8 March, 1996
CONSULTATION
DOCUMENT
ELECTORAL MODELS
PART of the purpose of the current round of intensive multilateral consultations is to reach widespread agreement on proposals for a broadly acceptable elective process leading directly and without preconditions to all party negotiations on 10 June.
This paper summaries [sic] the key features of what the British Government believes in the light of the consultations so far to be the two main realistic options for the method of election.
An important point to note is that the choice of election method is independent of the issue of whether the election should be used as a basis for establishing an elected forum in Northern Ireland as well as for determining negotiating teams for the negotiations. In other words, either system could be used solely to produce negotiating teams and either system could be used to elect representatives to an elected forum.
It is abundantly clear to the Government that the choice, of election method is of crucial importance to many parties and that there are deep divisions of opinion between the parties on what method should be used.
The British Government hopes that the following brief summaries of the two main options will assist the parties as they debate the issues, internally and with each other and would like to encourage the parties to redouble their efforts to reach widespread agreement on the nature of the elective process. Ultimately, however, the British Government will, if necessary, bring forward legislation based on a judgment on what seems most broadly acceptable.
Given the depth of feeling shown on this issue, that would obviously disappoint some of the parties. Nevertheless, as the agreed objective is to provide a basis for early all party negotiations on the substantive issues, the British Government trusts that no party would wish to withdraw from the talks process on this point and it would be helpful if that could be confirmed in the parties responses to this paper.
The two main realistic options appear to be:
(a) STV 18 x 5 Member Constituencies
18 parliamentary constituencies would be effected and each would return 5 representatives through PR (STV), which is the existing method of election in Northern Ireland for other than Westminster elections.
Legislation for this type of election already exists in the Northern Ireland Assembly Elections Order 1982. This would need to be updated and adapted to form the basis of fresh legislation. This drafting task should be relatively straightforward, with little need to design completely new rules.
In view of its familiarity to the electorate, adoption of a PR (STV) 18 x 5 system would permit the voter information campaign to concentrate on refreshing rather than educating from scratch.
(b) Party list, Northern Ireland single constituency
Northern Ireland would be treated as a single constituency. The ballot paper would list the names of parties, not individual candidates. Each party would be entitled to whatever number of representatives corresponded to its proportion of the total vote. Successful candidates would be drawn in order from a list of nominees prepared by each party - the party would therefore decide who should be on its list and in what order they should be elected.
Since there is no enacted precedent for a list system in the United Kingdom, a significant amount of new legislation would be required. One important issue which would need to be resolved is that, since no system of political party registration exists in the UK, some certain method of identifying the parties contesting the election would need to be established. This would need to include a way of avoiding or very rapidly resolving disputes about party descriptions (e.g. a case like the Literal Democrat candidate in the Plymouth constituency at the 1994 European election) to minimise the risk of lengthy legal proceedings. There would also need to be provisions on how party lists, of candidates should be publicised.
The introduction of a list system would require a substantial advertising and voter education effort. However, the decision the voter would be faced with in the polling booth would be simpler than that needed in a PR (STV) election, since he or she would be required to make only one indication of preference.
Some commentators argue that smaller parties are more likely to gain representation under a list system. However, the distribution of parties' electoral support is significant here: if a relatively low level of support is evenly spread across the electoral region, then small parties could benefit; but if it is concentrated in specific areas then there may be no advantage, or even some disadvantage, for smaller parties, compared with PR (STV) in 18 constituencies.
If any party can demonstrate widespread agreement on an alternative approach, e.g. one which might combine elements of both approaches, the Government would be happy to consider it urgently and constructively. We have not so far ourselves been able to identify a practical third alternative which seems likely to meet the various parties' requirements.