Military analysis: The UK 1st Armoured Division yesterday launched a full-scale armoured incursion into Basra, writes Tom Clonan.
To the north-west of the city, the 16th Air Assault Brigade moved into the suburbs of Basra while, to the south-west, armour from the 7th Armoured Brigade moved towards the city centre.
A third axis of advance from the south-east was mounted by the 3rd Brigade, Royal Marine Commandos, accompanied by an armoured reconnaissance element. Artillery support for this large-scale assault is being provided by British guns located at Zubair, to the south of the city. The chief objective of this incursion is the capture of the Baath Party headquarters. It represents a determined attempt on the part of the British to finally wrest control of the city from the remnants of Saddam's forces in the area.
For the British, this long-awaited decisive "battle for Basra" will have come after an intense period of consolidation and confidence-building measures in the area. Since establishing a presence on the outskirts of Basra two weeks ago, British forces have been probing its defences with fleeting armoured engagements designed to draw Iraqi fire.
With each skirmish, the British have been building up a comprehensive picture of the strength, deployment and location of Iraqi forces in the town. In a war of attrition, each brief engagement has inflicted a continuous series of troop and equipment losses on the town's defenders.
While conducting these operations, the British have also been inserting teams of artillery observers, forward air controllers and sniper teams whose mission it is to monitor and target Iraqi military activity within the city. In this way, during a two-week siege, the British have steadily degraded Basra's defences and eroded the fighting effectiveness of its garrison.
Concurrent with this activity, the British have been attempting to win over the "hearts and minds" of the civilian population of Basra with an intensive public confidence and propaganda campaign. The British psychological operations (Psyops) offensive has included an intensive leafleting campaign concentrated at vehicle checkpoints and along strategic patrol routes.
The leaflets, written in Arabic, aim to reassure the predominantly Shia population that unlike Operation Desert Storm, Operation Iraqi Freedom will see British and US liberators remain in place to crush Saddam's regime and protect them from reprisals.
This message is also being reinforced by propaganda broadcasts on a British army radio station, Radio Nahrain. A critical component of the Psyops campaign is the participation of the military in the distribution of humanitarian aid in the area.
Images of British soldiers distributing food, water and medicine among the civilian population are calculated to have a powerful two-fold psychological effect. They are designed to undermine support for the town's defenders and to embolden anti-Saddam sentiment among the city's Shia population.
The relatively novel "aid and raid" policy adopted by the British in Basra is being followed by a large-scale conventional armoured assault.
If successful, the British approach to the capture of Basra is likely to become the blueprint for the US capture of Baghdad in the coming days. The consolidation of forces within Saddam International Airport will form a secure base from which ongoing armoured raids will be launched into central Baghdad.
The US-controlled airport, which Centcom is now calling a "military village", will also become a major distribution centre for humanitarian aid and medical supplies. As with British troops in Basra, initial supplies will be distributed in high-profile operations by US troops. As daytime temperatures increase and with the incremental effect of continued air and ground attacks, the Iraqi capital will be increasingly vulnerable to this twin-track approach.
For the US, it would represent a politically palatable alternative to the razing of Baghdad in conventional urban warfare.
The strategy of combining the delivery of humanitarian aid with conventional military tactics was heavily criticised in Afghanistan. In the long term, non-governmental organisations and aid agencies will be critical of the approach.
Opponents will claim that it represents an immoral and cynical approach to war that politicises the rendering of humanitarian aid. It will be argued that the militarisation of humanitarian aid distribution will jeopardise the protected neutral status enjoyed by NGOs and aid agencies with the potential to endanger the lives of those engaged in such activities in future conflicts.
In the short term, however, Centcom will argue that in the current battlefield environment, military control of the aid distribution network will remain essential due to a fraught security situation. While this may be a legitimate argument, there is no doubting the extraordinary value this strategy has as both propaganda tool and weapon of war.
Dr Tom Clonan is a retired army officer with experience in the Middle East and former Yugoslavia. He is a fellow of the US-based Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. He lectures in the School of Media, DIT