IF Sinn Fein wanted official recognition of its importance within the peace process, it could hardly have asked for a more explicit statement than that made by Fergus Finlay. He said: "All party talks without Sinn Fein would not be worth a penny candle.
That assessment by one of the Government's chief negotiators on the North generated immediate controversy. For it appeared to conflict with the official Government position that no party could have a veto on negotiations and that, no matter what happened, talks to secure a political settlement would go ahead on June 10th.
Coming immediately after Bertie Ahern's criticisms of the Government, in which he complained that insufficient efforts were being made to reassure, understand and encourage republicans at this difficult time in the peace process, Mr Finlay's statement was embarrassingly forthright.
It reflected a consistent strain in the policy of the last two governments. They turned the traditional British strategy of marginalising the men of violence on its head and, instead, championed an inclusive political approach designed to bring the representatives of all paramilitary organisations to the table with their negotiating positions intact.
Mr Spring's chief political adviser was telling Sinn Fein that its involvement in negotiations was a critical component in the Government's strategy. And, by inference, he was confirming that its concerns and political aspirations would be given full weight in the course of all party talks.
There was no question of the Government saying: Here are the talks, Now you are on your own.
The ground rules document for those talks, agreed by both governments, makes it clear that the arms decommissioning issue will not be allowed to stall negotiations on three stranded elements.
And the Framework Document provides a template for a political settlement. There are other options for confidence building mentioned by the Mitchell report, as the negotiators grapple with such issues as "parity of esteem" and North South links.
But there is a price. It involves a position common to both Governments, to the SDLP and to the unionist parties: the IRA will have to re establish its ceasefire before Sinn Fein can be admitted to negotiations. And the United States is particularly insistent that the violent, coercive element of the republicans' campaign must end.
THE republican movement is playing hardball on the issue. It is seeking to revive a strategy of advancing with "an Armalite in one band and a ballot box in the other".
The last time the IRA attempted that approach, in the early 1990s, Albert Reynolds told them the facts of democratic life. There could be no partial or conditional ceasefires, he said. No twin track approach. No democratic halfway house. It was all or nothing. An abandonment of violence in favour of political means.
The difficulties of Gerry Adams are apparent to most people. It is the IRA, rather than Sinn Fein, which ultimately dictates policy in the republican movement. The IRA decided, for tactical reasons, to break its word, and the 1994 ceasefire which was to have held "in all circumstances".
Mr Adams and Martin McGuinness resolved there should be no split between Sinn Fein and the IRA on the issue. Given that situation, it is difficult to decide what weight should be given to Sinn Fein statements.
Last Wednesday, as Mr Adams announced Sinn Fein's participation in Northern Ireland elections designed to lead directly to all party talks, Mr McGuinness was demanding "cast iron guarantees and assurances" from the two governments.
Specifically, he wanted sureties that the all party talks on June 10th would constitute "real and meaningful negotiations". Otherwise, he saw "no prospect whatsoever of a restoration of the IRA ceasefire".
There are hints here of the original IRA demand that Britain act as "persuader" in securing a settlement acceptable to nationalists. But both Mr Reynolds and John Major rejected the notion of coercing unionists.
And, in September 1994, Mr Adams himself joined with John Hume and Mr Reynolds in stating: "We cannot resolve this problem without the participation and agreement of the unionist people."
The IRA still has not got the message. And US officials are talking about a group of hard men trying to kill the peace process". Those same hard men showed how determined they are to extract concessions from all party negotiations when they attempted to blow up Hammersmith Bridge in London during the week.
At the same time, Mr Adams is talking about defending Sinn Fein's mandate in the elections and his automatic right to attend all party talks. It's all rights, no responsibilities. For the Sinn Fein president knows perfectly well chat unionists will not attend any negotiations involving Sinn Fein in the absence of an IRA ceasefire.
REPUBLICAN sources have begun to mutter in recent days that the organisation may well opt out of the present arrangements because of the unsupportive attitude of the Irish Government and the weakness of the British one.
In 18 months, the argument runs, there may be new and more responsive a governments on both sides of the Irish Sea. But political tides wait for no party. Eighteen months could see less favourable developments in the US. And there may be a slide back towards civil war in the North.
Republicans have been demanding all party talks for years. They are now on offer, without preconditions. It would be a tragedy if Sinn Fein, arising from fear of a split in the republican movement, failed to grasp this opportunity.
As Mr Finlay said talks without Sinn Fein would not be worth a penny candle. The same value could be placed on talks without unionists. Compromises and concessions are required from both sides. {CORRECTION} 96042500063