Tensions over how to handle civil rights campaign

Tensions between the head of the RUC and hardline Stormont home affairs minister William Craig over the handling of the historic…

Tensions between the head of the RUC and hardline Stormont home affairs minister William Craig over the handling of the historic Derry civil rights march of October 5th, 1968, are revealed for the first time in previously confidential files on the civil rights era just released in Belfast.

In a frank and honest memo to Craig, dated November 25th, 1968 - six weeks after the clashes between civil rights marchers and the RUC on Craigavon Bridge - the inspector general of the force, Sir Albert Kennedy, rejected official attempts to project the civil rights movement as an IRA front.

He pointed out that the movement enjoyed unionist support and warned that irresponsible statements by responsible people were stirring opposition to peaceful marches which might lead to "catastrophic" conflict and loss of life in the North.

Kennedy expressed the view that the current unrest was likely to continue until electoral reform was introduced. He told Craig that he felt he should commit to writing "the more important and serious features which appear evident to me, so that consideration may be given, at the highest level, to the kind of action necessary to cope with the situation".

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Kennedy emphasised that the trouble had the potential to become "much more serious than that created by the IRA border campaign of 1956-62.

"During that period it was largely a battle between the police and the IRA and fortunately the ordinary citizens did not become involved . . . The position today is fraught with more danger because, in my opinion, a number of people on what I may call the loyalist side are confused and are not making any distinctions between the IRA and civil rights marchers. This is resulting in opposition to peaceful marches and demonstrations, of such a nature as could lead to armed conflict, with the IRA stepping in to take advantage of the situation."

The RUC chief warned that in such a conflict, "death and destruction would be inevitable and the impact on the whole way of life in Ulster would be catastrophic".

Kennedy was adamant that public figures should refrain from making statements designed to inflame the situation. "It seems to me that enough is not being done by responsible people who should, I suggest, be busy pointing out the differences between the two kinds of activity I have mentioned and [ promoting] a better understanding, especially in regard to interference with those who, peacefully, are stating their grievances publicly."

Kennedy strongly expressed his view that the civil rights marches had no connection with the issue of partition.

"If it could be proclaimed that the old bogey of partition plays no part in the present agitation (and this is how I see it) and that the constitution is not in any danger from those who are protesting, I feel that a great deal of heat will disappear. In other words, if the 'Orange v Green' atmosphere could be dissipated, a happier state of affairs should emerge."

Every effort should be made both publicly and privately "to educate those who are apprehensive, pointing out the realities of the situation".

Kennedy told Craig: "Police information indicates that many professing Unionists support the protests, and that trouble emanates from a comparatively small minority of people holding extremist views who, quite sincerely, see a danger to the constitution which does not exist." (Craig had claimed that the IRA had been heavily involved in the October 5th march.)

In conclusion, Kennedy warned Craig of the intrinsic dangers in the situation now developing. "Unless there is a marked change in the situation soon, I am afraid that the small police force we have in Ulster will be up against the problem of maintaining law and order unprecedented in the history of the province, and one which they may find quite impossible to cope with successfully. One could elaborate . . . but I consider this unnecessary as the dangers must be evident to anyone who is giving the matter any degree of thought."

Kennedy closed his memo by expressing the hope that it would not be thought to be "presumptuous or alarmist" and that the points made by him might be emphasised by government spokesmen when elaborating on the proposed political reforms.

The evident uneasy relationship between Kennedy and Craig is underlined by a separate letter sent by him to Craig on November 22nd, 1968, concerning Craig's decision to re-route a civil rights march planned by the Derry Citizens' Action Committee for November 16th. Craig had given the impression publicly that the restrictions on the march had been proposed by the RUC.

Kennedy, who had met Craig along with senior RUC officers in advance of the march, was at pains to remind Craig of the ultimate responsibility for the decision to restrict it.

"Before going to your office I was informed by Mr Peacocke that the Londonderry police officers were of the opinion that the march should be permitted to proceed along the full route proposed by the organisers and at the beginning of the meeting in your office they expressed the same views. You produced correspondence, including letters from the Grand Orange Lodge and the Apprentice Boys, conveying the strong views that the marchers should not be allowed through the Unionist areas of Londonderry, and you also stated that you had other information intimating that there would be strong opposition to the marchers being allowed inside the ancient walls of Derry.

"In view of what you said, the police suggested that they should act under the Public Order Act (1951) and re-direct the marchers along a route which would keep them outside the walls."

Kennedy underlined Craig's responsibility for the decision to re-route the march. "From what I have said I think it is clear that the police did not advise you to impose a ban or, indeed, to interfere with the marchers at all but that, in the light of the information in your possession, they accepted the line of action ultimately decided upon."

Craig continued to attack the civil rights marches in a series of public speeches and was sacked by the unionist prime minister, Capt Terence O'Neill, on December 11th, 1968.