FORMER BRITISH prime minister Tony Blair’s repeated declarations that the planning for an Iraq invasion did not begin until 2003 have been cast into doubt on the eve of the opening of an official British inquiry into the war.
Official documents published by the Sunday Telegraphyesterday include statements made after the invasion to an internal minister of defence review of the war, in which officers sharply criticised preparations.
The documents are reported to contain classified interviews in which army officers describe how troops were exposed to “significant risk” because of a “rushed”operation “lacking in coherence and resources”.
The officers’ statements also reveal that British planning had begun in February 2002 – even though Mr Blair continued to tell the House of Commons for months afterwards that no such planning was under way.
US military chiefs, such as Gen Tommy Franks, who would lead the war, held a special planning conference on June 28th, 2002, with British and Australian counterparts, the documents say.
Indeed, the Americans and British discussed in August, and subsequently agreed, that a large contingent of British troops would form the core of a northern invasion force into Iraq from Turkey.
However, Mr Blair’s reluctance to move troops into forward bases until December – because of vocal British public and political opposition to the war – caused problems when the Turks refused entry, and forced their diversion to Kuwait.
Mr Blair’s enemies have long argued that he gave a guarantee to US president George Bush that by mid-2002, if not before, he would commit British troops to the invasion, preferably with UN backing, but, if necessary, without.
The secrecy was such that “only very small numbers of officers and officials were allowed to become involved” in invasion-planning until just two days before Christmas Day.
“The planning and preparation for this operation was more rushed than should have been the case . . . The time available to plan Op Telic was not well spent at the strategic [government] and operational levels,” the leaked papers reveal.
The shortcomings led to “many implications for the operational and tactical conduct of the operation”, including the post-invasion chapter when the British and Americans were roundly condemned for failing to provide basic services.
In one statement, seen by the Telegraph, the head of the British army's special forces, Lieut Gen Graeme Lamb, said he had been "working the war up since early 2002," the newspaper said.
Throughout 2002 Mr Blair consistently refused to rule out military action against Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein; but he insisted that no final decisions had been made, and that no military preparations were under way
The timing of the publication of the ministry of defence documents is striking given that the Iraq inquiry, which will hear evidence from Mr Blair early next year, meets in public for the first time tomorrow.
Even though the documents initially declare that the war-planning was “generic”, they quickly contradicted themselves to say that it was not “truly generic” and was, in fact, “detailed advance planning”.
Detailing significant changes to the order of battle, one of the documents noted: “From March 2002, or May at the latest, there was a significant possibility of a large-scale British operation.”
Headed by Sir John Chilcott, the Iraq inquiry team will include Sir Roderic Lyne, who was a serving ambassador at the time of the war.
Mr Blair will be asked to give evidence early in the New Year, along with the current and former heads of Britain’s MI6 intelligence agency – John Sawers and John Scarlett. Mr Blair may then be recalled to give more evidence.
The final report is not scheduled to be delivered until October of next year, which means that it will not be a factor in next year’s general election campaign, due in May or June.