An Garda Síochána needs more than institutional reforms - it needs the change in culture that those reforms can bring, writes Dr Barry Vaughan
The revelations of the second Morris tribunal report about Garda behaviour in Donegal are shocking. Once they have sunk in, the question of how a recurrence can be prevented becomes imperative.
Good police work is dependent on allowing officers discretion to act as they see fit within an accountability framework.
This latitude can degenerate, as the two reports from the Morris tribunal have shown, into self-serving behaviour by some if not properly monitored.
However, the culture of police organisations can impede such scrutiny since loyalty and trust in one's colleagues is considered essential.
Obviously, such a culture is helpful when gardaí are required to undertake dangerous or stressful duties. But "cop culture" goes awry when protecting colleagues is valued above the moral and legal standards of a community, and when some circle the wagons as decisions are reviewed.
Any changes designed to make An Garda Síochána more accountable must take this culture into account.
The most frequently discussed proposal to render gardaí more accountable is an ombudsman such as exists in Northern Ireland.
This is an independent civilian body that investigates complaints against police officers. Looking beyond the gardaí, we have witnessed a growing trend toward such independent oversight and regulation of many facets of the work of professions in Ireland.
The effectiveness of such oversight is an important matter. It is assumed, almost automatically, that an ombudsman structure, as provided for in the Garda Síochána Bill 2004, produces more satisfactory outcomes than the current system of gardaí investigating themselves.
One of the problems with relying on an ombudsman-type complaints system to uphold standards is that, by definition, an allegation of misconduct must have occurred before the system can take effect.
Another difficulty is that it is not clear that a greater proportion of complaints are substantiated under an ombudsman-type system, since cases often boil down to the word of the complainant against that of a police officer.
And the procedures required to ensure justice to all sides can lead to dissatisfaction as inquiries tend to be protracted. Some studies suggest that complainants may prefer an informal resolution such as an explanation or apology. Police officers sometimes claim that an ombudsman inhibits them from doing their jobs.
Somewhat surprisingly, however, research shows that most police officers actually accept civilian oversight as part of the rules of the game.
Other elements in the Garda Síochána Bill 2004, which is currently being debated in the Oireachtas, may have a greater impact in preventing causes for complaint.
Here the proposed Garda inspectorate will play an important role. Unlike the ombudsman, it could impact directly on police culture by shaping and monitoring standards and procedures.
As envisaged, the inspectorate will act as the eyes and ears of the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform to ensure that the gardaí are measuring up to best standards.
The equivalent body in England and Wales is characterised as the "principal professional police adviser" to the home secretary, but is independent both of the Home Office and police. Such independence allows the English inspectorate to undertake broad-ranging reviews of police forces and advise on training and promotions.
Rather than reduce political control of the force, an independent inspectorate enhances it by ensuring that the standards, designated by government, are maintained. Giving the Garda inspectorate the same level of autonomy would achieve the objectives of those who have argued for a "police authority" to oversee gardaí.
Another significant development proposed in the Bill is the establishment of policing committees. These would comprise local authority representatives and officials, gardaí, business associations and community representatives.
The intent is to allow policing to become more responsive to local concerns, but also more strategic in acting against crime and disorder.
These proposals may put community policing back on the front foot after it has faltered in recent years.
This would require that the gardaí invigorate and promote the role of community policing within their organisation.
The reports from the Morris tribunal show that some members believed the route to advancement was in claiming responsibility for high-profile criminal detections or, as it is put more colloquially, "getting a good collar", rather than the more low-profile work of liaising with communities.
The dangers in such an imperative are now obvious, as innocent people can be falsely implicated in crimes they never committed. Local forums, in which policing matters are discussed, may help to provide an early-warning system through which people can register their concerns. Among the inspectorate's important tasks should be the promotion of best practice in the working of these committees.
An Garda Síochána won its good reputation because it was embedded in the communities it served, respectful of their standards and responsive to their needs.
The reports of the Morris tribunal show a small section of the force turning away from the community to further its own ends. Only a programme of institutional change can ensure a Garda culture attuned to the community's highest standards and committed to its service.
A Garda inspectorate working to uphold standards and promoting community policing offers the best prospect for this.