THE Dublin and Stormont governments had separate intelligence reports in 1966 that the IRA was stepping up recruitment and intent on relaunching a campaign of violence in Northern Ireland, according to confidential cabinet files.
In preparation for his early summit meeting with the British Prime Minister, Mr Harold Wilson, soon after becoming Taoiseach, Mr Jack Lynch was briefed by Mr Peter Berry, secretary of the Department of Justice.
Mr Berry estimated that the number of the IRA "who would obey military orders" would be approximately one thousand. The number had "increased progressively from an estimated 650 in March 1962, when the organisation ordered a cessation of its campaign of violence".
Since then, occasional acts of violence had been prompted lest "they would lose too much face" if they did not protest against visiting British warships or royal visits.
Mr Berry reported that "a certain amount of drilling with firearms" had taken place since the 1962 cessation: but "there was no more reason now than in the past four years to conclude that a campaign of violence is imminent or will commence within, say, the next 12 months".
By June 1966, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) had shot dead two Catholic men, John Scullion and Peter Ward, a young barman, and carried out a series of sectarian bombings.
The prospect of republican commemorations in the North to mark the 50th anniversary of the Easter Rising raised the political temperature in March.
By February 1966, the Rev Ian Paisley had launched a virulently anti Catholic weekly, the Protestant Telegraph, and by April he had formed the Ulster Constitution Defence Committee, with the Ulster Protestant Volunteers as its political power base.
Dr Paisley's activities dominated the year's news. In March he brought Sir Edward Carson's son to Belfast where he warned that O'Neill's policies would destroy "Ulster's hard won constitution and liberties".
In his briefing on the IRA Mr Berry declared that "if the organisation were otherwise ready", it might use two excuses to recommence violence: the Easter Rising commemoration ceremonies and "the Paisley sectarian riots".
Military discipline among IRA members was strong, but the organisation was "not yet in a financial position to maintain an organised campaign for any length of time".
He also listed "fairly strong signs" during the course of 1966 of a shift towards a more political path. "Leaders of the movement have been attending education classes conducted by persons listed by the police as members of communist organisations."
Mr Berry concluded by commenting: "It is unquestionably true that there is a strong recrudescence of feeling running through the country at present which might be reflected in violence again unless signs become evident that the large block of nationalists in the Six Counties will not be denied their fair share of public appointments and participation in public affairs."
The reaction of the O'Neill government to mounting unrest on the streets of Northern Ireland in 1966 is also detailed in newly released cabinet files.
As nationalist goodwill turned to cynicism, the British Labour Prime Minister, Mr Harold Wilson, impressed on Capt O'Neill at a forthright conference in London in August that he must expedite his efforts to "liberalise" Northern Ireland society and, in particular, to eradicate discrimination and gerrymandering. Capt O'Neill warned his colleagues that he had merely "bought time" on the reform front.
The 1916 commemoration marches in Belfast and elsewhere passed without serious incident. Among those who observed the massive RUC operation at Easter 1966 was Brig W.M.T. Magan, a senior British intelligence officer "who later furnished a confidential report to both the Northern Ireland government and the British home secretary.
In his report, Brig Magan stated: "As late as Friday 15 April, RUC information was that it remained the IRA intention to exploit confusion and lawlessness arising out of the Belfast celebrations in order to shoot members of the crown forces.
"That the day passed off peacefully was due to three things: (a) the restraint of the Ulster authorities in assisting, rather than obstructing, the organisers of the provocative nationalist parade; (b) the closing of the Border, which deterred IRA members from risking entry to the North; and (c) the high order of police work."
He concluded with an estimation of the IRA's future intentions: "For the longer term, until revised IRA intentions can be assessed, it would be proper to assume that the intensive training of last year and distribution of arms, and the current activity of the most militant elements, indicates the likelihood of a period of violence, though possibly sporadic."