The Belfast Agreement of 1998 between the British and Irish governments and political parties in Northern Ireland has brought peace to the island and is now a settled part of Ireland’s political architecture.
Yet this extraordinary achievement failed to reconcile ethno-political identities in the North or stabilise government there. That is mainly because its imaginative three-stranded approach, inspired by John Hume and encompassing shared governing in Northern Ireland, North-South co-operation and institutionalised relations between Ireland and the United Kingdom, has been neglected and underused by these governments and parties.
That is the thrust of this meticulous, closely-argued study of the agreement and its subsequent evolution. It first examines the content, differing interpretations and major criticisms of the agreement, showing clearly how the various players had contrasting motivations in reaching it.
The two governments prioritised peace and stability, the unionists wanted to lock Northern Ireland into the UK, while nationalists and republicans saw a peaceful path to Irish unity. Critics say its consociational powersharing structure locks in sectarianism while its multiple veto points inhibit emergent political change.
The Brexit shock plus political and demographic change put a potentially united Ireland on the agenda
Subsequent chapters examine how Brexit’s resurrection of state sovereignty from 2016 undermined the agreement’s powersharing dimensions all round, dramatising these conflicting interpretations. The European element of the agreement was understated yet essential to its functioning. That showed up in North-South and East-West terms – Strands 2 and 3 of the agreement – as the book goes on to demonstrate.
British-Irish relations reached their lowest ebb during negotiation of the EU withdrawal deal and the Northern Ireland Protocol with the Conservatives. They are now being ambitiously repaired with the new Labour government.
The book argues strongly and persuasively that Hume’s three-stranded vision should continue to inspire North-South and East-West relations and that the institutional architecture agreed in 1998 has been underused. Taoiseach Micheál Martin’s Shared Island initiative and the current Dublin-London reset are happening more alongside than through the North South Ministerial Council and the British-Irish Intergovernmental Council.
Such institutions suit the smaller state. Tannam shows how political disagreements and pragmatic diplomacy have undermined that insight. This matters because the Brexit shock plus political and demographic change put a potentially united Ireland on the agenda. If that happens the agreement’s minority guarantees and institutions would still be available – and required.
