THE FOREIGN Affairs White Paper indicates that UN peace keeping operations have changed, becoming "politically, administratively and logistically more complex". The "Partnership for Peace" (PfP) is well placed to tackle these problems.
In the United Nations Protection Force for Bosnia (Unprofor), some activities' were "contracted out" or "mandated" to Nato. International Red Cross and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) were also present. Many UN troops in Bosnia were peacekeeping for the first time. They had much to learn some of them are now learning through the PfP.
The UN has no involvement in the Implementation Force (Ifor), which was formed to implement the Dayton peace accords. This avowedly enforcement operation became necessary because the disputing parties repeatedly violated previous agreements.
Mandating fits well into the current "Global Governance" concept. This calls for "better ordered and more reliable responses to problems which go beyond the individual or collective capacities of even powerful states." This, it is argued, "can be fostered by a better division of labour between universal membership and other institutions". This means that the UN organisation should do what it does best, or better, than other institutions. Responsibilities should be devolved when other institutions, such as regional organisations (provided for in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter), NGOs. etc., can respond more effectively.
Mandating suits the big countries, but one is uneasy that the concept may be used in the current scapegoating of the UN for Bosnia. Mandating is, arguably, a kind of subsidiarity. The UN admits that it is overstretched at present and has not the resources to deal with enforcement operations.
The White Paper is guarded.
"In view of the burden on the UN in the new international situation, the Government accepts that the development of regional organisations in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter, is both necessary and welcome." In our area, the region considered is the OSCE.
The Partnership for Peace was very well covered in Mark Brennock's article in this newspaper (March 29th). The PfP is going to affect peacekeeping, and us, whether we join it or not. The White Paper mentions peacekeeping training and exercises under PfP auspices which would "enhance the capacity and readiness of our Defence Forces to participate in UN or OSCE peacekeeping operations."
I would leave the political aspects of the PfP to others except for a reminder that nations join the partnership largely under their own terms when they indicate how they would contribute to its aims. Finland is the relevant case for us - she opted for peacekeeping.
To appreciate what the White Paper says, we should look at the peacekeeping training under way. There were eight peace keeping exercises between October and December 1995 - hosted by the Czech Republic, Hungary, Germany, the US and Albania. Civil Emergency Planning Exercises (CEPS) were also held in Slovakia, the Kola Peninsula (nuclear plant accident exercise) and St Petersburg. PfP partners also observed a Nato exercise on detecting and monitoring radiation.
Routine activities covered included establishing and running checkpoints and observation posts, deploying to troublespots, search and rescue operations, action on mines/ explosives and delivery of humanitarian aid.
More complex tasks like manning a UN buffer zone, escorting humanitarian convoys, separating combatants, negotiations, ceasefires and refugee repatriation were also dealt with. These are not aggressive preparations but the essential tasks of"multifunctional peacekeeping", a new term for old activities.
From the serious and varied training indicated above are coming agreed doctrines, procedures and new ideas. Those not familiar with them will be at a real disadvantage: military organisations depend on the intelligent application of agreed procedures and ideas.
Experience and expertise should enable us to contribute to this work, but we should not assume that we have nothing to learn. Experience and expertise are now more widely spread than they were. We might find ours to be deteriorating assets if they are not updated by continuing experience and if we exclude ourselves from the kind of training covered above.
The White Paper is objective. It lists the aims and advantages of the PfP and says that the Government will explore the benefits of participation and the contributions we might make.
Too much rigidity may leave us like the man who wasn't even asked to the party, much less to play his harp.
There is much speculation on the shape and future of peacekeeping. How would a future operation be formed and deployed?
In the past, UN HQ put forces together by a series of hypothetical questions. Country A was asked would it provide troops if the disputants agreed to accept them. Countries B, C, D, etc., were similarly queried. Cables flew. If A said "yes", the disputants, especially the host country, were asked if A's troops would be acceptable. If they agreed, the request to country A was confirmed.
Troops may now have to be acceptable to the mandated organisation rather than to, or perhaps as well as to, the United Nations, before the disputants are approached. The main country in the mandated organisation would also have a view. The process could be lengthy.
Slowness in deploying UN troops to the mission areas has become more pronounced in recent years. This has led to proposals for ready reaction forces.
The White Paper mentions one proposed by the UN Secretary General the recent and well worked out Canadian one is another possibility.