The Rambouillet conference on Kosovo ended inconclusively this week with a commitment to reconvene in March after Serbs and Kosovars have reported back on the draft agreement reached. It is an anti-climax following the repeated threats by the US Secretary of State, Ms Madelaine Albright, to launch air strikes against Serb targets if they refused to accept the agreement. In the event the Kosovars' refusal to sign it without reference back to their people prevented a settlement because it does not include a commitment to a referendum on independence in three years time.
This upset the plans of Western diplomats hosting the conference, who had expected to concentrate their pressure on Serbia as the main party resisting a settlement. They misjudged both the salience of the independence issue for the newly organised Kosovar guerrilla forces and the factionalism that has prevented them reaching a consensus. It is not the first time - and will certainly not be the last - that big powers have underestimated independence or secessionist movements. Kosovo is a classical case in point; if western initiatives had been taken earlier the crisis would not have become so intense or dangerous for the regional stability these powers rightly value.
Much will depend now on how the Kosovar delegation fares in explaining its position and arguing for it. A form of words is available to enable a conference to be called in three years time at which independence would be raised. A great deal has been achieved to allow an extensive scheme of home rule autonomy to be put in place, along with the presence of NATO-commanded troops to act as a buffer against Serb police and military repression. Clearly there are fears among leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army that they would lose an opportunity to consolidate their position; under the agreement they could be disarmed and marginalised by such a NATO force, despite the offer to incorporate KLA units in a new policing and internal security arrangement.
President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia refused to agree to a NATO force, but may be willing to accept it under a broader remit. If, that is, he resists the temptation to use the intervening weeks to try to provoke the KLA into an all-out and crippling confrontation which would alter the balance of forces when the conference reconvenes on March 15th. Another drumbeat of NATO warnings is building up against him on that score, but its credibility has been diminished by what happened at Rambouillet.