Through the maelstrom of war in the Balkans one creative and progressive idea has grown in recent weeks: that over the next generation the region must be included in European integration by a stability pact to reconstruct its economies, democratise its political systems and enable its diverse identities to coexist peacefully.
The trouble is that the daily continuation of the war makes these noble objectives all the harder to achieve. Kosovo's neighbours are increasingly fearful of political disintegration arising from the huge number of refugee victims of the conflict.
Albania cannot absorb them. In Greece, Albanians have an unenviable reputation for crime, vagrancy and mafia activity, despite the absorption of hundreds of thousands of them in the informal economy over the last 10 years. The same images and stereotypes are to be found in Italy.
It is feared in these states - with weary realism and scepticism about the rhetorical commitments of NATO leaders unwilling to get involved in a ground war - that after the crisis many victims of ethnic cleansing will not be able to return home and will add to the numbers of migrant peoples in the region. With them, it is assumed, comes political instability. That view is most marked in Macedonia, but in Greece it is also widely held.
It should be recalled how vehemently the Greek government argued over the title by which the EU would recognise the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the eventual compromise reached.
Behind the argument about nomenclature lies a deeper concern about the need to keep borders intact. An independent Kosovo would destabilise Macedonia by appealing to its Albanian minority to join a greater Albania. This would unravel the coalition government there, which includes Albanian parties, and the intricate agreements reached in recent years about minority language, cultural and educational rights which have allowed it to function effectively.
The new Bulgarian centre-right coalition which swept to power two years ago has performed miracles in turning the economy around from hyper-inflation and banking collapse. It is embarking on an ambitious programme of privatisation in preparation for long term accession to the EU.
In February it reached a whole series of agreements with Macedonia enabling the two states to sidestep the thorny question of Bulgaria's former refusal to recognise the Macedonian language and nationality.
These agreements are criticised by the ex-communists there, who have gained a new hearing after their attacks on NATO's bombing of Serbia and the government's agreement to provide backup facilities for it. Bulgaria has been badly affected by the war, just when it was confronting these deep-seated problems.
Collateral economic damage includes blows to the tourist trade, the loss of Serb markets and transport routes including, most dramatically, the complete blockage of the Danube, its lifeline to western Europe - and that of other states such as Romania and Ukraine, also suffering from severe economic distress. This is because of the destruction of bridges by NATO bombardments.
Bulgaria's agreements with Macedonia typify the most hopeful aspects of resolving cross-border disputes without changing boundaries in a region with so many minority questions. A similar change of government last year in Slovakia included the Hungarian minority party in the new coalition there, enabling it to reach agreements with Hungary on cultural, educational and language issues. In 1995-1996, Hungary and Romania reached landmark agreements, including dispute resolution clauses concerning the 2.5 million Hungarian minority.
These agreements have been driven precisely by the aspiration to join the EU and other pan-European bodies - including NATO and the Partnership for Peace, both of which are seen in the region to help in providing democratic norms. Other bodies such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe provide essential inclusive forums along similar lines.
An Austrian candidate for secretary-general of the Council of Europe, Mr Walter Schwimmer, underlined the point this week during a canvassing visit to Dublin. He sees it playing a complementary role in the long term stability pact for including the Balkan region, including establishing democratic institutions in Serbia and playing a role in a possible provisional administration of Kosovo under United Nations mandate. The peaceful resolution of national and other minority questions makes its own indispensable contribution to stability.
These hopeful agreements are threatened above all by Slobodan Milosevic and his regime. Ethnic cleansing contradicts all that they stand for, including multiple identities and diverse allegiances.
Those who know the region make two further points: that once people are treated like this it will take a very long time for them to be able to forgive or to live together again peacefully; and that their political culture is in any case very different from that of western Europe - much less hospitable to tolerance of diversity because of long traditions of Orthodoxy and lack of exposure to Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment traditions.
One can make too much of the second proposition, as a brilliant study of western stereotypes of the Balkans by Maria Todorova, who was raised in Bulgaria and now lives in the US, makes clear.
As she puts it, the Balkans have been transformed from a geographical expression "into one of the most powerful pejorative designations in history, international relations, political science and, nowadays, general intellectual discourse".
A French saying has it that the optimists are those who do not understand the question. The Balkan question is peculiarly prone to pessimism, based on supposed primordial attitudes of ethnic purity and rivalry. In fact, its various peoples historically have more experience of peaceful coexistence than ethnic conflict. Based on that there is surely room for hope that the stability pact could be made to work in the long term.
But it will require much more financial and political commitment from the EU than has so far been realised. And it is impossible to imagine it happening if Europe fails to develop its own means of ensuring its security and defence, rather than relying on a reluctant US dominating an unsatisfactory NATO alliance to provide it.
Imagining the Balkans by Maria Todorova, Oxford University Press, 1997.
