THE Compellability and Immunity of Witnesses Bill is probably the most fundamental Bill in relation to the role of the Oireachtas that has been tabled for many decades. It is also complex and technical.

The idea was that Oireachtas Committees of Inquiry could be a speedy, effective and cheaper alternative to judicial inquiries and, to that end, committees would have more powers than the Dail itself would normally have.

The Bill touches on issues of constitutional rights and natural justice. It affects, fundamentally, the future relationship between the Oireachtas and the Government and civil servants with both - or at least that was the original intention.

Since the failure of the Public Accounts Committee in 1970 to complete its inquiry into the Arms Crisis the matter has been under consideration by successive governments.

But giving Oireachtas committees a role of a quasi judicial nature is fraught with such difficulties as to give the faint hearted ample excuses for long fingering.

Then came the tribunal into the beef scandal which was so costly and time consuming.

It has been argued cogently that there would have been no need for a beef tribunal if Dail questions had been answered truthfully and comprehensively or if Dail committees had the necessary powers to investigate.

These arguments gave a powerful fillip to the drafting of the Compellability Bill, as did the recent apparent reluctance of some senior public servants to appear before Dail committees, e.g. the then governor of the Central Bank and the then Garda Commissioner.

This Government published a Bill in the latter part of 1995 and it was debated at Second Stage in the Dail and then referred to the Finance and General Affairs Committee for detailed consideration.

The committee decided that as the Bill was of major constitutional importance, it should seek from the Dail, specifically for this purpose, additional members with legal qualifications and seek sanction from the Minister for Finance to hire Senior Counsel to advise the committee on the Bill on an on going basis. Both were agreed to and implemented.

To process the Bill a special subcommittee was established which gave considerable pre Committee Stage consideration to the Bill and then proceeded with and completed Committee Stage two weeks ago.

What became apparent to the subcommittee in the course of its detailed consideration of the Bill was that it would seriously set back, rather than advance, parliamentary accountability because of two main factors

Firstly, the Bill is overladen with ample opportunity for hostile witnesses to delay and frustrate inquiries and with multiple excuses for mid inquiry litigation and, therefore, further delay.

Secondly, the original intention of the Bill had been perverted by the insertion of extensive protective provisions for the Government of the day and for the Civil Service.

To illustrate the second point first, the Bill, if enacted in its present form, would mean that Oireachtas committees of inquiry:

. could not ask certain questions even though those questions could be asked in the Dail itself;

. would have to operate a more restrictive subjudice rule than is operated by the Ceann Comhairle under Dail standing orders;

. would have to contend with a much expanded version of Cabinet confidentiality. The courts gave absolute confidentiality to Cabinet meetings. The Freedom of Information Bill, at present before the Seanad, would extend this to meetings between one or more Ministers and Ministers of State and/or the Attorney General provided these are deemed by the Government to be Government Comeven further and extends that Cabinet confidentiality to meetings between Ministers and civil servants, so both Bills seem at odds with the proposed referendum on the subject;

. could only hear civil servants who are permitted to attend by the Taoiseach who in this Bill is given a virtual judicial role;

. could not seek oral or written evidence which involved a civil servant's view of Government policy. This provision means that committees of inquiry could not ask many questions that could be asked in a tribunal of inquiry or in a court of law. Moreover, written comments by civil servants on aspects of Government policy contained in Departmental files would have to be expunged before any such file could be submitted to an inquiry.

MOREOVER, the already poor accountability of the Attorney General is inexplicably further restricted in this Bill and, worse, is confined to the Public Accounts Committee whose standing orders specifically preclude it from asking questions on policy.

Now, for the first time, that Committee's vital all party and non political role, which is its great strength, is to be politicised by importing the politically appointed Attorney General before it.

This Bill is clearly the end result of a process of attrition within Government. Its overall provisions are contradictory to the original objectives of the Bill.

The Committee has made a very strong case that all the political protection should be stripped from the Bill because it does not expand accountability, it restricts it.

Finally, on the vital question of natural justice and constitutional rights it should be possible to end up with an Act which gives effective powers and streamlined procedures to Oireachtas committees without justice being compromised.

After all the Oireachtas has given such powers to non Oireachtas bodies over the years, for example, the Medical Council.

Now it is time for the Oireachtas to take those powers for itself in the public interest but if this Bill is enacted in its present form it could set back parliamentary accountability by decades, when the opposite was the supposed intention.

Fortunately, the Minister of State, Ms Avril Doyle, undertook at Committee Stage to consider positively many of the changes proposed by the sub committee.

It is now clear that she has the support of the Taoiseach and the indications are that, within a few weeks, we will see major amendments proposed at Report Stage.