Mitchell review must not permit unionists to renegotiate agreement

From the signing of the Good Friday agreement in April 1998 until the UUP prevented the transfer of power and the establishment…

From the signing of the Good Friday agreement in April 1998 until the UUP prevented the transfer of power and the establishment of the institutions two weeks ago, the peace process has limped from one unionist-induced crisis to another. This is not a blip, but the possible meltdown of the political conditions that led to the agreement.

Sinn Fein's commitment to this process goes back more than a decade and was signalled publicly with the publishing of Towards a Lasting Peace in 1991. This was followed by many initiatives which republicans have taken both unilaterally and along with others in nationalist Ireland and abroad.

Most critical among these were the talks between John Hume and Gerry Adams in 1993/1994, which kick-started the peace process, and the IRA cessations of 1994 and 1997, which created the best opportunity for peace in Ireland this century. We sought and secured our party's support for the Good Friday agreement in 1998.

Most recently, in the Castle Building discussions in late June, we took a further initiative in an attempt to overcome the impasse. This initiative, which was described by the two governments as a seismic shift, was rejected repeatedly by the UUP.

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Despite the negative approach of unionism towards the Good Friday agreement, the primary responsibility for the failure to implement it in key areas lies ultimately with the British government. By indulging David Trimble in his delaying strategy and by pandering to unionist rejectionism, the British government has encouraged that intransigence.

Sixteen months on, none of the institutions have been put in place. On the ground there has been no progress on the equality agenda in terms of its effect on the day to day lives of people. There has been no progress on demilitarisation with the British government yet to fulfil even the minimal requirement to publish a "normalisation" paper.

The people of the Garvaghy Road and other isolated nationalist communities have yet to see evidence of their right to live free from sectarian harassment. Repressive legislation has not been repealed but strengthened. The RUC remains unchanged, unable and unwilling to root out the culture of collusion between its members and loyalist paramilitaries and unwilling to challenge wrongdoing within the force. We have seen a succession of missed deadlines and broken agreements. On July 1st, 1998, David Trimble was elected First Minister and Seamus Mallon Deputy First Minister. The summer passed with no executive formed.

It was not until September 10th, over two months after his election as First Minister, that David Trimble agreed to meet Gerry Adams. The all-Ireland bodies were due to be established through the shadow Ministerial Council by October 31st. On January 13th, a new deadline was set by the British government for March 10th, 1999. Five days after this deadline passed, Rosemary Nelson was murdered.

A new deadline of the week beginning March 29th was set to ensure that the institutions were established before the first anniversary of the agreement on April 10th. Once more the deadline passed.

Yet another deadline, an absolute deadline the British government told us was set for June 30th. That ended with the collapse of the executive at Stormont on July 15th.

DAVID Trimble's approach to the peace process should have come as no surprise. His strategy has been to assert unionist domination and control of the political process by imposing the unionist veto. Having reluctantly signed up to the Good Friday agreement, he has sought at every available opportunity to reduce its impact.

He casually made and then reneged on one agreement after another. He ran behind the "No" camp instead of standing by the Good Friday agreement and giving leadership to those inside unionism who want to look forward not backwards. David Trimble has succeeded in blocking progress and collapsing the institutions, but the responsibility is not his alone.

The British government needs to rectify the situation by changing its tactical approach. Tony Blair must ensure that the unionist writ is confined to Glengall Street and doesn't run in Downing Street. The Good Friday agreement will never deliver on its undoubted potential if its implementation is filtered through unionism.

On Saturday, July 24th, against this difficult backdrop, the Sinn Fein negotiating team reported to the Sinn Fin ardchomhairle on the preliminary discussions with Senator Mitchell and last week's meeting with the British government.

The ardchomhairle took the view that the refusal of the UUP to share power with nationalists and republicans and the consequent collapse of the executive requires urgent and immediate action by the two governments. Given the faltering approach of the British government to date, there is a particular onus on the Irish government to continue to pursue energetically the implementation of these aspects of the agreement, to defend and advance the rights of all Irish citizens and of the people of Ireland as a whole.

In addition, the two governments must seek to ensure that the UUP fulfils its obligations under the terms of the agreement or, failing this, ensure the establishment, under their auspices, of meaningful institutions, including a range of all-Ireland policy and implementation bodies.

But there is only one area of the agreement that has totally broken down and that concerns the political institutions. This is the area the review should address and this is the difficulty which it must overcome.

A further renegotiation of this issue to meet UUP demands is totally unacceptable. Given the uncertainty surrounding the conduct of the review, the ardchomhairle declined, at this time, to make a firm decision on whether or not Sinn Fein would participate in the review being conducted by Senator Mitchell.

While Sinn Fein's approach to the review has yet to be decided, the ardchomhairle did decide to seek a range of meetings with the UUP, at various levels, both formal and informal, in a concerted attempt to find a way forward. To facilitate these discussions, we are prepared to conduct these meetings in private.

Decommissioning was addressed comprehensively in the negotiations leading up to Good Friday and is addressed directly in the agreement itself. The section on decommissioning makes clear that addressing this issue is dependent on two key elements;

a collective responsibility on all participants to work in good faith with the International Commission; and

the implementation of the overall agreement.

There is no singular responsibility on Sinn Fein or any one party to bring about decommissioning. It is the collective responsibility of all participants and one which Sinn Fein fully accepts and has acted on. Unfortunately the UUP does not.

The reality is that for almost 16 months we have been attempting to address this issue in the context of the non-implementation of the agreement. The UUP has been misusing this issue both to block the establishment of the inclusive political institutions agreed on Good Friday and also in pursuit of their objective of excluding republicans from government.

The decommissioning section of the Good Friday agreement is free-standing. Entitlement to executive office is dependent only on electoral support and taking and honouring the pledge of office. Any attempt to exclude Sinn Fein on the basis of a failure to achieve decommissioning is beyond the terms of the agreement and would be totally unacceptable.

If it is to be objective, genuine and within the terms of the Good Friday agreement, the review in September must address the failure to establish the political institutions as agreed on Good Friday last year. This is the area of fundamental breakdown. It must examine the causes of the breakdown, including a close examination of the role played by the British government, and it must ultimately identify the source of the breakdown and how, within the terms of the Good Friday agreement, it should be overcome.

While Sinn Fein is justifiably critical of the British government, we have acknowledged and commended the positive way that Mr Blair approached the peace process. The Good Friday agreement provides the only way forward. It cannot be renegotiated at the behest of unionism. For Sinn Fein, it is the absolute bottom line.

Gerry Adams is president of Sinn Fein