BY persisting for so long with their demand for decommissioning in advance of negotiations, and by the clumsiness of their eventual climbdown, the British government produced three undesirable effects.
First, given the paranoia that exists among the IRA and its supporters about British motives and actions, this stringing out of the process was bound eventually to be viewed by the IRA, not just as a matter simple bad faith, which would be unfortunate enough, but rather as a Machiavellian British plot designed to wreck the peace process, however absurd that may appear to any rational observer.
The second undesirable consequence has of course, been that the public dropping of the British precondition of advance decommissioning shortly after the Canary Wharf bombing has served to persuade the IRA of something it has always needed to believe, namely, that the British concede only to force, and that it was the Canary Wharf bomb that finally blew away the advance decommissioning precondition.
It may well be the case, as has indeed been asserted, that our Government had in fact persuaded the British government to change its stance on this issue before Canary Wharf. But it may be doubted whether the IRA has been brought to believe this, when it has such an interest in believing the opposite.
And the third undesirable consequence is that many unionists now share this IRA belief, that it was the bomb at Canary Wharf that precipitated the change of policy on decommissioning.
NOW, if the stringing out of the pre negotiation period by the British government had any rationale at all it must have been designed to give more time to unionists to come around to constructive participation in negotiations with nationalists, including Sinn Fein.
But the British have produced the exact opposite effect, for the episode has increased rather than reduced unionist antipathy to such a negotiation.
By contrast, during the past two months the British government has handled the run in to the election and to all party talks with considerable skill. Already it is clear that, as a result, all the political parties will participate in the elections five weeks hence. Moreover, it seems at least possible that the tight constraints imposed by the British government on the elected body may decide the SDLP to play some part in its work.
At the same time the British government's isolation of the forum from the all party talks has not led the Ulster Unionist Party to adopt a completely negative stance towards the planned negotiations.
The great uncertainty that remains is, of course, whether the IRA will permit Sinn Fein to take part in these talks by declaring a further cessation of violence and by allowing its political wing to announce its acceptance of the Mitchell principles.
Thus far the IRA has chosen to leave this option open, although the prospects for Sinn Fein participation do not look too good at the moment.
Throughout these difficult months the Government and - at least until last weekend - the Fianna Fail opposition have, it seems to me, both been playing very positive roles. We cannot, of course, know at this stage just how much the belated shift in British policy in a positive direction has owed to Government pressure.
But given the scale and direction of this shift, and on the basis of my own past experience of Anglo Irish relations, I would guess that when the relevant papers become available they will reflect very well indeed on recent Irish diplomacy.
There has, of course, been a good deal of speculation about tension between the Taoiseach's Department and Foreign Affairs with respect to Northern Ireland policy, and on several occasions the British can be seen to have attempted to exploit these alleged divisions.
Clearly it would have been preferable for any difficulties of this kind to have been sorted out within the system without overflowing into public debate particularly if and when these differences have been at official rather than political level.
But, in relation to Northern Ireland our Government is required to face in three different directions at the one time seeking to persuade the IRA towards negotiations, the British towards minimising obstacles to Sinn Fein participation and unionists towards sitting down with Sinn Fein in a structured negotiation to be held under Irish as well as British government auspices.
IN these unusual circumstances the actual existence of several different sources of Irish Government policy formulation has not necessarily been entirely disadvantageous. Skilfully worked, a "hard man, soft man" approach, which this duality of policy leadership makes possible, can be a useful ploy in diplomacy as in other forms of negotiation.
What is not helpful, however, is the emergence of advisers in the role of enunciators of policies or positions which have not been agreed at Government level. There are, of course, some occasions when advisers may have to speak out, as indeed did Fergus Finlay several months ago - most effectively and convincingly I thought - in defence of his own and his party's integrity in relation to the divorce campaign advertising contract.
But if Fergus Finlay said on television on Wednesday last that the June 10th negotiation would not be worth a penny candle if Sinn Fein was not a participant he was trebly wrong.
First, it was out of place for him as an adviser to have made such a statement.
Second, the statement is in any event ill founded; for it is surely obvious that Northern Ireland negotiations confined to governments and constitutional parties (e.g. Sunningdale), or even confined to governments alone (the Anglo Irish Agreement of 1985), can be of considerable value, especially when, as in the case of the Anglo Irish Agreement, they help to isolate and erode support for organisations such as the IRA, with the possibility of eventually persuading it to contemplate abandonment of violence.
And, third, tactically this was not a good moment at which to encourage the IRA to believe that it is indispensable to a negotiation and thus to encourage it to hold back.
Finally, until last weekend the Fianna Fail opposition under Bertie Ahern's leadership had been playing a statesmanlike, constructive and most effective role in relation to the peace process, as indeed I have had occasion to remark in this column.
Their statements in relation to this peace process have hitherto been well calculated to persuade the IRA to restore the ceasefire and thus allow Sinn Fein to participate in the talks that will start, with or without them, on June 10th.
Moreover, this Fianna Fail stance must have been winning back support that the party had lost, to the PDs in particular, by the opportunistic tactics on the Northern Ireland issue deployed in opposition by its former leader, Charles Haughey, in relation to the publication of the Forum Report and the 1985 Agreement.
The terms of last weekend's attack by the present Fianna Fail leader on the Government's Northern Ireland policy was ill timed. It was also non credible, because it has coincided with a British policy shift that has cleared the way for all party talks without preconditions, and for this breakthrough Irish diplomacy clearly deserves considerable credit.
Also, the terms in which this Fianna Fail attack was formulated, e.g. the derisive reference to John Redmond, can hardly have encouraged floating voters to see Fianna Fail as a party capable of persuading people of a different, unionist, Irish tradition that they would be treated "generously" by that party in a negotiation for an Irish settlement.
One must hope that, despite the Fianna Fail leader's defence this week of his speech last Sunday, this will turn out to have been a temporary aberration rather than an almost 180 degree shift in the constructive stance hitherto taken by Fianna Fail under the leadership of Bertie Ahern.