Britain and the United States had only limited intelligence about Iraqi forces in the run up to the war, the British Ministry of Defence said today.
In its first official assessment of the Iraq campaign, the MoD acknowledged that it had not known whether Saddam Hussein's commanders would be able to deploy weapons of mass destruction against coalition troops.
A 48-page report, entitled Operations in Iraq 2003: First Reflections, underlined the problems coalition intelligence agencies had faced in obtaining information about a regime that was "secretive and based on fear".
"It was therefore a very difficult intelligence target with few sources of information," the report said.
"Assessments of Iraq's military capability depended on intelligence gleaned over more than a decade of surveillance and containment, as well as direct familiarity from frequent engagement with elements of it in recent operations.
"Although we knew much about the broad structure and disposition of Iraqi land and air forces, very little was known about how they planned to oppose the coalition or whether they had the will to fight."
While coalition commanders had believed the Iraqis may have been willing to use weapons of mass destruction, the report acknowledged that it was unclear whether they were actually able to deploy them.
"It was judged that the regime might use theatre ballistic missiles and possibly weapons of mass destruction if it could make the capabilities available for operational use and secure the obedience of subordinate commanders," it said.
The paucity of intelligence led coalition commanders to overestimate the likely resistance from Iraqi regular forces.
While little opposition had been expected from the run-down Iraqi navy, the army and air force were thought to be "substantially intact", with the Republican Guard and the air defence network expected to provide the "most determined resistance".
"The lack of clear information meant that the coalition did not anticipate that Iraqi organised military resistance would collapse so quickly and completely," the report said.
"Only with hindsight was it possible to assess the true state of Iraq's infrastructural, organisational and social collapse, caused by years of official neglect, criminal activity, international sanctions and war damage."
Liberal Democrat defence spokesman Paul Keetch said the admission that the intelligence had been so weak further undermined the British government's case for war based on the intelligence assessment of the threat posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.
"The government said they were sure enough of an imminent threat to take us to war and yet our military say there was a 'lack of clear information' whether Iraq 'could make its capabilities available for operational use'," he said.
"The truth of the matter has fallen between the spooks and the spinners."
Overall, the report concluded that the campaign had shown that Britain's war-fighting doctrine, based on flexible, rapidly-deployable forces, was sound, "albeit capable of further refinement".
PA