A series of smaller set-piece operations during the 1990s, for example, theSerbian air campaign, were classic examples of the new American strategy, writes Tom Clonan
The international war on terrorism may have begun last September 11th, but the US has been preparing for this battlefield for more than a quarter of a century.
Since their withdrawal from Saigon in 1975, the US military chiefs have been involved in a radical overhaul of their strategic, doctrinal and organisational philosophies. This process was led by defence intellectuals worried about low morale and low efficiency after Vietnam.
The modus operandi of the overhauled "be all that you can be" army of the late 1970s was tested during the invasions of Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989. Many of the architects of this success, such as Gen Colin Powell, came to prominence during the Gulf War in 1991.
Powell's successors, many of whom now serve on the General Staff of the US military, departed from such conventional military operations in the 1990s.
This was a period where ground troops were committed in relatively small numbers to theatres of operation such as the Balkans and Somalia. US deployments throughout the Balkans were confined to peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations.
The only combat experience gained by the US during this period was in Mogadishu in Somalia. This taste of urban warfare proved an unhappy experience for US commanders.
Overall, the 1990s saw a move away from the large concentration of troops seen in the Gulf War, where half a million American men and women fought in Desert Storm, to a series of smaller set-piece operations. The trend reached an apogee in 1999 with the Serbian air campaign.
This was a classic example of the new American way of war. The US had abandoned the large-scale concentration of troops along fixed lines of advance as seen in Desert Storm in favour of a highly mobile and fluid strategy.
This new strategic approach exploited the total air supremacy enjoyed by the US and its allies. The campaign abandoned the notion of ground troops closing with the enemy and holding ground.
These fundamental principles of land operations were supplanted by a new doctrine involving the high-tech, high-spec argot of the third-generation battlefield.
The air campaign rendered modern warfare Baroque with a new language of surgical strikes, smart munitions, target neutralisation and collateral damage.
At this point the US represented an economic and military ascendancy, which remained unchallenged until September 11th.
In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the air-campaign concept, the push-button warfare of the technologically superior West, seemed tailor-made as an appropriate response.
This form of warfare was perfectly suited to the asymmetrical war to be waged in the international offensive on terrorism.
It was employed to great effect in Afghanistan. By February this year, approximately 60,000 soldiers, sailors, marines and aircrew were involved in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.
This involved a staggering intelligence and logistical effort on the part of the US.
A fleet of KC-10 and KC-135 air refuelling aircraft flew constant flight paths over south-west Pakistan supporting aircraft such as B-1, B-2, B-52, F-15 and F-16s involved in combat operations. These aircraft delivered approximately 10,000 tons of guided munitions on to Taliban and al-Qaeda targets in the region.
Advanced satellite imaging techniques, intelligence-gathering methods and guidance systems dramatically improved the performance of allied weapon systems. Gen Tommy Franks claimed that, on average, a single allied aircraft would take out two verified targets per sortie in Afghanistan.
In the Gulf War, it took an average of 10 such sorties to eliminate one target. This dramatic improvement in the air war was accompanied by spectacular successes on the ground. Providing Special Forces support to local dissident warlords, the US achieved a regime change in Afghanistan for the modest cost of approximately $700 million for the opening air campaign and $1 billion per month thereafter.
With a mere 60,000 troops in theatre, US casualties were considered relatively low with collateral damage to the local population considered "minimal".
Compared to Desert Storm, which cost $61 billion and involved a half-million troops - and no regime change - Operation Enduring Freedom has provided the US government with plenty of bang for its buck.
The spectacular success of this operation has even coined a new military phrase, the Afghan Option, the economic mix of air power and local dissidents to oust a rogue regime.
Hawks in the Bush administration are actively preparing for war in Iraq. From their point of view, with only 60,000 or so troops in Enduring Freedom, and a relatively minor commitment to the Balkans (approximately 10,000 troops), the US can well afford to deploy a quarter of a million troops to Iraq.
Ironically, the doves in the Bush administration include many former military commanders such as the Secretary of State, Colin Powell. The fear among serving and retired US military commanders is that the Afghan Option will not apply to a possible invasion of Iraq.
Despite considerable sabre-rattling and leaks of plans to overthrow Saddam's regime, there does not appear as yet to be a clearly identifiable dissident group within Iraq suitable for Special Forces support. There is no immediate prospect of a collapse of Saddam's regime.
Despite these fears and despite apparent divisions within the US administration, there has been a steady and growing political momentum for an invasion of Iraq. This will have been consolidated by the recent and controversial "blood price" comment by Tony Blair in relation to Iraq.
The British Prime Minister's statement of support for the Bush administration was matched by action in a powerfully symbolic way, with a massive joint air attack on Iraqi air defence assets last Thursday. This will send a clear message to Saddam Hussein and his neighbours in the region that the West means business.
Many of Saddam's neighbours have stated that they would not welcome such a war.
The American view is that, while no one in the region would, if the US were to take decisive action, Iraq's neighbours would row in with American plans for the region.
This was certainly the case during the Gulf War.
What the US military is facing in a potential invasion of Iraq is a return to the old-style conventional tactics of the Gulf War. Unlike Desert Storm however, this is a war that will likely involve bitter urban warfare in densely populated Iraqi cities.
On the basis of an objective military analysis, this is a war the US can win.
However, US military commanders are aware that the American public may have a hard time accepting the inevitable cost of such an operation, in human as well as fiscal terms.
As the anniversary of the September 11th attacks approaches, US public opinion is faced with the fact that the American way of war it has become accustomed to - low casualty rates and the sanitised language of high-tech combat - may be replaced with something far uglier.
Dr Tom Clonan is a retired Army officer with UN experience in the Middle East and former Yugoslavia. He is a fellow of the US-based Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society and currently lectures in the School of Media at DIT