EU: Analysts see a post-Iraq division of military labour emerging. Tom Clonan examines the debate.
Following a second referendum last October, Ireland's ratification of the Nice Treaty had important security and defence implications for the EU.
It allowed for the formalisation of an EU military committee and an EU military staff reporting to the European Council.
Theoretically speaking, with these newly-formed command and control structures in place, the EU for the first time has the ability to embark on autonomous military operations up to 2,500 miles beyond its boundaries.
The type of military operations it is authorised to conduct is framed by the Petersberg Tasks, including humanitarian and rescue tasks, crisis management, peace-keeping and peace-making tasks.
In line with the EU's St Malo declaration of 1998, such "autonomous action" would be conducted by "credible military forces", namely the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF).
On paper, the ERRF is a formidable military force consisting of up to 100,000 troops, 100 warships and 400 combat aircraft. However, such a force would not seem to be enough to satisfy the security and defence concerns of four of the EU member-states.
In the wake of this week's Belgian mini-summit, the participants, Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg, declared that "with a view to improving command and control capabilities available to the European Union as well as to NATO, our four defence ministers will take the necessary steps to establish, not later than 2004, a multinational deployable force headquarters for joint operations".
This force would exist in parallel with the ERRF, and would consist of a Franco-German brigade enhanced by Belgian special forces and a reconnaissance element from Luxembourg.
In terms of command structures, such a force headquarters would appear to duplicate the role of the ERRF and its EU military staffs reporting to the European Council. It is, however, a step down from an original French and German-inspired proposal by Belgium for a 50-strong "European defence general staff" to be based in Tervuren, outside Brussels.
Given France, Germany and Belgium's opposition to the US and British war in Iraq, and given that Britain, Spain and Italy were not invited to the summit, many commentators feel such a proposal, had it been ratified, would have caused division among the EU defence community.
Some observers have also suggested that the newly-formed Franco-German brigade is a vehicle to ensure French command and control of any future European military interventions.
Such observers would argue that consistent with France's aspirations for superpower status, French generalship would be de rigueur for any future European military adventures.
Given their problematic status within NATO and the egalitarian and multinational make-up of the ERRF, the French military would be unlikely to assume overall command of any forces promulgated by either of these agencies.
According to the cynical view, the newly-announced force concept would probably represent Chirac's best chance at approximating world-class status as a military and foreign policy supremo.
These developments come at a time when Europe is attempting to evolve a robust and integrated European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This policy is being formed in the "new" security environment post-September 11th, and the demonstrated ability of the US to militarily assert, at will, its own security and foreign policy imperatives worldwide.
In such an environment, the debate in Europe will centre on whether EU defence policy will function as an alternative or support to the US and NATO.
Given the scope permitted to the ERRF under the Petersberg Tasks in military terms, an evolving division of labour would appear to be developing already, with the US and its NATO partners waging high tempo combat operations, and EU formations configured for peace-keeping, peace-support and low tempo stabilisation missions.
Among defence intellectuals in Europe, the debate on European defence and security does not simply consist of technical military considerations. The threat to European security no longer consists of the spectre of Warsaw Pact troops advancing westward in massed armoured columns.
The European vision for future security incorporates human, economic and political elements.
Among the new threats identified is the instability associated with neighbouring states to the south and east of the EU. In such states it is acknowledged that existing political and economic deficits breed "pools of human misery" which ultimately give rise to a security and terrorist threat to the west. Such states are now identified as being in the "seduction zone" of the EU.
Rather than bombing such states into submission, the EU's vision for future security would involve positive measures such as increased trade with such states with the prospect of membership of the EU.
This "golden handcuffs" approach is being posited as an alternative to the vast military industrial complex necessary for the US model of security.
As this debate progresses in Europe, the question of Irish neutrality will continue to be an issue. Our "neutral" stance, however, should not be allowed to deny Ireland's fullest participation in this debate.
Neutrality ought not to imply indifference to or ignorance of the New World security order. Nor should it imply automatic criticism of organisations such as NATO or the newly-evolving EU security structures. Recognised by other neutral states as valid political and military institutions, they have provided a peace dividend from which Ireland has derived a great deal of benefit.
Perhaps with a positive contribution from Ireland, with its experience of peacekeeping abroad and conflict resolution at home, they might continue to do so.
Dr Tom Clonan is a retired army officer with experience in the Middle East and former Yugoslavia. He is a fellow of the US-based Inter University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. He lectures in the School of Media, DIT.