`Flexibility' - an idea whose time has come

"Where I use a word it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less." - Humpty Dumpty to Alice in Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking Glass.

IN September 1994 a debate began which has the potential to change profoundly the way the European Union works.

The German Christian Democrats put it rather bluntly. Rather than face a "destabilising vacuum of power in central Europe", they warned then that Germany might "try and affect stabilisation of eastern Europe on its own and in the traditional way" if the EU proved unequal to the task.

The fear of instability in central Europe has since receded, but the fear of EU decision-making gridlock has not. And the solution proposed is very much at the heart of next week's treaty-changing Amsterdam summit - "differentiated integration", or provisions to allow "coalitions of the willing" to collaborate on projects that do not have unanimous support.

Nearly three years ago, the British prime minister, Mr John Major, was setting out his vision of the EU, a Europe of variable speeds in which members pick and choose which bits they want ii Ia carte.

Both concepts came to be known as "flexibility", yet they reflected profoundly different understandings of the nature and direction of the EU. Yet integrationists and federalisers, it seemed, had found common cause with those opposed to pooling sovereignty.

The challenge for Europe, the Germans argued, was to prevent those who lacked the stomach or ability at present for further integration from holding up the forward march of the majority.

This was particularly important because of the unclubbable British, but will become more crucial after enlargement with up to 12 new members. If the union did not find a way round the problem of the veto it would grind to a halt, it was argued.

Moreover, if countries did not advance within the framework of the treaty they would do so outside, using models like the Schengen Treaty on border controls. It would he much better, surely, to use the example of the single currency to embrace such advances within the union?

Flexibility would be an engine of integration, allowing advance guards to break new ground while the slower members took their time to catch up. No longer would the convoy travel at the speed of the slowest member.

Mr Major's vision, however, was not of a convoy remorselessly heading to a common destination, but of concentric poles of activity, overlapping clubs which members could opt in or out of as they chose and definitely no advance guards.

Within a year, however, Britain was getting cold feet. The enthusiasm with which the integrationists had grasped the flexibility nettle was making London think again. Could flexibility actually lead to the creation of an inner core leadership of the union of which Britain would not be part?

Britain, first under the Tories and now Labour, began to see her interests alongside a disparate group of others, Ireland among them. For these countries the idea of flexibility represented a danger of unravelling the political cohesion of the union. Although never outrightly opposed to the idea, Dublin has insisted that it had yet to be convinced.

But this is an idea whose time has come, and a rearguard action, whether in defence of EU constitutional orthodoxy or its strange bedfellow, Euroscepticism, has had to settle for building in as many safeguards as possible.

At the summit, then, the debate will focus largely on whether, if the union's institutions (the property of all 15) are to be used by a smaller group, all 15 should have to consent to the project the "unanimity trigger".

With flexibility easier to enunciate in theory than in practice, the details are yet some way from being thrashed out, particularly on border controls. But the Dutch outline draft treaty reflects the summit's broad likely outcome.

A general clause on flexibility sets out the conditions under which groups of member-states can bypass a reluctant minority to create new common projects. Such projects must involve a majority of states, must not undermine the aims of the treaty or standing practice and programmes, must respect the union's institutional framework, and must be undertaken only if it can be shown that the traditional route is not possible. The project must not detrimentally affect the rights - and interests of those not participating, and they shall have the right to join in whenever they are willing and able.

To copper-fasten such preconditions, the Irish and other small states have argued successfully that, as a minimum, any undertaking should have to have the support of the Commission, as defender of the treaty and the common good. The Irish would prefer to go further and provide that only the Commission could initiate a proposal. But, if satisfied by the Commission's standing as guarantor, Dublin would not demand a unanimity trigger.

Different provisions will also be set out for the three decision-making pillars of the union. In the first, largely covering the single market, economic, industrial, and social policy, the scope of flexibility options is likely to be limited to issues outside the single market and outside any areas covered already by qualified majority voting. (There is no need for flexibility provisions, it is argued, where the veto does not apply).

The British are still insisting on a unanimity trigger as they are in the Third Pillar, justice and home affairs co-operation, including the incorporation of Schengen, where veto voting is standard.

A formula on Schengen is still not agreed, with the Irish expressing particular concern that they are outside the initial decision-making loop.

The exclusion of states from decision-making in areas of flexible integration, Dublin argues, should only be at the level of secondary legislation so that all 15 retain overall control of the use of the union framework.

In the Second Pillar, common foreign and security policy, also an area of veto voting, many member-states are convinced that the Dublin draft treaty's provision for "constructive abstention" is sufficient. This allows reluctant member-states to abstain on a common action without jeopardising it. If states representing a third of weighted votes abstain the action would not be agreed. In the Second Pillar, attempts are also being made to circumvent the veto, of which more tomorrow.

Tomorrow: Making a place on the world stage.