The Arms Crisis, involving the self-destruction of the first post revolutionary Fianna Fail government, represented the greatest threat to the stability of this State, arguably, since its formation. The controversy over Col Hefferon's witness statement provides further confirming evidence that the Arms Trials centred, not on the legality of arming Northern nationalists, but rather on a power play for control of Fianna Fail, in which the most potent weapon was the ideology of the State itself.
It is difficult to exaggerate the impact the Northern Ireland civil rights movement had on the politics of the entire country. By August 1969 the situation had become uncontrollable. The sectarian forces lurking just below the surface erupted in a rage of fury. In short, the cataclysmic events in Northern Ireland provided an opportunity to complete the unfinished business of the Irish revolution.
A cable from the then British ambassador, Sir Andrew Gilchrist, caught the volatile mood when he told the Foreign Office in London: "All in all, we are in for a fairly difficult time from the Irish. If I were a fire insurance company I would not like to have the British Embassy on my books . . ."
The rhetoric of nationalism had the potential to suck the Republic into the vortex. The risks were maximised because the violence in the North coincided with a vicious power struggle for control of Fianna Fail in which the opposing sides used the disturbances to further their own competing agendas. Chaos was a valuable political commodity in the battle for control of Fianna Fail.
The threatened destabilisation of the Republic was possible precisely because important figures in Fianna Fail were prepared to use ownership of the national question to assert their position within the State, the party and ultimately the nation. It was a defining moment in Irish political history.
Responsibility for this state of affairs rests squarely with Jack Lynch. He delegated control over Northern policy to Charles Haughey and Neil Blaney in the confused days of August 1969 and never really regained it.
From the first burnings in Belfast, the priority in Dublin was to ensure that if confrontation was inevitable then the government would have some control of the situation, at all costs preventing the contagion from spreading South. If that meant supplying arms and expertise, then Military Intelligence was quite prepared to do so.
The pivotal figure in the crisis was Neil Blaney, a political heavyweight within Fianna Fail whose power and influence within the political machine have been largely forgotten. Blaney's motivation throughout was to weaken the Official IRA, to destroy the Northern state and, most importantly, assume the leadership of Fianna Fail from a leader he openly despised. Throughout late 1969 and 1970 his public denunciations of Lynch's stated policy - that unity could only be achieved by peaceful means and with the consent of the Northern majority - were the only outward sign of the deep divisions within the cabinet over the way forward.
In a key speech in Letterkenny on December 8th, 1969, to mark his 21st anniversary as a TD, Blaney declared: "No one has the right to assert that force is irrevocably out. No political party or group at any time is entitled to predetermine the right of the Irish people to decide what course of action on this question may be justified in given circumstances. The Fianna Fail party has never taken a decision to rule out the use of force."
LYNCH put the speech down to a bout of "intemperate impetuosity", despite the fact that it had been widely circulated in advance to the media. Blaney followed up this challenge with a bid for the leadership in an RTE interview. He buttressed his case by using the power delegated to the cabinet sub-committee to organise arms expeditions to New York and Europe. He also encouraged Northern delegations to keep the pressure on the cabinet by lobbying for arms.
Lynch's policy was under intense scrutiny when he addressed the 1970 ardfheis and it was by no means certain that his calls for restraint would prevail. He concluded with a direct challenge to those determined to question his leadership. "If anybody wants to change the policy that I have set out, this is the place to do it, now is the time." The Blaney challenge evaporated but, crucially, Lynch failed to remove his recalcitrant minister from control of Northern policy.
The fact that the most pressing issue facing the State was no longer decided in the office of the Taoiseach gave considerable decision-making latitude to the hawks. Despite the commitment at the ardfheis to the pursuit of unity by consent, those directing Northern policy retained, in private, the option of military engagement as a matter of policy.
This was copperfastened by a directive on February 6th, 1970 instructing the Army to prepare for invasion and to provide weapons if appropriate. It is certainly arguable that the contingency plan provides evidence that the weapons-buying expedition on the Continent was compatible with the terms of the directive.
When Lynch finally moved to sack Haughey and Blaney in May 1970 for contravening government policy it was imperative that the minister for defence, Jim Gibbons, be extricated from the crisis. This was necessary not only to justify the sackings but also to proceed with a prosecution. Under the terms of the Firearms Act, under which the defendants were charged, weapons could be imported only with the authorisation of the minister for defence and this was the key plank of the defence case and the central import of Col Hefferon's testimony.
The tampering with the evidence was therefore crucial. Neither the fact that the tampering ultimately failed, nor its wider purpose - to prevent the injudicious use of ideology from embroiling the entire island in civil war - makes the reality of attempts to abuse the rule of law by engaging in a political show trial any more palatable.
In refusing to make the original file which would reveal the annotations available to the second trial, the Department was, in effect, covering its tracks. It has taken more than 30 years for the truth about how the battle for control of Fianna Fail moved from the cabinet table to the Four Courts to be revealed.
Its consequences will be felt for a long time to come.
Justin O'Brien is author of The Arms Trial, published in 2000 by Gill and Macmillan, price £9.99.