Sparrow -v- Minister for Agriculture Fisheries and Food and Anor
Supreme Court
Judgment was given by Mrs Justice Denham on Jan 29th, 2010, Mr Justice Geoghegan and Mr Justice Finnegan concurring
Judgment
In an appeal against a decision of the High Court that a trial should go ahead, despite evidence that the accused suffered from a serious and potentially fatal heart condition, and that his stress would be exacerbated by the trial, the Supreme Court ruled that it was a matter for the trial judge to assess all the evidence, including the medical evidence, in making a decision that the trial should continue.
The requirement that the judge make a judicial decision is not trumped by medical evidence on behalf of one party.
Background
The applicant, a veterinary surgeon, was seeking to prohibit his trial on two charges relating to foot-and-mouth disease forms. The minister for agriculture initiated summary proceedings in the District Court in April 2003, in respect of offences alleged to have been committed in April 2001.
The applicant took judicial review proceedings seeking to have the trial prohibited on a number of grounds, including his health, but also a claim of bias and a claim relating to the venue for the proposed hearing.
In June 2006 the High Court ruled that the proceedings should go ahead, but in front of a different judge. They were then set for hearing before Judge Hamill.
When the case came before Judge Hamill in November 2007, he stated, having heard the medical evidence on behalf of the applicant, that the case should proceed, and that no exceptional circumstances – similar to those in the case PT -v- Director of Public Prosecutions – existed to justify prohibiting it. He adjourned the matter until January 2008.
On December 3rd, 2007, the applicant obtained leave to take judicial review proceedings seeking an order to prohibit the trial on the grounds of his serious health problems.
He stated that there was a very high risk of sudden death at the trial, which in itself constituted a real risk of an unfair trial; the stress of further court appearances could result in his sudden death; his constitutional right to life outweighed the community’s right to prosecute; and the decision of Judge Hamill was irrational and flew in the face of the expert medical evidence.
The respondents opposed the application on the grounds that he had already taken judicial review proceedings seeking to prohibit the trial, where his arguments relating to his health had not been accepted; the health grounds were res judicia; and Judge Hamill had acted lawfully and within jurisdiction in deciding the matter should proceed after hearing all the evidence.
The High Court ruled that the trial should proceed, pointing out that this case differed from PT in that the applicant was 66 years old, while PT was 86, and the events giving rise to the prosecution had occurred 35 years earlier.
Mr Justice Sheehan also stated it was relevant that the applicant continued to work, to drive and to give expert evidence in court cases.
The applicant then appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, arguing that the judge had erred in law to the extent that he substituted his own view for that of the expert consultant cardiologist, that he had given no reasons for his conclusion and that the failure to prohibit the trial amounted to a violation of his constitutional right to a fair trial.
Decision
Mrs Justice Denham summarised the medical evidence given on behalf of the applicant, which was that he had suffered from heart trouble since 1992. His condition remained relatively stable until 2001, when, around the time of the event giving rise to this case, he had a heart attack. His doctor recommended he avoid stressful situations.
This view was also put forward by his consultant cardiologist, who gave evidence to the District Court. This included the fact that there had been a progression of his heart disease, and he had developed florid diabetes. His heart condition was “strongly associated with intense distress”. He had a pacemaker inserted following a collapse in 2007.
The cardiologist stated that the risk of sudden death was very high, and there was a serious risk of a fatal incident occurring if he were to give instructions during a trial. He put this risk at 50 per cent.
Mrs Justice Denham pointed out that there was also other evidence before Judge Hamill, including the fact that the applicant continued to practise as a veterinary surgeon, though in a limited fashion; he drove a car and attended court in his professional capacity; and he had instructed his legal team over the years.
“The appeal is based on the medical evidence and the misconception that Judge Hamill had no choice in his decision once the medical evidence was given on behalf of the applicant. This fundamental error undermines the whole appeal,” she said.
The court was not compelled to comply with the medical evidence given on behalf of one party. The duty and responsibility of the judge was to hear and assess all the evidence.
There was no doubt that the accused had a serious heart condition, and that stress was bad for people with such conditions. “However, the fact that a person has heart disease, and that stress is bad for such persons, and attending court is stressful, does not mean that a person may not be prosecuted,” she said.
The approach and decisions of Judge Hamill and Mr Justice Sheehan in the High Court had not been in error, she concluded.
Referring to the decision in the PT case, she said this was not based on medical evidence alone, but included the fact that the case was brought after many years, and the accused was very elderly.
The applicant had brought two sets of judicial review proceedings, which had postponed the proceedings by years. “This matter alone must have been an additional stressful factor for the applicant.” The prosecutions in the District Court should now proceed.
The full judgment is on www.courts.ie
Gerard Hogan SC and Randal Hill BL, instructed by LK Shields, Dublin, for the appellant; David Nolan SC and Eamonn Walsh BL, instructed by the Chief State Solicitor, for the respondent