There is trouble ahead in Northern Ireland. Maybe even a reversion to the IRA's "armed struggle" for a while. And that is in spite of the anticipated victory for pro-agreement candidates in tomorrow's Assembly elections. The problem is that unionists are unlikely to allow the Assembly to work, the agreement may then unravel and, if so, the IRA will revert briefly to "what it knows best". The crunch issue will become very clear very quickly: whether even pro-agreement unionists can countenance Sinn Fein becoming part of the new Northern Ireland executive (or shadow executive) in the absence of a start to decommissioning. The overwhelming evidence is that they cannot.
David Trimble's speech to selected business and community leaders in Belfast on Monday was indeed remarkable. There was one passage which was particularly so. "We can now get down to the historic and honourable task of this generation: to raise up a Northern Ireland in which pluralist unionism and constitutional nationalism can speak to each other with the civility that is the foundation of freedom." The speech went on to hint that there would be no difficulty in involving Sinn Fein, provided there was no trace of coercion.
If it were only this speech that we had to found our prognostications, we could be optimistic but there is more in the background than this one speech. There is most obviously David Trimble's decision to vote against a crucial part of the agreement in the House of Commons last week on the release of prisoners. Not even he could stomach IRA prisoners being released in advance of a start to decommissioning. If even he is unable to accept this prospect how then will even he be able to live with the inclusion of Sinn Fein in the executive which he will lead, before decommissioning begins?
But apart from that there is the litany of his own commitments on decommissioning: not to engage in talks with Sinn Fein unless decommissioning had taken place; not to take part in talks with Sinn Fein unless there was parallel decommissioning; not to agree to any settlement which did not include immediate decommissioning. And side by side with that there is the litany of promises made by the Major and Blair governments on the same issue. And most problematic of these latter undertakings was that of the Tony Blair speech at Balmoral on May 14th during the referendum campaign.
In that cleverly drafted speech Tony Blair set out essentially fudged criteria by which it would be determined whether parties were genuinely committed to peaceful means and therefore eligible for participation in the executive. These criteria were: (a) "a clear and unequivocal commitment that there is an end to violence for good on the part of republicans and loyalists alike"; (2) that "the ceasefires are indeed complete and unequivocal"; (3) that there is "full co-operation with the independent commission on decommissioning"; and (4) no other organisations (are) being deliberately used as proxies for violence.
That speech no doubt was a reassurance to unionists and helped to increase the Yes vote in the referendum. But the fudge part of it is now likely to cause problems.
Similar criteria were outlined in the Ulster Unionist Party manifesto for the Assembly elections. That states: "Ulster Unionists reiterate that we will not sit in government with unreconstructed terrorists. The UUP will measure compliance with (a series of) criteria to judge whether in our opinion a true and permanent commitment to peace and non-violence has been established." The criteria were the same as those outlined by Tony Blair at Balmoral, with the additional and crucial commitment that there would be established "linkages between paramilitary organisations and their political wings".
Once pro-agreement unionists in the new Assembly discover that Sinn Fein can take part in the executive without any "clear and unequivocal commitment (on the part of the IRA) that there is an end to violence" there will be problems. Even more so will there be problems when the pro-agreement unionists in the Assembly discover that whereas Sinn Fein is prepared to give all the co-operation demanded to the independent commission on decommissioning, it will be on the basis that it has no arms and doesn't know of any arms. Meanwhile, the IRA will be giving no co-operation at all. And the UUP manifesto commitment to "linkages" between paramilitary organisations and their political wings will be set at nought.
I am not arguing that unionists are right to insist on decommissioning by the IRA as proof of Sinn Fein's commitment to democratic and peaceful means. My view is that this coupling was a mistake from the beginning, when the British first made this link in late 1994.
And not being met, pro-agreement unionists, along with anti-agreement unionists will balk at the establishment of a Northern Ireland executive and the whole deal will be in danger of coming apart. And coming apart against the backdrop of increased tensions over parades. Even in his emollient remarks on Monday in Belfast David Trimble gave no hope of compromise on that front and, for good measure, Gerry Adams signalled likewise yesterday.
In the context of a collapsed agreement, the "unarmed struggle" of the republican movement will be seen to have collapsed as well. And there are and will be those within the movement who will argue that at the very least there should be a modified resumption of the "armed struggle" to nudge along the political process, rather as was done in February 1996.
At 7.01 p.m. on Friday, February 9th, 1996, an IRA bomb exploded on Canary Wharf in London, killing two people and injuring more than 100 others. An accompanying IRA statement said this was in response to the obstacle - decommissioning - placed in the way of Sinn Fein's participation in all-party talks. On February 28th, 1996, the British and Irish governments announced a package which removed the obstacle that the IRA said caused the breakdown of the ceasefire.
At least from an IRA perspective, that was a dramatic affirmation of the effectiveness of violence. It would be surprising if there were not people within the IRA who would view this precedent as an encouragement for a resumption of limited violence to get the Agreement or something like it back on the rails. This may seem a hopelessly depressing scenario but, even if it transpires to be true, it need not herald hopelessness.
The fundamental reality is that the republican movement is now conditioned to accept the kind of compromises for them that the Belfast Agreement represents - in the long term, even the medium term, the war is over. But a resumption of that campaign will defer for years the reassurance of unionists that the war is indeed over and without such reassurance no agreement can work.