite of all this, there remains a prospect of reaching a comprehensive overall settlement which would copper fasten peace and stability forever justice is another matter.

I spoke on radio for more than an hour on Monday night to Martin McGuinness. I asked him, given his insight into IRA thinking, what in his opinion it would take to reinstate the ceasefire.

He said at first that a statement by the two governments that they would move immediately to all party talks would reinstate the ceasefire in his opinion. Then he said there would have to be "absolute confidence" and a "guarantee" that the two governments would move to all party talks.

I asked if such "absolute confidence" were created and such "guarantee" were given would the new ceasefire, in his opinion, be permanent. He said there was nothing permanent in life. I pointed out that the Progressive Democrats or the Alliance Party would have no difficulty in giving a "permanent" guarantee that they would not support the use of violence in the pursuit of a political goal (I should have said "illegal violence"), why could he not give the same kind of commitment on behalf of Sinn Fein?

He said that if we could be assured that there would be an end to injustice, an end the decrimination and an end to the "undemocratic state" then we could talk of a permanent ceasefire.

I went on to ask Martin McGuinness whether Sinn Fein could accept the Mitchell principles I had written recently that neither Sinn Fein nor the IRA would accept all of them and a prominent Sinn Fein person had gone out of their way to inform me I was mistaken about that. I asked him whether specifically Sinn Fein accepted the principle "to agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree".

He started his answer by saying that his response would probably not be satisfactory to me. It wasn't. He said this was a matter for negotiation, that people should not try to back Sinn Fein into corners at this time, that issues such as this should not be debated on the airwaves, that people should not now be seeking further preconditions for talks. Manifestly, his answer was no, Sinn Fein could not accept this principle.

NOW Martin McGuinness is undoubtedly one of those who took most risks for peace in the last two years. If the process and Gerry Adams embarked upon went badly wrong for the republican movement one or both of them could have lost not just their credibility or their political positions but their lives. Nobody else, not Albert Reynolds, not John Hume, not John major, not John Bruton, has taken anything like such risks. But precisely because he was in a position to take such risks his views on the IRA's position must be taken very seriously.

Incidentally, isn't it a little surprising that Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness knew nothing about the ending of the ceasefire until media reports informed them of what had happened last Friday evening? Would you not think that out of politeness or comradeship the IRA would have found ways of letting Adams and McGuinness know in advance that the ceasefire was ending, given that it was these two who persuaded the IRA into a ceasefire in the first place and given that these were the people apart from the victims that would be most directly affected?

But back to the message coming from Martin McGuinness on Monday evening that the cease fire could be reinstituted only if there were "absolute confidence" that there would be all party talks without further delay and that such a cease fire would not be declared as permanent. First, on the all party talks issue.

Whether preceded by elections or otherwise, it is now clear the British and Irish governments agree all party talks should happen quickly. Sinn Fein and one presumes the IRA are implacably opposed to elections but there does not seem to be an issue of principle here if assurance is given that this is not a signal or a mechanism for an "internal Six County" settlement and if elections are established clearly as merely the means of speedily starting all party talks.

SO IT would seem to be possible, with a little fine tuning, to meet the IRA requirement for a reinstatement of the ceasefire, provided Sinn Fein is permitted to enter such all party talks.

But there are two obvious difficulties with this First, it seems the ceasefire will not be declared to be permanent and, in view of last Friday's bombing, any "working assumption" that a new cease fire would be permanent is implausible. Second, it seems obvious that Sinn Fein cannot accept the Mitchell principles in total and thus cannot meet even the compromise preconditions for involvement in all party talks.

So either Sinn Fein is excluded from such talks, in which case the ceasefire will not be reinstated and the likelihood is that there will be a reversion to a full scale IRA campaign or Sinn Fein is allowed partake in talks in conditions that most democrats would accept as unsatisfactory.

Here the bogey of "principle" intrudes. It is possible to find a principle for all occasions and to justify almost any action.

The clear objective in relation to Northern Ireland now is not to teach democratic manners to Sinn Fein and the IRA but to reach an overall settlement that will secure peace and stability for generations. It is manifestly the case that this has the best chance of being achieved now by including Sinn Fein in all party talks on a settlement and by the reinstatement now of an IRA ceasefire, even though it is not declared to be permanent.

These are not ideal circumstances in which to conduct negotiations but the little to be lost by so doing is far exceeded by the potential gains. And it is not as though there is no hope of reaching a settlement.

The Framework Document provided the basis for such a settlement, one that could be sold to republicans and loyalists at least as the foundation from which they could pursue their different political objectives through peaceful democratic means.