Pope John Paul has expressed his "anguish and worry" following the US-led attacks on Afghanistan, but did not say whether he condemned or approved the military action. The Vatican said last month that it would understand if the US had to resort to force to protect its citizens from future attacks. But the Pope yesterday called the attacks a dark day for humanity and said religion could not be used to justify conflict between peoples.
The caution of Church leaders underlines the fact that most Christians hold that war is inconsistent with the teachings of the New Testament and the participation of Christians in war must be limited by the demands for justice and peace.
But when is a war just? Is the "just war" theory simply a formula to allow Christians to take part in any and all wars? And, can the war against Osama bin Laden and the Taliban be regarded as a just war? Over the centuries, the Christian tradition has produced three contrasting approaches to the dilemma posed by war: pacifism, Crusades, and the just-war theory.
Christian pacifism, with its roots in the Sermon on the Mount and the practice of the early church, demands total opposition to all wars. However, the call to peace-making in the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5:9) is not a call to maintain an unjust cessation of violence or to seek peace at any cost. Nor must the demands of peace always take priority over the demands of justice.
Those who invoke the principles of pacifism in the present conflict are open to condemnation if they have not spoken out against the tyranny of the Taliban in Afghanistan, condemned bin Laden's attacks, or challenged racism and violence towards Muslims.
President Bush has spoken of a "crusade" against terrorism. The Crusades found their initial justification as defensive action aimed at protecting Christian pilgrims to Jerusalem, but quickly took on the characteristics of the jihad or Muslim holy war. The theological justification of Crusades has long been abandoned, and there is no place in international law for either a crusade or a jihad. But the Crusades continued to have resonances in the Cold War, in talk about a crusade against Communism, and was reflected in debates about a "clash of civilisations" between the West and the Islamic world.
The third Christian approach has been the just-war theory. The concept of a just war owes its original formulation not to Biblical principles but to Aristotle (who first used the term), Cicero and others. The theory was first framed by Saint Augustine, who was exercised by the problem of when a Christian might take part in war with a good conscience.
For Augustine, all wars remained sinful and could only be waged in "a mournful spirit". War involved resorting to a lesser evil only in the hope of preventing a greater evil and of restoring justice. He accepted that the command to love the neighbour included a duty to defend the vulnerable against attack, while the commandment to love the enemy placed moral limits on the use of force in defending the vulnerable.
Augustine's theory was developed in the 13th century by Thomas Aquinas, and by 16th century Spanish and Dutch theologians. Their formula for a just war passed into international law.
The just-war theory does not seek to legitimise, and still less to glorify, war. Jurists and theologians alike accept that seven conditions must govern a decision to go to war (jus ad bellum) and three conditions must govern its conduct (jus in bello). The seven conditions governing a decision to go to war are: there must be a just cause; war must be waged by a legitimate authority; it must be formally declared; those waging it must have a right intention; it must be the last resort; there must be reasonable hope of success; and must be a due proportion between the benefits sought and the damage done.
Three conditions govern the conduct of war: non-combatants must have immunity; prisoners must be treated humanely; and international treaties must be honoured. Each condition must be met for any conflict to be regarded as a just war. Is the present conflict a just war? It might even be asked whether this is a war. Has there been a formal declaration? Bin Laden is not a head of state with competence in international law; and it is questionable whether the Taliban regime is an appropriate authority to have war declared against it.
Undoubtedly, there is a just cause if the intention is to stop further similar attacks. But revenge is not a just cause, for vengeance has no place in international law; nor could it justify bombing cities or creating hundreds of thousands of civilian refugees. The refusal of the Taliban to hand over bin Laden, despite four weeks of international pressure, may support the argument that war has become a last resort. But is there a reasonable hope of success? Or is it a predictable failure?
The just war theory also demands a due proportion between the benefits sought and the damage caused. If further terrorist attacks on the West are a foreseen consequence, who can weigh the damage caused in Afghanistan against the damage that may be caused afterwards? And while the principle of proportionality may sustain the argument that saving the lives of another 5,000 people justifies killing one bin Laden, can 5,000 bin Ladens be killed to save 5,000 future lives? Or 5,000 bin Laden supporters to save, perhaps, 10 lives?
In a just war, non-combatants must be guaranteed safety. The conditions do not allow us to dismiss any large-scale death of civilians as mere "collateral damage".
One of the weaknesses of the just-war theory is that it is only long after a war is over that we have the time and the luxury to determine whether all conditions have been met. In the meantime, we can only accept that all moral decisions are contingent and, at best, penultimate. We are left to confess that war is evil, and accept that many people of good will resort to a lesser evil in the hope of preventing the perpetration of a further, greater evil.
Rev Patrick Comerford is an Irish Times journalist and an Anglican theologian. Contact: theology@ireland.com