Unionists in talks went `for the man, not the ball'

August 31st, 1994, was a turning point in Irish political history. In a statement delivered to the media the Irish Republican Army, believing an opportunity had been created to secure a just and lasting settlement, declared a "cessation of all military operations". The statement was made against the background of the Hume-Adams talks, the Framework Document and an increasing momentum for peace in the North.

Within months, the Combined Loyalist Military Command had declared a ceasefire and political life in the North embarked upon a journey which would lead politicians back to the historic building of Stormont in east Belfast.

In that summer of 1994 few would have believed that within six years the North of Ireland would have its own system of devolved government - a legislative Assembly, a ministerial team comprising members of the SDLP, Sinn Fein, the UUP and the DUP working against the backdrop of relative peace and stability and elected by, and accountable to, the people of Northern Ireland.

While this journey was not an easy one, and still has many miles to go, it is important that we don't take for granted all that has been achieved. It was the hard work and dedication of many people, over too many years, which made what were previously only aspirations, hopes and dreams a reality.

Every party, every person involved took risks which could have jeopardised their political career and perhaps even their lives. For this we must all be grateful.

With this in mind, I want to reflect on the developments and the part played by the Irish Government during the period of the multi-party negotiations.

These negotiations commenced on June 10th, 1996, and involved both governments and nine out of the 10 parties deemed eligible to participate. Sinn Fein was excluded on the basis that the IRA ceasefire had broken down.

While some inroads were made, progress in the negotiations was disappointingly slow.

The following year Fianna Fail entered government on June 26th, 1997, and within one month the IRA had restored its ceasefire and Sinn Fein was invited to enter the negotiations. While there was some opposition from within unionist and loyalist ranks to Sinn Fein involvement, on the grounds that it failed to adhere to the Mitchell Principles, both governments rejected this assertion, and political negotiations got under way on October 7th, 1997.

I was catapulted into the talks at this stage, not having been appointed as minister for foreign affairs until the day after the talks restarted, October 8th. Although I had some involvement in what had been happening through the few Cabinet meetings we had had since the summer recess, I was still somewhat at a disadvantage initially and had to read a lot of papers very fast to get into the brief.

However, I looked forward to this challenge like everyone else with a great sense of hope, coupled undoubtedly with a certain amount of apprehension.

For the first time in modern Irish history, negotiations were taking place in which Sinn Fein and unionist and loyalist parties were jointly involved, as well, of course, as the SDLP. The negotiations were chaired by the former majority leader of the US Senate, George Mitchell, whose input and foresight would prove central to the success of the negotiations.

Moreover, the negotiations had the support of the two governments. Mr Ahern and Mr Blair established an excellent working relationship which was also personal and warm. There was no doubt in all our minds that this was the best opportunity in the North's history to build lasting stability and establish political structures acceptable to all.

However, difficulties ensued and at times it seemed that we might lose our way.

In those first months the relationship between Sinn Fein and the UUP was, at times, extremely difficult. At the beginning, the UUP refused to answer questions put to it by Sinn Fein; however, it later changed position and answered questions through the chair.

I was convinced then, and remain convinced today, that dialogue and consultation are the only way to overcome difficulties in the North or in any conflict resolution situation. This is as relevant today, in addressing the issue of Orange Order marches, as it was in October 1977 at the inception of the talks.

Throughout the first months of negotiation Sinn Fein's increasing frustration and belief that it was being isolated and excluded from a process because of the UUP's unwillingness to enter into direct dialogue with it were obvious. The Irish Government was firm in its belief that Sinn Fein's role was central to success, and its frustration was, indeed, a concern.

HOWEVER, in contrast to the difficulties in dialogue between the UUP and Sinn Fein, the Government embarked upon a series of meetings with David Trimble and the Ulster Unionist Party which proved surprisingly positive.

Once more Mr Ahern achieved a good rapport with Mr Trimble. Commentators pointed out that the Strand Two negotiations, which focused on the relationship between the North and the South, would prove to be the "hot potato" of the talks. No one doubted that it would pose difficulties for the Ulster Unionist Party. However, this did not diminish but rather increased the importance of the bilaterals between both parties.

While the Government stressed the importance of North-South bodies for the nationalist people, a primary concern of the UUP related to the redrafting of Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution. Our initial bargaining position was one of great reluctance to move on Articles 2 and 3 but we knew that this would eventually be an area in which we would be seen to concede.

At this point in the process we began real engagement with the Ulster Unionist Party. The positive relationship paved the way for further significant movement over the following months; this was underpinned by a very good meeting between the Taoiseach and Mr Trimble in December.

Just before this I had my first "run-in" with the unionists which, though it had little effect on the talks, caused me considerable anxiety. At the end of November I did a fairly long interview with BBC Northern Ireland.

This was recorded on Friday, November 28th, for broadcast the following day. It was mainly very conciliatory in tone. However, in talking about the North-South bodies, I made the remark that they would be "not unlike a government". At the time I was reasonably pleased with the interview but the following morning I got the news that this little segment was being promoted all morning and the unionists were being contacted and coming back with some angry responses.

I realised then that it was probably unwise to have made this remark although it may well have reflected the view of many nationalists. In fact, I still cannot to this day work up a sweat of sorrow for the remark made in a very peaceful interview.

Initially the response from the unionists was moderate enough. Mr Trimble said the remark was "silly" and that he would have to give me "a piece of his mind" next day. David Ervine said that I was "mischievous". However, as the media cranked up the incident all day the unionists began to take it more seriously and started calling for me to step down.

Of course, the unionists do this regularly with Irish foreign ministers, and initially it didn't worry me unduly. On the following Monday they walked out of the talks, saying that they wouldn't return as long as I was there. Sinn Fein and the SDLP were very supportive of me, the indefatigable John Hume saying that if people walked out every time we had a disagreement hat we were not going to get very far.

ON the Monday I had a long and very tough meeting with the combined forces of unionism (14 of them in all). At this stage they had worked themselves up into a very angry position. I worked hard to placate them and felt I was making some progress, but they were still insisting on my resignation. I went on television and basically withdrew the remark, saying that if I could "unsay" it I would.

At this stage I decided I'd better come back to Dublin and talk to the Taoiseach. In the back of my head was the notion that I could not afford to be the cause of the collapse of the talks. The Taoiseach and a number of other colleagues I talked to were adamant that I mustn't think of resignation. The view was that it would send out a terribly depressing message to nationalists if unionists could have an Irish foreign minister removed for expressing such a view.

With a lot of foreboding I headed back to Belfast next morning. There I found to my amazement that the unionists were coming back into the talks without making any further comment and as far as they were concerned the matter was over.

The whole incident is very typical of how unionists operated. They were very much inclined to "go for the man, not the ball". They will also move very quickly on to the next item when they feel they have made their point. It was never referred to again by the unionists, except perhaps in an occasional aside. However, some Southern journalists continued to give me a hard time on this for a couple of months. I just had to grin and bear it. It comes with the territory after all.

At the same time, history was taking place in London where Mr Blair met Gerry Adams at Downing Street, the first British prime minister to meet a Sinn Fein delegation for 76 years when Lloyd George met Michael Collins.

Both governments were going to make the process work and were doing everything to inject the necessary confidence and momentum into the process to see it through.

In the months before Christmas, and despite a genuine effort by all parties to engage, no agreement was forthcoming. A sub-group comprising representatives of the parties, established to consider the key issues and the format for resolving these issues, failed to reach consensus. As a result, there was despondency and a sense of frustration.

On December 16th the talks went into suspension for the Christmas period. Although all were disappointed, we also had an instinctive sense that the difficulties being encountered could be overcome with added effort. In the weeks which followed, events on the streets of the North were to make the process all the more difficult. However, as lives were lost, our determination doubled, and the need to reach a lasting agreement became all the more crucial.