MEMOIR:Within days of Charles Haughey becoming Taoiseach, there was uncertainty among Ireland's friends in Washington as to what the change meant for policy. The fact that Neil Blaney and the Irish National Caucus welcomed the change added to their doubts
IN JULY, 1978, I was appointed Irish ambassador to the US. I had spent the previous seven years in the Anglo-Irish division of the Department of Foreign Affairs, much of it in Northern Ireland monitoring and assessing the situation there for the government.
When telling me of my appointment, the then taoiseach Jack Lynch said that the priorities in my mission were, firstly, to do everything possible to reduce US financial, political and logistical support for the Provisional IRA and, secondly, to work closely with the IDA to secure US investment in Ireland. The Ford Motor Company had recently, much to his disappointment, announced a major European investment in Wales rather than in Cork. Lynch felt that the British embassy in Washington, led by then British prime minister Ian Callaghan’s son-in-law, Peter Jay had played a significant role in the Ford decision.
From the early 1970s, the main political parties in Dublin were in substantial agreement on Northern Ireland policy. In particular, there was agreement that there was no role for organisations supporting violence, whether those organisations were based in Ireland or abroad. The Cosgrave government’s decision to name two US based organisations, The Irish Northern Aid Committee (Noraid) and the Irish National Caucus (INC) as supporters of the Provisional IRA’s campaign of violence was reiterated by the Lynch Government when it was returned to office in 1977.
I presented my credentials to president Jimmy Carter in October, 1978. A year earlier, Carter had become the first US president to indicate a positive interest in contributing to a resolution of the Northern Irish situation. Prompted by four prominent and powerfully placed politicians, speaker Tip ONeill, Senators Ted Kennedy and Pat Moynihan and governor Hugh Carey of New York (together to become known as the Four Horsemen), he issued a statement offering to help and holding out the carrot of financial assistance if the parties in the North and the British and Irish governments could reach agreement.
In line with Lynchs instructions, my US-based colleagues and I used every appropriate opportunity to make clear the Irish government’s position on the Provisional IRA and its US-support organisations. We briefed the major newspapers, usually at editorial board level. We went on radio talk shows. We briefed members of Congress, individually and in groups. We spoke at meetings of Irish-American organisations of which there were 12 organised nationally and about 220 at local level in the late 1970s.
The message we were giving was that violence was not justified and that we needed Irish-Americans to back the Irish government and support and encourage the Four Horsemen.
It was not an easy message to convey. The huge goodwill in the Irish-American community was not always matched by an appreciation of the realities of the situation back in Ireland. Not everyone accepted that it was not possible simultaneously to support the Irish government and the Provisional IRA. Aspects of British policy such as tolerance of unionist discrimination and excesses for 50 years, the introduction of one-sided internment in 1971, Bloody Sunday in 1972 and the failure to deal with the Ulster Workers Council strike in 1974 fed the view that the only thing that would move the British was violence.
Noraid was the US fundraising arm of the Provisional IRA and the INC was initially a related political front. Under pressure from the Irish and US authorities, the INC began to distance itself from the Provisional IRA in the mid-seventies and to focus on alleged violations of human rights in both parts of Ireland. Significant overlap of leadership between both organisations continued and the INC did not find it possible to condemn the violence of the Provisional IRA.
In congressman Mario Biaggi of New York they had found a supporter and through him had created in the US Congress an informal ad hoc committee on Irish Affairs. Because of his failure to condemn the use of violence in Ireland and because of dubious activities unconnected with Ireland which eventually led to his being convicted and jailed, the Four Horsemen were not prepared to have anything to do with Biaggi. Eventually, they drowned him out by creating the Friends of Ireland in Congress which grew to have more than 200 members in the 1980s. It was initially chaired by congressman Tom Foley who went on to become Speaker of the House in succession to Tip O’Neill.
On December 7th, 1979, Lynch was succeeded as leader of Fianna Fáil by Charles Haughey and four days later he was elected Taoiseach. The independent Fianna Fáil TD Neil Blaney happened to be visiting the US at the time as a guest of the INC. He immediately issued a statement saying that with the formation of a new government under Haughey “it is the wish of all the friends of Ireland that the government will work with the INC in the important task it has undertaken . . . it is doing the job that our embassy in Washington should be doing but is not doing”.
At the same time, head of the INC Seán McManus asked for my removal and the appointment of an ambassador who would reflect Haughey’s view. In his post-retirement intervention in Irish politics, Lynch responded that “Irish diplomats in the US were acting directly under my instructions and those of my government. The reason is that leading members of that organisation in the US have had close contact with and openly expressed support for the Provisional IRA and its activities”.
Within days of Haughey becoming leader of Fianna Fáil, there was uncertainty among the Four Horsemen as to what the change meant for policy. They were, of course, aware of his involvement in the arms trial 10 years earlier and of the divisions within Fianna Fáil. The fact that Blaney and the INC had warmly welcomed the change added to their doubts.
O’Neill had sought me out – at his birthday party – as early as December 11th. There were, he said, two Irish positions in the US, that of the Four Horsemen and that of Biaggi and the INC. The positions were in conflict. The basis for the horsemen’s position was the Irish government and John Hume. If that basis was removed, they were no longer interested in being involved. If they were to continue to influence US policy, and indirectly British policy, they would have to be seen to have no association, however remote, with violence. They wished to know, and quickly, if there was going to be a change in the Irish government’s position. Then British prime minister Margaret Thatcher was due to visit Washington on December 17th and O’Neill wanted to know what he and Carter should say to her about Northern Ireland. I reported all of this to the Department of Foreign Affairs.
In Haughey’s early days as taoiseach, there was media speculation in Ireland as to what his approach to the North would be and, in party terms, whether or not he would move quickly to reconcile Blaney with Fianna Fáil. The role of Irish diplomats in the US would not normally have been of such interest but we had unwittingly become touchstones by which changes, if any, in policy could measured.
There was an initial hesitation to clarify the situation and specifically to defend me. During a supplementary estimate debate in the Dáil on December 13th, the new minister for finance, Michael O’Kennedy, who had under Lynch been minister for foreign affairs, refused to come to my defence, even when pressed by Fine Gael deputies Austin Deasy and Paddy Harte.
In private, Haughey’s response to the concerns of the Four Horsemen was quick and decisive. He telephoned me on December 14th and instructed the following points to be conveyed to them:
- He did not know the INC, had never met them and had nothing to do with them;
- The horsemen could lift the phone to him at anytime if they wished clarification on any point or have a general chat;
- The basis of his approach to the North was as set out in his speech to the Dáil the previous day;
- He hoped to continue the good working relationship with the British prime minister which Lynch had enjoyed;
- There was no possibility of a settlement in an exclusively UK context;
- Northern Ireland was a drain on UK finances;
- The festering situation in the North was a poisonous element in Anglo-Irish relations and possibly also in Anglo-US relations;
- The longer the situation was allowed to fester, the more poisonous an element it would become;
- As far as the Carter statement of 1977 was concerned, we should not press for any official US commitment to invest in Northern Ireland in advance of the creation there of acceptable political institutions;
- We should not do anything to discourage private US investment in Northern Ireland.
I conveyed the message and in a report to the department on December 18th noted that, while the horsemen appreciated the private assurances, they suggested that if there was any indication of the INC or Biaggi exploiting recent changes in Dublin to their disadvantage in local US terms, they might request public clarification.
The Irish media continued to seek clarification and on December 20th Haughey gave The Irish Times written answers to questions put by Joe Joyce. He said that “the government’s view on Northern policy would continue to be put forward in the US by their officially accredited representative in that country. Any claim by anyone else to speak for the government should not be taken seriously”.
At the same time Brian Lenihan issued a statement in which he “made it clear that he and the government had full confidence in the ambassador in Washington and his staff . . .” and added that “the government will continue to advocate that no support or encouragement should be given to any organisation in the US which sends to Ireland funds to be used in the promotion of a violent campaign in this country”.
No organisation was, however, named and this was noted at the time by the Four Horsemen.
Tomorrow: Haughey tries to remove Donlon from Washington but John Hume intervenes; Brian Lenihan subsequently denies any such move was planned