Within the EU, Ireland has national interests which must be safeguarded. Some of these may require attention for a limited time when they relate to specific policy areas to be decided at a particular time. During the 1970s and 1980s, this was the case, for example, in respect of fishery quotas, milk quotas and maximising structural funds.
Yet pursuing too many national interests simultaneously with excessive zeal, especially if some of them are not vital to the national interest, can be - and during the 1990s was - counter-productive in terms of the goodwill of our neighbours.
This has especially been the case for a country such as Ireland, which has benefited so significantly from the goodwill of other member-states.
There are long-term vital national interests which are much more fundamental than any individual interests of the type just mentioned, and it should be clear that our European strategy must be built on a clear recognition of these more fundamental interests.
Let me illustrate this point.
In the light of European history, one might have expected that an institution which from the outset has comprised powers like Germany, France and Italy, and has for for many years also included Britain and Spain, would be an uncomfortable environment for small states like Ireland, Luxembourg, Denmark and Finland.
Yet the precise opposite has been the case. It is the smaller states which have fared best within the EU. Not alone have most of them secured higher growth rates than their larger neighbours, but they have also been remarkably free from any exploitation they might have expected from larger member-states.
This has not been due to an outburst of virtue on the part of the bigger powers, although it would be ungenerous not to recognise the genuine goodwill which Ireland has sometimes been shown by larger countries.
The reason why the experience of smaller EU states has been so favourable has been the unique nature of the EU's institutional structures and that only the independent European Commission can initiate legislation.
The key point is that under the treaties which established the Community, larger states simply have no capacity to propose measures which would benefit them at the expense of smaller countries. Nor can states, however large, later amend Commission proposals for their benefit. No Commission proposal can be amended save by unanimity.
It should be clear that the most vital national interest of Ireland, and other smaller member-states, lies in the preservation and, where possible, enhancement of the key role of the Commission. This stance, which I made a key element of our EU policy in May 1973 following my appointment as minister for foreign affairs, has in principle been sustained by all subsequent governments.
I say "in principle" because the logic of this stance implies not merely supporting the Commission's position as between the institutions of the EU but also putting forward on every occasion the strongest possible candidate for the position of Irish Commissioner. While we have had some outstanding Commissioners, these appointments have undoubtedly been over-influenced by domestic party considerations.
Although the Commission's key role is embedded in the treaties, it remains possible for it to be weakened - and more than once this has been attempted.
One of these moves led to the emergence of the European Council in 1975, involving heads of government meeting several times a year instead of at intervals of several years.
At that time we were able by diplomacy, and with the help of some other smaller states, to reduce the potential threat which this move posed to the primacy of the Commission and to the key role of the General Affairs Council of Foreign Ministers.
Within that council, an element of collegiality between ministers, which is less evident between heads of government who meet much less frequently, has offered some protection against large power dominance.
Nevertheless, although some dangerous elements in that project were then eliminated, we should be conscious of the dangers which can still occasionally be posed by meetings of the European Council.
These are meetings at which small countries' leaders tend to be disadvantageously placed visa-vis the heads of government of larger states. This is especially so if proposals not signalled in advance of the meeting are sprung on heads of government without warning.
Moreover, in such cases the Commission is also psychologically disadvantaged, sometimes finding it difficult to challenge an unexpected initiative by the heads of government emanating from a larger state or states.
Thus the trend towards enhancing the role of the European Council, now being pressed by some larger states, needs to be monitored.
It is clear our interests also lie with minimising inter-governmentalism - proposals for action by the EU states outside the Community decision-making framework - because the larger states have a clear advantage in such action. For small states it is better that as many decisions as possible be brought within the Community decision-making framework.
A corollary of all this is that our interests lie generally - although not in all cases - with the extension of qualified majority voting and the minimisation of unanimity decision-making. This has never been well understood in Ireland because of an "inferiority complex" reaction: a belief that as a small country we need to be able to veto proposals which might be to our disadvantage.
There are areas where this is true, most notably the tax harmonisation area, where some large countries have recently shown an interest in forcing corporate tax rates up to their own excessive levels.
By and large, the unanimity decision-making has been used - and sometimes abused - mainly by large countries. In practice, small countries can threaten to withhold consent to a proposal only when a vital national interest is at stake, which is rare. For small states to abuse this right in other cases would be very counter-productive in terms of the negative reactions this would evoke from larger partners.
THERE is one policy area which is particularly sensitive for us. Whatever views one may hold on the issue of Irish participation in military alliances such as NATO - and I have never hidden my minority view on this subject - so long as a majority of the Irish people remain opposed to such participation, Irish governments must maintain this stance.
This means that in respect of any proposal to incorporate the Western European Union alliance (WEU) within the EU, our Government must ensure that Article 5 of that Treaty, requiring member-states to come to the aid of partners who have been attacked, is not applied to member-states who do not wish to undertake this obligation.
The situation in relation to this matter is non-threatening from our point of view. The Koln European Council has simply given a mandate to the forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference to prepare the modalities for the inclusion of those functions of the WEU which will be necessary if the EU is to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg Tasks, i.e. peace-keeping and peace-enforcement, which our Army is now carrying out in Kosovo and East Timor.
Some member-states would like to see all members committed to mutual support under article 5 of the WEU Treaty, something which Irish public opinion is not prepared to accept. This is, however, unlikely to be pressed and, if pressed, could be successfully resisted without damage to our relations with other states.
It is important that, while maintaining our opposition to any such move, we do not go beyond this position by opposing any relationship between WEU and the EU which the other "neutral" member-states may accept.
Apart from anything else, if the Government were to take up a "dog-in-the-manger" stance by opposing a relationship between WEU and the EU, and if it was later necessary in our national interest to concede this non-fundamental issue during a negotiation, such a climbdown or apparent defeat could make it very difficult to win any referendum which might be required to ratify a further treaty involving this and other changes to the existing treaties.
The Government should decide at an early stage where it stands upon this issue and should make clear its determination to preserve our non-involvement in military alliance commitments while preserving flexibility upon precisely how this is best achieved.
Meanwhile, our European policy should remain focused principally upon unwavering support for the role of the Commission. This should include vocal support for as many as possible of the proposals about to be made by the President of the Commission, Mr Romano Prodi, who will need all the help we and others can give him to restore the prestige and authority of the body he leads.
Garret FitzGerald can be contacted at gfitzgerald@irish-times.ie