If it fails, the fault lies with leaders who fudged

If tonight or in a few months' time the Belfast Agreement is torn in shreds and the best hope for centuries for permanent peace on this island is blown away, the responsibility will rest heavily on the shoulders of Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern. Both were hugely responsible for the making of the agreement in April of last year; but both have contributed hugely to its undoing since by giving wildly conflicting signals to opposing parties on what the significance of the agreement was on what has emerged as the crunch issue: decommissioning.

Tony Blair started to confuse the issue within minutes of the signing of the agreement on April 10th, 1998. Under pressure from David Trimble, Mr Blair wrote him a letter which, understandably, led the Ulster Unionist Party to believe that holding tough on decommissioning would win the backing of the British government and win through in the end. The letter read:

"I understand your problems with paragraph 25 of Strand 1 is that it requires decisions on those who should be excluded or removed from office in the Northern Ireland executive to be taken on a cross-community basis. This letter is to let you know that if, during the course of the first six months of the shadow Assembly or the Assembly itself, these provisions have been shown to be ineffective, we will support changes to those provisions to enable them to be made properly effective in preventing such people from holding office.

"Furthermore, I confirm that in our view the effect of the decommissioning section of the agreement, with decommissioning schemes coming into effect in June (1998), is that the process of decommissioning should begin straight away."

It was a skilful fudge, in that it managed to suggest the agreement required a start to decommissioning before Sinn Fein could be part of the new power-sharing executive without actually saying that. Mr Trimble sought to have this stated explicitly in the agreement but failed. Now, with Mr Blair's assistance, he was seeking to claim this was implicity so.

Mr Blair proferred more help to Mr Trimble when he came to Northern Ireland on May 14th of last year, just prior to the referendum on the agreement. Mr Blair then set out the criteria by which it would be determined whether parties (which, in the context, meant Sinn Fein) were genuinely committed to non-violent peaceful means and therefore eligible to take part in the executive: "a clear and unequivocal commitment that there is an end to violence for good on the part of republicans and loyalists; that there is full co-operation with the Independent Commission on decommissioning and that no other organisations (were) being deliberately used as proxies for violence".

The criteria properly reflected the requirements of the agreement, but the speech was deliberately spun in a way to suggest, again, that decommissioning was a precondition on Sinn Fein's participation in the executive.

Meanwhile, Bertie Ahern was also muddying the waters. The most spectacular instance of this was his interview with the Sunday Times on February 14th last. He said: "I am on record in recent weeks and months as saying that it is not compatible with being a part of a government - I mean part of an executive - that there is not at least a commencement of decommissioning and that would apply in the North, it would apply in the South, that is what we need to achieve".

The two prime ministers joined together in fudging the issue still further on April 1st last. While acknowledging that decommissioning was not a precondition of Sinn Fein's participation in an executive, they went on to seek to make it a precondition. The unionists were delighted and then, understandably, dejected when the precondition was withdrawn.

Of course the decommissioning issue was made an issue long before Mr Blair and Mr Ahern came on this scene. John Major and John Bruton had made it that. But Mr Blair and Mr Ahern could have attempted to row back from that misjudgement; instead, they exacerbated it.

The pity is that the agreement was not sold to the unionist community for what it was and is: an abandonment by nationalists of nationalism and a copper-fastening of the constitutional position of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom until such time as a majority of the people of Northern Ireland determine otherwise.

What was and is essential is that the focus is moved from decommissioning, and that the reassurance that the unionist community reasonably requires about the republican movement's abandonment of the armed struggle is achieved through other means. Such other means could be a formal and explicit commitment by the Sinn Fein leadership to the Pledge of Office required of executive members, notably a commitment to non-violence and exclusively peaceful and democratic means.

Further contortions on decommissioning, such as that suggested by Seamus Mallon, will lead only to further intractability. Mr Mallon's suggestion that Sinn Fein be removed from the executive if decommissioning is not completed by May 2000 would be a breach of the agreement and therefore, quite reasonably, unacceptable to Sinn Fein and unenforceable.

The reality is not just that decommissioning is not a precondition of Sinn Fein's participation in talks, but that decommissioning is not required by the agreement at all. What is required, according to paragraph 3 of the section dealing with decommissioning, is as follows:

"All participants . . .reaffirm their commitment to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations. They also confirm their intention to continue to work constructively and in good faith with the Independent Commission (on decommissioning) and to use any influence they may have to achieve the decommissioning of all paramilitary arms within two years, following endorsement in referendums north and south of the agreement, and in the context of the implementation of the overall agreement".

For Sinn Fein this means it is required to work constructively and in good faith with the commission and use its influence to achieve total decommissioning by May 2000 in the context of the implementation of the overall agreement.

It could be argued that in present circumstances Sinn Fein is not even required to work constructively and in good faith, or to use its influence, because the implementation of the overall agreement has been stalled. But that aside, Sinn Fein is not required to bring about decommissioning, by May 2000 or ever.

This may be unsatisfactory and it may be a pity the agreement did not demand more of Sinn Fein. But that is how it stands, and there is no point in digging further holes by pretending the agreement requires more than it actually does.

Perhaps a little further time will convince the unionists of the splendid deal the agreement represents for them. But a little further time will not change the terms of the agreement on decommissioning or the demands it places on Sinn Fein.